Concept
Delay and Its Consequences
Omitted time for performance
Delay and Its Consequences
Section 2-309(1) answers a contract’s silence about timing with a standard, not a date: when the time for shipment, delivery, or any other action is neither provided in Article 2 nor agreed upon, it is a reasonable time.1 The earlier subsections showed how a court measures that standard. A soft deadline still leaves three questions, and this unit takes them in order: when the time has run out, what the waiting party must do before it acts on the lapse, and how parties who need a firm date can get one.
Performance Past a Reasonable Time
A reasonable time works as a deadline even though no one wrote it down. When it expires, performance still unrendered is overdue, and the failure to render it is a breach; Comment 5 to § 2-309 assumes as much when it speaks of treating a contract as breached for failure to perform within a reasonable time.2
The default needs both an outer edge and some give. Without the edge, the promisee has nothing to plan around and nothing to enforce. Without the give, ordinary friction turns into liability, because buyers need time to obtain financing, inspect, and secure permits, and the law allows them the time those steps take.3 A reasonable time supplies both.
A sale of goods with an open performance date shows where the edge falls.
Vern has a viable claim. The form fixes an order of performance, with payment and delivery following financing, but it names no date, so § 2-309(1) supplies one.5 Reading the financing language to make performance due whenever Bob chooses to seek a loan would let him postpone forever and would leave him with a promise that binds him to nothing. The better reading implies a reasonable time for Bob to obtain financing, and an implied time can be exceeded as surely as a written one. Nothing in the exchange suggests that a lender held him up; he simply decided to wait. A postponement of some eight months, chosen by the party who owes performance, is not a reasonable time.
A land sale shows modest delay coming out the other way.
S’s cancellation should fail. Time ordinarily is not of the essence absent an express stipulation, and setting a closing date does not supply one. B therefore has a reasonable time to close, and a two-week delay brought on by factors beyond B’s control but foreseeable when the parties contracted is reasonable.6 Land is not goods, so Article 2 does not govern, but common-law principles reach the same place: when the contract does not fix a time, the parties have a reasonable time to perform or to close.
Set side by side, the two scenes show what a court weighs. Length comes first, roughly two weeks against some eight months. Cause comes next: B’s delay came from queues B could not shorten, while Bob’s came from his own choice. Foreseeability adds weight, because a contract that anticipates ordinary friction cannot treat the usual amount of it as breach. S’s better offer explains why S wants out, but it does not make the delay unreasonable.
The third step carries the weight, because the first two establish only that a reasonable time governs. A buyer who deliberately postpones for months fails it, and a buyer held up two weeks by a lender’s backlog passes.
Notice Before Breach
Comment 5 to § 2-309 ties the reasonable-time default to the Code’s obligation of good faith, which requires reasonable notice before a contract may be treated as breached for failure to perform within a reasonable time.9 The requirement answers a problem built into the standard. A written date tells both sides the same thing, and each can see when it passes. A reasonable time gives no such signal, because the moment of breach is a conclusion a fact finder reaches later from the goods, the market, and the parties’ history, and each side may honestly hold a different view of whether time has run. A buyer free to act on a private conclusion without a word to the seller could wait out a price movement and declare the time expired once walking away paid. Notice removes that opportunity by warning the seller and giving the seller a chance to perform before the contract is lost.
The two scenes illustrate; Comment 5 prescribes no form of notice and no minimum period, so how much warning is reasonable depends on the circumstances, as the reasonable time itself does. What the comment supplies is a sequence. The lapse of a reasonable time is a fact the waiting party must communicate, through reasonable notice, before relying on it. An answer that stops at the lapse and declares breach skips a step.
Silence can also work in the opposite direction. If the parties allow the reasonable time for delivery or demand to pass in silence, Comment 5 says the reasonable time may be extended.10 What the parties did after contracting shows what each was prepared to accept, so a buyer who says nothing while the seller keeps the goods ready has acted as though the date were not pressing. A fact finder may read that shared quiet as evidence that neither side expected the schedule the buyer later claims. Two parties who both behave as though the clock were slow can slow it, and notice is how one of them stops it.
Silence stretched far enough has a further consequence: at some point, Comment 5 adds, the contract may be considered tacitly rescinded.11 Rescission is the cancellation of a contract, ordinarily by agreement, and tacit rescission means the agreement to cancel is inferred from conduct and not from anything the parties said. The inference rests on the same logic as the extension. Two parties who each let the delivery obligation lie dormant, neither shipping nor demanding, look like parties who have abandoned the deal. The comment says only that the contract may be treated this way and marks no moment at which it must be, so the question turns on the particular facts. A party who wants the contract kept and a party who wants it ended should each treat silence as something other than neutral.
Tacit rescission should not be confused with rescission for misrepresentation, the other cancellation ground that often appears beside delay on an exam. A party may rescind when its assent was induced by a material false representation on which it justifiably relied, even if the representation was made innocently, with no showing of fraud or negligence.12 Delay and silence play no part in that ground; they play the whole part in this one.
Time of the Essence
The reasonable-time default serves most deals but gives a party who needs precision no way to demand it, because the point at which delay becomes breach depends on circumstances a fact finder weighs after the dispute begins. Parties can bargain for precision by stipulating that time is of the essence. The Code’s default reaches only a time not agreed upon,15 and a term making time of the essence is a way of agreeing on one.
Courts begin from the opposite assumption, and with reason. Time ordinarily is not of the essence absent an express stipulation, and setting a closing date does not supply one.16 Commercial performance meets ordinary friction, and a court that treated every short slip as forfeiture of the bargain would punish delay out of proportion to its harm. Courts in equity therefore tolerate delay past a stated closing date unless the contract stipulates that time is of the essence.17 The term reverses that presumption for the parties who choose it. A party who insists on it has told the other side before signing that exact timing is part of what it is buying, so the other side cannot claim surprise when a court holds it to the date. Even then, minor delay by one party is permitted if the other suffers no harm.18
The Whiteacre sale shows the baseline. The contract there contained no essence stipulation, so S’s cancellation over a two-week miss failed. Had the contract carried the stipulation, S would have had a stronger argument, though minor delay that causes no harm is tolerated even then.
The same logic shapes a seller’s time to cure. Article 2 gives a seller who tenders nonconforming goods a right to cure in some circumstances,19 but the time to cure is itself a further reasonable time, measured by the attending circumstances.
The cure fails. Timely notice preserved the seller’s right, but it did not extend the time. The essence term and the buyer’s stated urgency are circumstances that shorten what counts as a further reasonable time, and five months is outside it. A seller with no such clause in its contract would still have to cure within a reasonable time, but a court would have less evidence of how much the buyer valued speed.
A contract on the other side of the line signals flexibility, and the soft deadline it leaves behind still has an end.
A court need not accept that argument. An event that is uncertain to occur may be a condition or a promise, or it may merely indicate the point in time at which the parties contemplated performance.20 Read that way, the new-house settlement and the word “approximate” mark a convenient time for settling and do not make time of the essence. The sellers could delay for a reasonable period while the new house was finished, but they had to settle within a reasonable time after October 1971, and by the time of suit that time had expired. The word “approximate” announces that a date is a target, so it lengthens the period for performance without ending the duty to perform.
The two contracts differ on a single hinge: whether the parties said that exact timing was part of what they were buying. Where they said so, the seller’s extra time shrinks and five months is too long. Where they signaled the opposite with an approximate date, the buyer waits through a reasonable period, though not without limit.