Concept
Performance and Reliance
Court supplies an omitted essential term
Performance and Reliance
Gaps in a contract come from lack of foresight, incomplete bargaining, or excessive initial optimism about performance.1 Some gaps are serious enough to call for unwinding the deal. In other cases the evidence of intent to be bound, or the degree of performance already rendered, makes rescission inappropriate, and § 204 then directs the court to supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances.2 Section 204 reaches only a bargain "sufficiently defined to be a contract,"3 so what the parties did after they agreed bears directly on whether a court will fill the gap. Performance can do two things. It can remove the uncertainty, or it can leave the uncertainty in place and still favor recovery.
Part Performance
A party who begins to perform with the other side's knowledge and approval has nearly always done so because both regard the contract as consummated. Corbin says such performance "is nearly always evidence that [the parties] regard the contract as consummated and intend to be bound thereby."4 Performance can also remove the uncertainty, because acts carried out under the agreement show how the parties read a term that their words left unclear.5 Both effects serve the first question under § 204, which is whether the parties intended to be bound.
The requirement of knowledge and approval does real work. Performance by one side alone shows only what that side believed. Once the other side watches the work proceed and accepts it, the conduct is shared, and accepting work as the work the deal called for treats the deal as made.
In B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Angelou the court had already found that the parties intended to contract, and it treated that finding as an obligation to fill the gaps in their agreement if it reasonably could. Voiding an agreement for lack of essential terms, it said, "is a step that courts should take only in rare and extreme circumstances." It added that a court should be especially willing to attach a definite meaning to the bargain when the plaintiff has fully or partly performed, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34.6 A judge asked after the fact what a reasonable frequency or scope would have been can look to what the parties actually did, and that record replaces speculation about what they would have wanted.
Performance has the least to offer when it never touches the open term. In Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., a newsprint contract left the price and duration for each later period to be agreed fifteen days before the preceding period expired.7 Shipments were made and paid for from September through December 1919 as the contract required. When the time came to agree on a new price and term, the seller gave notice that the contract was imperfect and disclaimed any further obligation to deliver.8 The earlier shipments had been made under terms already settled, so they showed nothing about how the parties expected the open price to be set, and the seller refused before any performance at an open price had occurred. In that setting performance cannot remove the uncertainty, because the uncertainty is the whole dispute.
Performance is evidence of intent and does not replace it. The B. Lewis court filled gaps because the parties intended a contract, and it added that a court may not make a contract for them.9 Corbin's phrase is "nearly always evidence," which makes performance a strong indication that falls short of proof. It feeds the first element of § 204 and cannot stand in for it.
Reliance Without Certainty
Performance does not always reach the open term. A party may deliver the work that was clear while the term that was left open stays open, such as who pays a crew or how long a price lasts. The B. Lewis court anticipated that situation. Citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34, it said performance "may either remove the uncertainty or militate in favor of recovery even if the uncertainty continues."11 A party who has performed has acted on the deal and relied on it, and the court's reluctance to void for missing essential terms means that continuing uncertainty does not by itself defeat recovery. The degree of performance already rendered may make rescission inappropriate, and § 204 then directs the court to supply a reasonable term.12
The reason is easy to see. A rule that any open essential term defeated the claim would let a party who watched and approved the work walk away from the bargain on the strength of its own incomplete drafting. That is the result the "rare and extreme circumstances" standard is meant to prevent.13
None of this dispenses with intent. The B. Lewis court filled gaps because the parties intended a contract, and it said a court may not make one for them.14 Where neither side has performed and nothing in the agreement or the surrounding circumstances shows an intent to be bound, the evidence that supports filling the gap is missing.
A stem that pairs an open essential term with a party who has performed calls for two questions in order. First, did the performance come with the other side's knowledge and approval, and did it clarify the open term? Second, if the term is still open, does the performance favor recovery anyway, so that § 204 can supply a reasonable term?