Concept
Gap Filling Versus Interpretation
Court supplies an omitted essential term
Gap Filling Versus Interpretation
Courts distinguish between interpreting terms the parties expressly manifested and supplying terms where the contract is silent on a particular issue. The second activity is sometimes called gap filling.1 The distinction matters because the two activities rest on different grounds: one on evidence of what the parties meant, the other on a judgment about what they would reasonably have wanted.
Section 204 applies only when the parties "have not agreed" on an essential term, so a court must establish what they did agree on before it supplies anything.2 Interpretation answers that question from the evidence. Construction begins where the evidence ends. Construction is the implication of a term in law. It arises when the parties clearly made a contract but never addressed a particular issue and no factual evidence shows how they meant it to be handled. The court then decides, from what it knows of the contract and its context, how the parties would have dealt with the issue had they thought of it.3
A term found by interpretation traces to what these parties said, did, or implicitly agreed. A constructed term traces to the court's judgment: it builds on what it knows of the transaction to interpolate a meaning the parties probably would have agreed on.4 Courts are wary of devising an agreement the parties never made. They accept it anyway, because it is sometimes preferable to defeating contractual expectations by demanding clear proof of intent for every gap and uncertainty.5
That difference fixes the order in which a court works. It applies the full array of interpretive principles first, and only if it still concludes that the parties failed to agree on a material term does it reach the question § 204 addresses.6 Even then a gap does not automatically produce a supplied term, because, depending on the posture of the case, the court may conclude that the parties made no enforceable agreement. Where the evidence of intent to be bound, or the degree of performance already rendered, makes that result inappropriate, § 204 recommends that the court supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances.7 Gaps of this kind come from lack of foresight, incomplete bargaining, or excessive initial optimism about performance.8
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon shows the interpretive step succeeding. Lady Duff-Gordon granted Wood an exclusive agency, and her only compensation was half of the profits resulting from his efforts. The agreement contained no express promise by Wood to make those efforts, yet the court found one implied: unless he gave his efforts, she could never get anything. A recital that his business organization was adapted to placing endorsements pointed the same way, as did many other terms of the agreement, and the court refused to suppose that one party was placed at the mercy of the other.9 Every support for the finding came from the deal itself. The court inferred the term from evidence of what these parties arranged, so the term is implied in fact and no rule of law had to supply it.
Employment law teaches the same lesson from the other side. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. the court said that permitting proof of and reliance on implied-in-fact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule; it merely treats such contracts the way general contract law treats other contracts.10 The operative word is proof. An implied-in-fact term is one the parties actually, if implicitly, agreed to, so a party asserting it must point to evidence of that agreement.11 A rule that applies to every employer and employee alike would supply a term of a different kind.
The line between the two processes can be hard to draw. Suppose a seller agrees to deliver six computers to a buyer and the contract names no delivery date. The law supplies performance within a reasonable time under UCC § 2-309(1). That result is arguably both construction and interpretation, because the statute only codifies the standard common-law reading, which probably rests on party intent.12 A good answer says which view it takes and why.
Now suppose the contract is also silent on where the goods are delivered and who installs them. If the parties have no history, a court has no evidence of intent and must fall back on a default rule. If instead the seller delivered other electronic equipment to the buyer's place of business in three earlier transactions, and its employees handled the installation, the buyer can argue that the prior course of dealing establishes the parties' implied intention that delivery and installation are part of the contract.13 The question has moved from construction toward interpretation, because there is now evidence of intent to interpret.
Interpretation and construction also trade places over time. Wood is generally regarded as the genesis of the UCC rule in § 2-306(2) that imposes a best-efforts obligation on exclusive dealing, so a term first inferred from one deal's facts became a term the Code supplies.14 Usage follows a similar path. A usage can be offered as evidence of what the parties meant, but one so well established that it is recognized as a gap filler becomes part of the contract as a matter of law and need not be proved by evidence.15
The older labels invite confusion. Implied-in-fact terms are those the parties actually, albeit implicitly, agreed to, and implied-in-law terms are thought to be imposed without their consent. The Restatement speaks instead of courts supplying terms.16 This chapter reserves implied for terms found in the parties' agreement and constructive for terms the law imposes, so that an answer names the process it is invoking and not just the result.