Concept
The Basic Default Rule
Omitted place of delivery
The Basic Default Rule
Article 2 answers the omitted-place problem in the opening clause of UCC § 2-308(a): unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business or, if the seller has none, the seller's residence.1 The clause works in two tiers. The first names one location, and the second takes over only when the first has nothing to attach to. Together they give a court a single answer to the question that left Brown and Silver each waiting for the other to move.
The default governs a sale in which the parties expected a plain handover of the goods and said nothing about where it happens. Anything the parties agreed displaces it, whether an express term, a course of dealing, a usage of trade, or a shipment or destination term, as later sections show.2 What remains for § 2-308(a) is the silent contract.
The two tiers follow from what a gap-filler must do. A default earns its keep only if it always produces an answer, and a rule that named only the seller's place of business would fail the seller who works from home. The residence fallback closes that hole, so a court applying the section never has to hunt for a third location.
Seller's Place of Business
When the contract specifies no place, the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business.3 The seller's performance obligation is to deliver the goods, and the buyer's is to accept and pay for them;4 the default fixes where that exchange occurs. Because the spot is the seller's premises, the buyer is the one who travels. The seller performs by holding conforming goods ready there, not by carrying them to the buyer. The rule describes a sale in which no carrier was contemplated; a contract that requires the seller to send the goods has its own shipment terms, taken up later in this chapter.
The rule settles the grommet dispute. Silver's plant is the place of tender,5 so Brown must come to the plant and collect the 1,000 grommets, and Silver has no duty to ship them. Each party's general duty, Silver's to deliver conforming grommets and Brown's to accept and pay for them, is performed there.6 Silver's assumption about who moves was therefore correct, and nothing in the contract or the statute supported Brown's expectation that the grommets would arrive at Brown's door.
Silver must still make a proper tender at that place. Tender means putting and holding conforming goods at Brown's disposal and giving any notice Brown reasonably needs to take delivery. A Silver who never told Brown the grommets were ready would have a weaker claim that Brown failed to perform, because the duty to pick up presupposes that the buyer knows the goods can be had.
Each feature of the default has a reason. Courts and legislatures do not pick standard terms out of the air; they base them on common expectations, commercial practice, and public policy, so a default should reflect what the parties likely would have agreed had they discussed the point.7 Parties who say nothing about place most plausibly expect the handover to happen where the seller keeps the goods, and a seller who never agreed to ship should not have the burden of transport imposed by a gap-filler. The rule also yields a single determinate location, so neither side can reasonably wait for the other to move. That waiting is the stalemate that left Brown and Silver each convinced the other was in breach. Because the place rests on presumed intention, it is a constructive term that gives way to whatever the parties actually agreed.8 A court applying a gap-filler of this kind is usually engaged in construction rather than fact-based interpretation.9
Courts reach for the gap-filler when a writing leaves the place out. In Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Industries, Inc., a cross-tie dispute decided under Texas's enactment of the Code, the letter at issue failed to specify a place for delivery. The court observed that the Texas counterpart of § 2-308 provides one: unless otherwise agreed, the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business.10 The record also showed that cross-tie industry custom was for the seller to deliver the ties to the buyer's place of business. That custom runs against the statutory default, and it previews how usage of trade can displace § 2-308, a point developed under Course of Dealing and Usage below. The narrower lesson is that the omitted place was a gap the statute could fill, not a hole in the deal.
A working artist makes a convenient seller to picture, since an artist's finances are often precarious: a 2018 study found that fine arts degree recipients had the lowest salaries and the highest unemployment rates among 162 college majors.11 A sale by such a seller can omit the place of delivery as easily as any other.
The result depends on the silence. A dealer with a shop who sells six computers under a contract that says nothing about place may insist that the buyer collect them at the shop. A contract that says 'delivered to the buyer's office' has answered the question and leaves nothing for § 2-308(a) to fill, because the parties may specify the place and the law imposes one only when they have not.12
The intuition to resist on an exam is that a seller naturally 'delivers' to the buyer. Without a carrier term or some other agreement, the seller's duty is a proper tender at home. Two qualifications follow: § 2-308(a) itself names the seller's residence when the seller has no place of business, and § 2-308(b) moves the place for identified goods that both parties knew were elsewhere when they contracted.13
Residence Fallback
The same clause of UCC § 2-308(a) supplies a second tier: 'or if he has none his residence.'15 When the seller has no place of business, the seller's home becomes the place for delivery. Everything said about the first tier carries over. The buyer comes to the seller's door and collects, and each party's general duty, the seller's to deliver and the buyer's to accept and pay,16 plays out there, with the seller holding conforming goods available and giving whatever notice the buyer reasonably needs. The second tier moves the location and leaves the tender duties where they were.
Some sellers have no commercial premises at all, as with an individual who sells a personal possession. A rule that named only a place of business would give no answer for those sales, and the missing answer would recreate the standoff that left Brown and Silver each waiting for the other to move. Every seller has a residence, and a residence is a fixed location the buyer can identify. Naming it as the fallback guarantees that § 2-308(a) always produces a determinate place, so no court must search for a third location and neither party is left to guess.
The ordering of the two tiers needs the most care, because the provision names two places but supplies one answer. The residence is reached only when there is no place of business, so a seller who has both is held to the place of business and the home is never consulted. The place of business is the location commercially associated with the transaction, and a buyer dealing with a business can rely on its premises without learning where the owner lives. An exam question about a seller who has a showroom and also a house therefore calls for the one question the statute asks: does the seller have a place of business?
Two mistakes recur on exams. The first treats the tiers as alternatives, as though a buyer could choose the seller's home because it is closer; the text orders them and gives the buyer no choice between them. The second reads 'residence' as the buyer's, which has no footing in a silent contract, because the residence the statute names belongs to the seller. The clause also closes with a 'but' that introduces an exception for identified goods both parties knew were elsewhere when they contracted. That exception can displace both tiers, as the next section explains.17 Which place controls therefore depends on the facts: the same provision can point to the seller's business, the seller's residence, or the spot where the goods actually sit.18