Concept
Interpreting Express Conditions
Conditions (express and constructive)
Interpreting Express Conditions
Deciding that the parties made an event a condition is only the first step. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 226, an event becomes a condition by the parties’ agreement or by a term the court supplies, and whether the parties agreed to one is a question of interpretation.1 Once a court has found a condition, § 225(1) states what it does: performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.2 Four questions then remain. How exactly must the condition be met? Is the clause a condition at all? How is a condition of satisfaction measured? Which party does a condition protect?
Express conditions let a party hold back performance until events turn out the way it hoped. A buyer’s duty to close may wait on a financing commitment, a clean inspection, or a timely notice, and the other side bears the cost of that protection. The case of enXco shows how heavy the cost can be. enXco sued NSP for breach and lost on summary judgment. On appeal it argued that temporary impracticability and disproportionate forfeiture prevented strict enforcement of the condition precedent, and the court affirmed.3 The excuse doctrines come later in this chapter, but the case already shows how much a single clause can decide.
Two pulls shape the rules that follow. The parties wrote the condition to allocate a risk, which argues for enforcing it as written, because a condition that bent whenever it proved inconvenient would allocate nothing. A failed condition can also cost the other side the whole return performance, which argues for care in finding conditions at all. The first pull governs strict compliance. The second governs the cases that ask whether a clause is a condition or only a promise.
Strict Compliance
An express condition must be fulfilled exactly as the contract states it. The Restatement endorses strict enforcement of express conditions, and Comment d to § 237 rejects a substantial-performance qualification to that rule.4 When the parties have taken the trouble to create an express condition in clear language, the court enforces it strictly, and unless the condition is exactly satisfied the conditional duty does not become due.5 The party who withholds performance has then not breached, because its duty never ripened. For express conditions, “close” is not enough. A buyer whose duty to take and pay for a horse depends on a veterinarian’s finding owes nothing if the veterinarian finds even the slightest disease, and a time-is-of-the-essence clause, a common express condition, is enforced the same way.6
The rule rests on intent. Parties who clearly make performance subject to a stated event have chosen that event, and the court honors the choice by upholding the beneficiary’s right to demand nothing less than exact fulfillment. It does not matter that the condition seems technical, or that it was substantially satisfied and the shortfall is trivial. A court that treated the condition as met would be second-guessing the parties.7
Predictability supports the rule as well, and Luttinger v. Rosen shows why. The buyers’ duty to purchase a house depended on financing within a stated interest-rate limit. The rate actually available exceeded the limit, and the seller wanted to make up the difference through a funding arrangement of his own. The Supreme Court regarded every such alternative as “irrelevant.”8 The contract named the event as financing within the rate limit, and a seller’s promise to absorb the excess cost is a different event. No generosity on the seller’s side turns the missing event into the named one. Had the Court allowed the clause to be “interpreted” so that a seller could overcome the interest-rate condition by some funding arrangement, parties to every home sale with a financing clause would have to negotiate and draft further. The seller would want to absorb the extra interest by means of his own choosing, and the buyer would reject that or insist on limiting the acceptable alternatives. All this would add time and expense to what should be a very simple transaction, and it might even be a deal-breaker.9
A Restatement illustration reaches the same place. A contract to sell a house recites financing by a “$30,000 mortgage from X Bank” and makes the buyer’s duty conditional on his ability to arrange that financing. X Bank refuses, and the seller offers to take a purchase money mortgage on the stated terms. Although circumstances may show a contrary intention, the language is ordinarily read so that the condition occurs only if the buyer gets the mortgage from X Bank. The buyer’s refusal to perform is therefore not a breach.10
The time and manner of an event are part of the condition, and they get the same literal reading. In Maxton Builders v. Lo Galbo the buyers could cancel a real estate contract “upon written notice to the seller within three days” if the real estate taxes exceeded $3,500. They learned the next day that the taxes did, and their attorney telephoned the seller’s counsel to cancel. A certified letter was mailed on the second day but not received until the sixth. The court called it “settled law” that a written notice required by a contract is ineffective unless actually received within the stated time.11 Seller’s counsel had learned of the cancellation by telephone, yet the contract named a writing received on time, and a phone call is a different event. A standard illustration isolates timing alone. Sprawling Malls had to deliver notice to Sue by August 1 to take the land, and it mailed the notice before that date. The contract specified delivery, meaning receipt, and delivery occurred a day late. A day’s delay may be a small deviation, but the strict compliance rule takes no account of it, because once the parties have taken the trouble to articulate and define the condition, the court should not tamper with their expressed intention.12
Two safety valves soften this result, and each is narrow. A court may excuse the condition, but only if the facts fit one of the narrow recognized grounds for excuse. It may also read the condition so that it was in fact satisfied, but only if the language admits that meaning.13 A plainly stated date, as in the lien hypothetical, leaves nothing to interpret.
The strictness belongs to express conditions. Take a building contract in which the owner pays a deposit and the builder then starts work. If the contract clearly makes the deposit a condition of the builder’s duty to begin, a short or late deposit leaves that duty undue however slight the lapse. If the contract says no such thing, and the dependency is read into the sequence of performances, the court has more flexibility. It may ask whether the owner, despite the shortfall or delay, substantially complied with the payment condition.14 The difference tracks the evidence of intent. The parties who wrote an express condition showed that they wanted it taken literally, while a court that supplied the condition has no such statement to honor. A late or short payment may still breach the owner’s separate promise to pay, a possibility the earlier discussion of promissory conditions develops.
The usual exam error is to import substantial performance into an express condition because the shortfall looks small. The size of a shortfall decides the question for a promise or a construed condition. For an express condition, the only question is whether the event occurred as the contract stated it. That severity also explains why courts demand clear language before finding an express condition, the subject of the next subsection.
Condition or Promise
When a clause could be read as a condition or as something weaker, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 227(1) prefers the reading that reduces the obligee’s risk of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee’s control or the circumstances indicate that the obligee assumed the risk.16 The obligee is the party who needs the event to occur in order to collect the other side’s performance, and the obligor is the party whose duty would wait for it. Where it is doubtful whether words create a promise or an express condition, they are interpreted as creating a promise.17 Courts generally require an express condition to be stated clearly, and in case of doubt they read the clause only as a promise by the other party that the event will occur.18
The preference follows from the severity of strict compliance. A court that calls a clause a condition commits itself to literal enforcement and to whatever forfeiture follows, so it asks first whether the words carry that meaning. No particular form of language is necessary to make an event a condition, though “on condition that,” “provided that,” and “if” are often used, and the general nature of an agreement can show the intent as well as specific words.19 The parties’ purpose carries great weight, and between reasonable meanings the one that operates against the draftsman is generally preferred.20 A Restatement illustration shows the tilt. A safe-burglary policy required visible marks of forced entry on the exterior of all the safe’s doors, and a burglar picked the outer lock without leaving marks. If the requirement is merely evidentiary, the condition occurs when the evidence of force and violence is adequate to prevent fraudulent claims, and because the insurer drafted the policy, the meaning favorable to the insured is preferred.21
Howard v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. shows the preference at work. Tobacco farmers insured against crop loss claimed that heavy rains had damaged their crop, with losses above $35,000, and they filed timely notice and proof of loss. Before the insurer’s adjuster inspected, they plowed or disked the fields under to sow a cover crop. The adjuster found the stalks largely obscured or obliterated and denied the claims, relying on a policy provision that the stalks on any acreage with a claimed loss “shall not be destroyed” until the insurer inspects.22 On summary judgment the district court held that the provision was a condition precedent that forfeited the coverage. On appeal the court compared the clause with two Restatement illustrations and held that this was error, because the provision did not state any conditions under which the insurance would “not be payable” or use words of like import.23 The labels condition precedent and condition subsequent matter largely for who must plead and prove, but Howard shows that the choice can have substantive consequences too. Here it decided whether rain-damaged farmers kept their coverage at all.24
A clause that only fixes when a duty falls due creates no condition. A promise to pay $10 next Tuesday is unconditional, because Tuesday is certain to come, and the passage of time is not a condition.25 Chirichella v. Erwin applies that principle to a clause that only marks time. The Chirichellas contracted to sell their house to the Erwins, under a settlement provision that referred to their new home. Mr. Erwin asked Mr. Chirichella to settle, but he refused because the new home was not ready. The Chirichellas did not appear at the June 15 settlement or at the one rescheduled for August 9, and the Erwins sued. The chancellor thought the Chirichellas’ complaints about the new home were justified, yet he still concluded that the settlement provision was not a condition precedent to performance. It was merely a requirement about when settlement was to take place.26 The clause’s purpose, not its vocabulary, decided the case.
The preference has two limits, and each follows from the logic of forfeiture. The anti-forfeiture preference fades when the event is within the obligee’s control, because the obligee can avoid any forfeiture by bringing the event about. Section 227(2) adds that, outside contracts in which only one party generally undertakes duties, when it is doubtful whether the obligee is bound to bring about an event, whether the event is a condition, or whether it is both, the first reading, a duty on the obligee, is preferred if the event is within the obligee’s control.27 The second limit applies when the circumstances show that the obligee assumed the risk. In Gibson v. Cranage, taken up below, the photographer took a deliberate risk in giving the customer a right to reject the work at will, and the court found “no hardship whatever” in holding him to it.28 Because both limits can displace it, the preference operates as a default.
A subcontractor paid after the owner pays the general contractor presents the preference in commercial form. Does the owner’s default excuse the general contractor from paying? Courts interpreting such provisions are skeptical that they create conditions. Unless the language, read in light of any available context, makes it very clear that the owner’s payment was a condition precedent, the assumption is that the term only fixes a time for payment, so the general contractor must pay within a reasonable time even though the owner has not paid it.29 The majority of courts read language of this kind as calling for payment within a reasonable time and not as also conditioning the subcontractor’s right to payment on the owner’s.30 Peacock Construction Co. v. Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. is the standard example, and the reason for the rule is a question of who carries the owner’s credit risk. A subcontractor who deals only with the general contractor is not readily taken to have accepted it, which is why the contrary intent must be very clear.
Clear words change the result because they show that the parties actually allocated the risk. A pay-when-paid clause says when payment falls due, while a pay-if-paid clause says whether it falls due at all. Superior Steel, Inc. v. Ascent at Roebling’s Bridge, Inc. enforced an explicit pay-if-paid clause as an express condition precedent. The same pattern holds outside construction. An express condition must be stated in unambiguous language because it demands literal performance, and none will be found where another reasonable reading exists.31 In Solar Applications Engineering, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp. the court relied heavily on the preference for a promise to hold that a lien-release affidavit required before final payment was only a promise. Whether a term is an express condition depends on the parties’ intent, and the contractor could deliver a lien-free property by other means and still be entitled to final payment.32
The preference gives a careful drafter a plain instruction: say that the event is a condition and say what follows if it fails. A lease clause such as “Tenant must give notice of intent to vacate at least one month in advance. This is an express condition and failure to give this notice results in forfeiture of the security deposit” uses the conventional term and also states its meaning and legal consequence.33 Spelling out the consequence matters because a determined court can often find some way to excuse a failed condition. The drafter can guard against that by writing the consequences of failure into the condition itself, by adding boilerplate that the terms are to be strictly construed, by stating the reason for the condition, and by stating that it was a fundamental inducement to enter the transaction.34
The usual exam error is to treat one conditional-sounding word as conclusive. “If” and “provided that” are often used to make conditions, but the clause is read as a whole against its purpose. The settlement clause in Chirichella and a pay-when-paid clause both sound conditional and both only mark time. The preference for a promise is itself a default, and it gives way to clear words, to an event within the obligee’s control, and to circumstances showing that the obligee took the risk.
Conditions of Satisfaction
Gibson v. Cranage anchors this subject. A photographer had given a customer the right to reject the photograph at will, and the customer rejected it. The photographer had spent time and money on the project, yet the court held that, because he took a deliberate risk in granting that right, “there is no hardship whatever” in holding him to it.36 A satisfaction clause is therefore an express condition of the kind discussed earlier in this chapter, with one unusual feature: the event that must occur is a person’s contentment. Because express conditions are enforced as written, the live questions are whose satisfaction the contract requires and how that satisfaction is measured.
A party writes a satisfaction clause when it does not wish to take the risk of performing until it is sure that circumstances are as desired or that the other side has properly done what the contract requires.37 The condition may look at the other side’s work, as when a customer’s duty to pay for a commissioned portrait depends on the customer’s being satisfied with it. It may instead look at a state of affairs outside the contract. A buyer unsure whether an old building can be turned into profitable shops can make its promise to buy conditional on its own determination, after a feasibility study, that renovation will pay. That condition manages the risk of an economic environment on which the buyer has inadequate information, and the adequacy of the seller’s performance is beside the point.38 The contract may also tie the condition to the satisfaction of a party’s agent rather than the party itself.39
The word satisfaction does not settle the standard; the subject matter does. Where the contract involves aesthetics, taste, or fancy, a subjective test applies and the promisor’s own satisfaction controls. Where it involves commercial quality, operative fitness, or mechanical utility, an objective test applies and the question is whether a reasonable person would be satisfied.40 Each test has a practical reason. A portrait’s merit has no outside measure, so the promisor’s own reaction is the only workable one. Whether equipment performs to specification can be checked against a standard, and applying one keeps the promisor from escaping the bargain on a whim. A court uses the subjective track when the wording or the nature of the performance shows that the parties meant individual taste to govern, and otherwise it prefers the objective track, particularly for commercial or technical work.41
A tenant who must paint the premises to the lessor’s satisfaction presents the objective track. Nothing in the wording or in the nature of painting shows that individual taste was meant to govern, so the lessor’s satisfaction is judged by objective reasonableness.42 What separates that clause from the portrait clause is the subject. The portrait invites a purely personal reaction, while the paint job invites comparison against a standard anyone can apply.
Both tracks rest on a floor of good faith. A condition of satisfaction is subject to a promise, implied in law if not expressed, that the person judging will act reasonably or in good faith.43 On the objective track the judge must act reasonably, and on the taste track the standard is subjective good faith. The honesty requirement does not ask whether a reasonable person would share the promisor’s reaction, which would collapse the two tracks into one. It asks whether the promisor was really dissatisfied.
A customer who inspects the work and honestly dislikes it stands in the position of the customer in Gibson. One who invents dissatisfaction to avoid payment has not satisfied the condition at all. The later section on prevention and hindrance covers the party whose own conduct keeps a condition from occurring.
Conditions Protecting One Party
A house sale in a Restatement illustration shows how a court decides whose duty a condition qualifies. The contract is “conditional on approval by X Bank of B’s pending mortgage application.” The Restatement concludes that approval is a condition of the buyer’s duty but not of the seller’s, because the clause is read in light of the parties’ purpose, and their purpose in including it was to protect the buyer if the application is refused.45 The word “conditional” tells a court that something must happen first, but it does not say whose duty waits for it. That answer comes from asking whom the clause was written to shelter. A condition included for one party’s benefit qualifies that party’s duty, and the other party cannot invoke its failure.
The rule follows from what a condition does. It is the product of a bargain in which one side asked to be spared a particular risk. Here the risk is that the buyer cannot borrow the money and would be committed to a house he cannot pay for. Suppose the seller could also treat the refusal as a release. A seller whose interest had cooled, perhaps because a higher bid arrived, would hold an exit the buyer never granted, and the buyer who still wanted the house would lose it through a clause meant to protect him. Reading the condition by its purpose prevents that result.
The illustration states the consequence in both directions. If X Bank refuses, the buyer’s performance does not become due even if the seller makes a conditional offer to deliver a deed. The seller’s performance does become due if, in spite of the refusal, the buyer makes a conditional offer to pay the $50,000.46 A conditional offer is an offer to perform if the other side performs too, a mechanism the later section on tender develops. The asymmetry is the whole rule. The failed condition gives the buyer a choice and gives the seller no way out. The X Bank financing illustration from the strict compliance subsection shows that purpose also decides which event counts. A buyer whose duty depends on his ability to arrange a mortgage from a named bank is ordinarily not obliged to accept the seller’s substitute mortgage, unless circumstances show a contrary intention.47
The homeowner’s choice reflects a corollary. The party a condition protects can usually give up that protection and insist on performance, because the protection is hers to give up. The buyer in the bank illustration does the same when he offers to pay despite the refusal. How a waiver is made, and when it can no longer be withdrawn, is taught in the later section on waiver, estoppel, and election.
The corollary has a limit, which appears when a condition shelters both sides. In a standard illustration, Byron’s duty to buy Stella’s house depends on his selling his existing home, and Stella has agreed to finance the balance of the price. Byron could have abandoned the condition had it been solely for his benefit. But the condition was not necessarily intended for his protection alone. It also ensures that upon buying Stella’s house, Byron will have discharged the mortgage debt on his prior home. If he kept the old house and borrowed for the down payment, his heavier debt load could raise the risk that he defaults on his payments to Stella. Her mortgage secures the debt, but foreclosure is inconvenient and costly, and the proceeds might not cover the balance, so Stella has a stake in the event and Byron cannot waive the condition unilaterally.48 In the bank illustration nothing gives the seller a continuing stake in how the buyer funds his purchase, while Stella becomes Byron’s creditor. That difference in who else needs the event to occur separates a condition the beneficiary may waive from one he may not. The usual exam error is to treat any financing or sale contingency as freeing both parties, or as waivable by the party whose duty it qualifies, without asking who else the clause protects.