Concept
Indefinite Duration and Termination
Omitted time for performance
Indefinite Duration and Termination
A contract for a single sale ends when the seller delivers and the buyer pays. A contract for steady supply ends in no such way, and when it says nothing about how long it lasts or how either party may leave, subsections (2) and (3) of § 2-309 fill the silence.1 Subsection (1), the rule this chapter has relied on so far, supplies a reasonable time for shipment, delivery, or any other action that Article 2 and the parties leave open.2
A reasonable time works well for a performance that finishes the contract once rendered. A standing arrangement has no such finish: each delivery completes one installment, and the contract goes on. Two questions therefore need separate answers for these arrangements, how long the relationship lasts and how a party leaves it, and the Code answers each with a gap filler. A gap filler is a term the law implies when the parties plainly meant to contract but failed to address the question; courts and legislatures draw such terms from common expectations, commercial practice, and public policy.3
Successive Performances
Section 2-309(2) provides: “Where the contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by either party.”4 The sentence fills two gaps. A contract with no stated end date does not fail for that reason; it is valid for a reasonable time. And either party may end it at any time, a result commonly paraphrased as “termination at will” and subject always to the notice provisions of § 2-309(3).5
The first two questions bring the duration filler into play. The termination filler requires both and adds a third condition: the agreement must not provide otherwise about when the contract may be terminated.6 The first question does the sorting, because it decides whether the subsection applies at all.
A distributorship is the typical case. An agreement under which one party sells the other’s products for an indefinite period will ordinarily fall under § 2-309(2). In one dispute a distributor agreed to market a manufacturer’s pianos and to keep buying pianos from the manufacturer as retail sales warranted. The court treated each order as a separate, successive performance, held that § 2-309(2) governed, and held the agreement terminable at will.7 A supplier that furnishes materials to a contractor on an ongoing basis for one or more construction projects is another example.8
In Panhandle Agri-Service, Inc. v. Becker, a farmer agreed to sell 10,000 tons of hay and, after a bad harvest, could not deliver the entire amount. The parties then agreed that the balance would come from the following year’s crop. The court held that § 2-309(2) did not govern: the contract called for a single performance, delivery of 10,000 tons, and an agreement to take delivery over a period of time does not make the performances successive. The contract was therefore not terminable at will.9 The hay contract fixed one total delivery; the piano contract fixed nothing beyond the orders placed as sales warranted. A deal that stretches over months thus calls for one question before any citation: does it set up one total performance, which sends the timing of each act to § 2-309(1), or a standing relationship of repeated orders, which sends the duration to § 2-309(2)?10
The second condition, indefinite duration, does not require a contract that announces its own openness. The official comment explains that indefiniteness may be found in a term implied from the contractual circumstances, usage of trade, or course of dealing or performance, as well as in an express term.11 A written supply agreement with no end date is the obvious case, but a court may also look to how the parties have behaved and how their trade works. A contract with a stated term, such as a three-year supply arrangement, is not indefinite in duration, so the subsection has nothing to fill.
The two paint contracts show why the third condition belongs to the termination filler alone: an agreement about how to end the contract displaces the at-will exit and leaves the duration filler in place.12
Outside Article 2, courts that face an agreement silent as to duration most often decide that a reasonable time was intended, although they divide over franchise agreements.13 Section 2-309(2) reaches the same reasonable-time result for a goods contract that meets its conditions and adds the power to terminate, subject to notice.14
Notice of Termination
The power to end an indefinite contract at will carries a condition. Section 2-309(3) provides: “Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.”18 That sentence holds three ideas: a requirement of reasonable notification, an exception for termination on an agreed event, and a limit on clauses that waive notification. The at-will rule of subsection (2) operates subject to all three.19
The requirement rests on good faith and sound commercial practice, which, in the official comment’s words, normally call for notification of the termination of a going contract relationship that gives the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement.20 The Code defines good faith in § 1-201(b)(20) and addresses it in § 1-304.21 The power to terminate survives, and notification gives the other side time to plan its exit.
The statute requires that the notification be received, so a notice that never reaches the other party gives no warning at all. Receipt does not end the inquiry. Reasonable notification “does not relate to the method of giving notice, but to the circumstances under which the notice is given and the extent of advanced warning of termination that the notification gives.”22 The comment’s own measure is the time the other party needs to seek a substitute arrangement, so the size of its stock, its investment in the relationship, and the availability of other sources all bear on how much warning is enough. Decisions in some states go further and imply that a dealership contract terminable on notice must continue long enough for the dealer to recoup its investment, and Minnesota law implies a reasonable duration where a dealer has made substantial investments in reliance on the agreement.23
A stem in which a manufacturer hands a dealer a termination letter tempts the answer that notice was given and the analysis is over. Receipt answers only whether the notification arrived; the next question is how much lead time it gave.
The statute excepts termination on the happening of an agreed event.24 The logic follows from the purpose of notification. Notice exists to warn the other party, and when the parties themselves named the event that ends the contract, the event is the warning. The other party built its inventory and commitments knowing the arrangement would end when that event occurred, so a further notification would tell it nothing new.
The third idea shows how the Code balances freedom of contract against harsh results. The parties may bargain over notification, but an agreement dispensing with it is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.26 Unconscionability is the subject of § 2-302.27 The text asks whether the clause’s operation would be unconscionable, so the test looks at what happens when the clause is invoked, not at how it looked at signing. A clause dispensing with notification, invoked against a dealer who holds almost no stock, may leave the dealer with nothing to complain about. The same clause invoked against a dealer who has just bought a season’s inventory in reliance on the arrangement may produce the result the statute forbids. The commentary accordingly observes that reasonable notification would be required in some cases even if a written agreement dispensed with it.28
The fourth question carries the weight, because delivery of a letter answers only the third. A termination letter that reaches the dealer an hour before shipments stop has been received and still fails to give the warning that reasonableness demands.