Concept
Impracticability of a Condition
Excuse of conditions
Impracticability of a Condition
Impracticability can excuse a condition that failed to occur, but only on terms borrowed from the forfeiture doctrine. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 271 excuses the non-occurrence of an express condition when the condition’s occurrence is not a material part of the agreed exchange and forfeiture would otherwise result. The two requirements match those of the forfeiture excuse discussed above, with one difference: the Restatement (Second) does not require the forfeiture to be extreme.1
The doctrine’s ordinary work is different. When an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract makes a party’s performance impracticable without that party’s fault, the party’s duty to perform is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.2 That rule frees a promisor from a burden. Aimed at a condition, it turns a shield into a sword: the claimant seeks payment, or the other side’s performance, although the event on which the other side’s duty depended never occurred. Granting the request would give the claimant the bargained-for return without the performance the bargain required. The law allows that result only when the missing event is peripheral to the exchange and enforcement would strip the claimant of value it has already earned, which is what the materiality and forfeiture requirements test.
A music-hall hypothetical marks the boundary. A hall burns down before the event it was licensed for, and the fire may discharge the owner’s own duty to supply it. Suppose the owner then sues the users for the rental and argues that the failure of its own performance is excused by impracticability. The hall’s availability is a constructive condition of the users’ duty to pay and a material part of the agreed exchange, because the hall is what they bargained for. The owner has also performed nothing that enforcement would forfeit. Both requirements fail, so the condition is not excused.3 The same reasoning bars the excuse for every constructive condition of performance, since each is a material part of the agreed exchange.4
The excuse does apply when the missing event is peripheral and the claimant has already performed. Suppose a contractor finishes a house under a contract that conditions final payment on the certificate of a named architect, and the architect dies before issuing it. The certificate is an express condition, but it only supplies proof that the work conforms; the owner is paying for the house. Conditions that merely provide for notice or the supplying of proofs are standard examples of immaterial conditions.5 Refusing payment would take the contractor’s finished work for nothing, so a court applying § 271 would likely excuse the certificate and hold the owner to its promise to pay.
Insurance cases draw the same line. When an insured misses a notice or proof-of-loss deadline because of impracticability, some courts have excused the condition and others have disagreed. A missed premium is different. The premium is a material part of the agreed exchange, so the condition is not excused, although some authority holds otherwise.6
The case law shows how hard the excuse is to win. In enXco Development Corp. v. Northern States Power Co., enXco did not obtain a permit by a date certain, so a condition precedent to its contract failed. Northern States Power (NSP) terminated, and enXco lost several million dollars.7 enXco answered that several delays in holding a proper public hearing had made compliance temporarily impracticable.8 The court assumed, without deciding, that Minnesota courts would let a party use temporary impracticability as a sword against a condition precedent. It then held that the doctrine did not apply on these facts.9
The court first looked at enXco’s own timeline. enXco waited about two years before applying for the permit. It could have applied as early as January 2009 but applied in October 2010, less than six months before the contract’s Long-Stop Date, although North Dakota law expressly authorized the state commission to take up to six months to consider an application.10 Those dates fit poorly with the requirement that impracticability arise “without his fault.” A party that leaves itself no margin has trouble blaming an outside event for the shortfall.
The contract also settled who bore the risk. The parties specifically contemplated what would happen if the permit was not obtained by the Long-Stop Date: NSP could terminate, and the language on conditions precedent and the termination clause said so. They foresaw regulatory and weather delays and accounted for them. They could not have foreseen the particular circumstances behind the failure, but they plainly anticipated that the permit might not arrive in time.11 The Restatement formula yields to such an allocation, because it discharges a duty only “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”12 The court added that temporary impracticability does not apply when the government fails to issue a permit in a timely manner, especially where the parties recognized that possibility.13
A claimant must therefore show more than a failed condition. It must show that an event, not its own delay, defeated the condition, and that the contract left the risk of that event unassigned. Only then do the two § 271 requirements, immateriality and forfeiture, come into play.
Impracticability is also the residual ground, not the first one to try. If the other party’s breach by non-performance contributed materially to the non-occurrence of a condition of its duty, § 245 excuses the non-occurrence.14 Section 255 does the same when the other party’s repudiation contributed materially.15 By their terms, neither rule asks whether the condition was material or whether forfeiture would follow. Impracticability is for the case in which an outside event, and not the other party’s conduct, stands behind the failure.