Concept
Delivery Gaps and Defaults
Omitted place of delivery
Omitted Place of Delivery
Delivery Gaps and Defaults
Brown has agreed to buy 1,000 grommets from Silver for $100, and the two are located some distance apart. The contract fixes the goods, the quantity, and the price, but it never says where Silver is to tender the grommets. When the performance date arrives, Brown assumes that Silver will deliver the grommets to Brown, while Silver assumes that Brown will come to Silver's plant to collect them. Silver does not ship and Brown does not pick up, so each believes the other is in breach.1 Each belief is reasonable from where its holder stands, and nothing in the contract says which of them is right.
Interpreting the agreement cannot settle the dispute. Interpretation looks to what the parties said, to any course of dealing between them, and to any relevant usage of trade, and none of those sources speaks to the place of tender here.2 A court might be tempted to call the contract too indefinite to enforce. Article 2 closes off that response. Under UCC § 2-204(3), a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness even though one or more terms are left open, so long as the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.3 The grommet contract meets both conditions: the parties plainly meant to bargain, and the stated goods, quantity, and price give a basis for measuring a remedy.
The same result holds when several logistical terms are missing at once. Suppose a seller and buyer agree on six computers for $9,000 with no time or place stated for delivery or payment. The law enforces that agreement, and the question becomes where the missing terms come from.4 Article 2 answers with gap-fillers. Issues of this sort arise with some frequency, so the drafters resolved several of them in advance as a matter of law.5 Place of delivery is one of them, and § 2-308 supplies the place when the contract specifies none.6
Courts and legislatures do not choose such terms arbitrarily. They draw on common expectations, commercial practice, and public policy, and the resulting terms are meant to reflect what the parties likely would have agreed had they discussed the issue.7 That purpose also describes the work a court does when it applies one. The court is engaged in construction, supplying a term by law, and not in fact-based interpretation of what these particular parties agreed.8
The same purpose explains why the statute opens with the words "Unless otherwise agreed."9 Those words mark what follows as a default. A gap-filler stands in for what the parties likely would have wanted, so it gives way once they have actually said something. Earlier deals can also carry an answer of their own. If, in three prior transactions involving other electronic equipment, the seller always delivered to the buyer's place of business and handled installation, the buyer would argue that this course of dealing shows the parties' implied intention about delivery in the next sale.10
The next section turns to what the default itself provides, and later sections take up the ways the parties displace it.