Concept
Events That Terminate Duties
Conditions (express and constructive)
Events That Terminate Duties
Every condition studied so far works as a gate. The duty stays dormant until an event occurs, and once the event can no longer occur, the duty is discharged unless the nonoccurrence is excused.1 This unit reverses the sequence. The duty already exists, and may already be due, and the contract names an event that will end it.
Section 230 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts enforces such a clause as written and then withholds discharge in three situations. The obligor may have brought the event about in breach of good faith; the event may have been impracticable to prevent, with the duty's survival costing the obligor little; or the obligor may have promised beforehand to perform even if the event occurred.2 The rule and each exception take a subsection below, in the order you should apply them.
Termination by Event
Section 230(1) states the rule. If the contract provides that an event will terminate an obligor's duty of immediate performance, or the obligor's duty to pay damages for breach, the duty is discharged when the event occurs, subject to the limits in § 230(2) and (3).3 The obligor is the party who owes the duty. Both duties the rule names exist before the event does: a duty of immediate performance is already due, and a duty to pay damages follows a breach already committed. The event ends something that is running. A condition, by contrast, is an event that must occur before performance becomes due, so a terminating event falls outside the Restatement's definition of the word.4
A fire policy contains one event of each kind. Nothing is owed until the house burns, and as soon as it does the insurer has a duty to pay. If the policy gives the insured one year to sue, the failure to sue within that year occurs after the duty arose and discharges it.5 A sales contract requiring suit for breach of warranty within one year of delivery works the same way, because the buyer who files nothing in that time loses the right to sue.6
An escape clause is the other familiar form. In Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., a drug-store tenant held a long-term lease in a shopping center that let it terminate on 90 days' notice if the anchor supermarket ever ceased operations. The supermarket operated for almost twenty years and then closed during bankruptcy proceedings, and the tenant was allowed to terminate.7 The lease had been running for two decades, so the closing ended duties that were already live.
The Restatement files events of this kind under § 230 as plain events, although the tradition called them conditions subsequent.8 Its authors believed that the difference in meaning is one of substance and not merely of the form in which the provision is stated, yet courts that endorse the Restatement still often use the traditional precedent and subsequent labels, so you must read the old vocabulary and translate it.9 The care about vocabulary is deliberate. The Restatement uses condition only for an event that qualifies a duty, and it refuses the word to a contract term or to standard conditions of sale.10
The traditional label turns on how the clause is worded. Suppose a land contract makes the buyer's obligation to purchase depend on a pending rezoning application. If the obligation is suspended until the application is granted within 60 days, the condition is precedent. If the clause instead says the obligation will be discharged if the application is not granted within 60 days, that subtle change in wording makes the condition subsequent.11 When rezoning fails, the buyer is free of the contract under either wording. What changes is who must prove what.
Fulfillment of a condition precedent is an element of the plaintiff's case and must be proved by the party seeking to enforce the contract. Occurrence of a condition subsequent is a defense to nonperformance and must be proved by the party whose duty has allegedly been discharged. If the grant is a condition precedent, the seller must prove the rezoning, and if the failure of the application is a condition subsequent, the buyer must prove the refusal.12 The allocation matters only when proof is hard, and it changes little in most cases, where nonfulfillment is easily shown or conceded.13
A shipping contract shows what the allocation can do. A buyer agrees to purchase cotton aboard the Lady Adams. If the buyer's duty depends on the ship's arrival by a stated date, the seller must prove timely arrival. If the buyer's duty instead ends when the ship arrives after that date, the buyer must prove late arrival. When the arrival time cannot be proved either way, the buyer wins under the first provision and the seller wins under the second.14
The parties' wording sets the label. A mother who promises her son financial support and states that dropping out of law school will terminate her duty has chosen termination language, and many courts treat the dropout as a condition subsequent. The son who sues need not prove that he stayed in school, and the mother must plead and prove that he left. The rule on pleading and proof is not uniformly followed, however.15
Classify a clause by what it does to the duty. If it holds the duty off until an event occurs, the event is a condition precedent. If it provides that the duty is discharged when the event occurs, the event terminates a duty already in force. The exceptions in § 230(2) and (3) belong to the second kind, and the next three subsections take them up.
Bad-Faith Events
Section 230(1) asks only whether the event happened, and § 230(2)(a) asks why. The obligor's duty is not discharged if occurrence of the event is the result of a breach by the obligor of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.17 An obligor who engineers the event cannot collect the discharge, and the duty stays in force as though the event had not occurred.
The exception follows from what a terminating clause does. The clause allocates the risk that some contingency will end the duty, and the obligee accepts that risk when it prices the deal. An event the obligor manufactured is not a risk that has materialized. It is a switch the obligee never agreed to hand over, and enforcing the discharge would let the obligor profit from its own wrong.
Return to the Jenkins lease. The anchor supermarket closed in bankruptcy after almost twenty years, and nothing suggests that the tenant had a hand in it. That was the outside contingency the clause was written to cover, so § 230(1) applied and the tenant's exit right worked as written.18
The two leases read the same and the closings look the same. The difference lies in where each closing came from: a bankruptcy the tenant did nothing to cause in one, and a payment the tenant made to cause it in the other. The exception has two working parts, because it reaches an event that is the result of a breach. The obligor must have breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the event must have followed from that breach. An obligor that merely welcomes or profits from an event has breached nothing. A tenant who is pleased to see the anchor fail, but did nothing to bring the failure about, keeps its exit right. A contrary rule would make nearly every terminating event suspect, since obligors bargain for exit clauses precisely because they benefit when the event occurs.
The same principle protects the obligee when the gate is a condition precedent. Take the rezoning contract, where the buyer's duty depends on the grant of an application. The condition may be excused if its nonoccurrence resulted from wrongful action by the buyer to influence the authority's decision, such as persuading a neighboring landowner to file an objection or lobbying board members to vote against the application.19 The prevention doctrine, taught below with excusing conditions, is the mirror image of § 230(2)(a). One rule bars an obligor from profiting from an event it wrongfully caused, and the other bars it from profiting from an event it wrongfully stopped.
Students often stop at § 230(1) once the contractual event has occurred and treat discharge as automatic. Ask first whether the event occurred independently of the obligor, because only an event that did falls under the general rule.
Impracticable Prevention
Section 230(2)(b) withholds discharge in a second case. The obligor's duty is not discharged if the event could not have been prevented because of impracticability and continuance of the duty does not subject the obligor to a materially increased burden.21 The first exception looked at the obligor's conduct. This one asks whether the event could realistically have been stopped and what survival of the duty would cost the obligor. A typical setting is a deadline that someone must meet, such as the one-year suit period in a fire policy. Both parts must be met, and if either fails, the general rule of § 230(1) discharges the duty.22
The first part keeps the exception from excusing every missed deadline. A clause that ends a duty unless something is done in time gives the party with something to lose a fair chance to guard against the loss, and when an ordinary act would have prevented the event, discharge simply enforces the clause. The second part protects the obligor, who bargained for a duty that would end on the event. Overriding the discharge takes that bargain away, and it is justified only if it leaves the obligor close to where it contracted to be. Materially means that a modest inconvenience does not defeat the exception, and increased measures the burden against the one the obligor accepted at the outset.
A missed suit deadline shows how the first part sorts cases, since one clause can produce opposite results depending on why the date passed.
The second part then sorts the cases that clear the first, because an event that could not have been prevented still discharges the duty when survival would cost the obligor too much.
Condition law meets the same problem in insurance cases. Some courts have excused an insured who, because of impracticability, failed to furnish proofs of loss or give notice within the time stated, but others have disagreed, and the situation is different if the insured fails to pay a premium within a stipulated time.23 That split is a warning not to treat the showing as easy. Courts are wary of excuse doctrines generally. The doctrine of unfair forfeiture, taught below, is applied only rarely because its overuse would eliminate the rule of strict compliance.24
Students often treat any hardship in meeting a termination clause as enough to keep the duty alive. A deadline missed through neglect or ordinary inconvenience leaves the general rule in force. A second error is to stop after the first part, since an unpreventable event still discharges the duty when survival would materially increase the obligor's burden.
Promise to Perform Anyway
Section 230(3) supplies the last exception. The obligor's duty is not discharged if, before the event occurs, the obligor promises to perform the duty even if the event occurs and does not revoke the promise before the obligee materially changes position in reliance on it.26 The first two exceptions looked at how the event came about. This one looks at what the obligor said beforehand: an obligor who would be released by the event has told the obligee in advance that it will not claim the release, and it is held to that assurance once the obligee has acted on it.
The exception has three parts. The first is a promise, a commitment to perform, so a tenant who remarks that the shopping center is a pleasant place to do business has committed to nothing about what it will do if the anchor leaves. The second is the content and timing of the promise: it must promise to perform even if the event occurs, because only that language speaks to the contingency the clause covers, and it must be made before the event occurs. The third is the point of no return. The promise stays revocable until the obligee materially changes position in reliance on it.
Tying the obligor's power to retract to the obligee's reliance follows from what a terminating clause does. The clause allocates the risk that the event will happen, and the obligee priced the deal on that basis. An assurance changes the obligee's planning, because a party told that the release will not be claimed can commit money and opportunities it would hold back if the duty might vanish. If the obligor could withdraw the assurance after those commitments were made, the clause would become a trap in which the obligee pays for acting on the assurance and the obligor keeps its exit. Before any reliance no one has been harmed, so the obligor remains free to retract. The subsection turns on reliance and does not ask whether the obligor was paid for the assurance.
The Restatement's rule for waived conditions has the same shape. A party that, without consideration, waives a condition within the other party's control before the time for its occurrence can retract the waiver and reinstate the requirement, unless the other party has relied to such an extent that retraction would be unjust.27 For conditions, a promise to perform despite the condition's nonoccurrence is binding whether made before or after the time for the condition to occur, unless, among other exceptions, occurrence of the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange and the promisee was under no duty that it occur.28 The later section on waiver, estoppel, and election develops those rules, including the harsher treatment of a waiver made after the time for the condition has passed. Section 230(3) covers only an assurance given before the terminating event.
Applying the exception comes down to a timeline. A stem that gives a terminating event and an earlier assurance is asking which came first, the obligor's withdrawal of the assurance or the obligee's change of position.
The two leases share a clause, an assurance, and an anchor closing. They differ in what the landlord had done by the time the assurance was withdrawn, and § 230(3) turns on that fact. Materially ties the exception to a real change of position, such as a signed construction contract, money spent, or an alternative forgone. A trivial step or an unexecuted plan leaves the promise revocable. The change must also have been made in reliance on the promise, so a landlord that renovated for reasons unrelated to the tenant's assurance cannot invoke the exception.