Concept
Default Rules and Party Freedom
Court supplies an omitted essential term
Default Rules and Party Freedom
Section 204 supplies “a term which is reasonable in the circumstances,” but only when the parties “have not agreed” about an essential term.1 That condition makes the supplied term a default: it governs the parties' silence and yields once they speak. Treatises file silence as to a material term under indefiniteness, a topic they treat separately at common law and under the UCC.2 The earlier sections of this chapter asked when a gap exists and what a reasonable term looks like. This section asks what kind of rule fills the gap, and why contract law may apply it to parties who never chose it.
Courts and commentators distinguish interpreting terms the parties expressly manifested from supplying terms where the contract is silent, and they call the second activity “gap-filling.”3 Traditionally, the terms a court adds fall into two groups. An implied-in-fact term is one the parties actually, though only implicitly, agreed to. An implied-in-law term is thought to be imposed on the parties without their consent. The Restatement avoids both labels and speaks of a court supplying a term.4 This unit follows the Restatement's usage: “supplied” names any term the law adds, and “implied-in-fact” is kept for the parties' own implicit agreement.
Modern contract theorists draw a second line, and it does more work than the first. They divide judicially supplied gap-fillers into default rules and immutable rules.5 The parties can avoid or vary a default rule by an express clause that differs from the term a court would otherwise supply. They cannot vary an immutable rule by consent, and it overrides any express clause to the contrary.6 Only the terms that come from immutable rules, then, are imposed without consent in the strong sense. A default rests on different footing. Like acceptance by silence, it can be explained as consent: parties who say nothing about a point and defer to the law of contract may be taken to have agreed to the term the law supplies.7 That consent is the law's characterization of silence, not a finding that either party considered the point.
Economic efficiency supplies the usual justification for shaping defaults the way courts do. Contract, in the economist's picture, is exchange in which each party trades until further trading would no longer advance its interest.8 On that picture, a default earns its place by saving effort. If the terms the law supplies are those most parties would voluntarily choose for themselves, agreement-making costs less, because the parties have fewer terms to bargain out.9 Standard forms serve the same purpose, and so do terms standardized by law: off-the-rack terms cost less than custom-tailored ones. The law could require the parties to specify every right and duty, but, as the Seventh Circuit observed, “then contracts would be very long.” Selcke v. New England Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 1993).10
Article 2 collects many defaults, and three of them show how a default works. When the time for shipment, delivery, or any other action is neither provided in Article 2 nor agreed upon, it is a reasonable time. The place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business or, if the seller has none, the seller's residence. And where a contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration, it is valid for a reasonable time but, unless otherwise agreed, either party may terminate it at any time.11 For the most part such rules are regarded as mere gap-fillers, “subject to preemption by the parties' express agreement.”12
The limit on party freedom appears in the subsection that follows the termination default. Termination other than on the happening of an agreed event requires that the other party receive reasonable notification, and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.13 The two subsections work as a pair. The parties may agree on an event that ends the contract without notice, and they may agree to dispense with notice, but a court will not enforce that dispensation where its operation would be unconscionable. Article 2 treats a few obligations of this kind, among them §§ 2-309(3) and 2-719(3), as mandatory and not variable even by express agreement, while for the most part its rules yield to the parties' contrary agreement.14 The mandatory floor is therefore narrow, and a handful of immutable rules does not make the rest of Article 2 immutable.
Not every supplied term fills a gap in the strict sense. The law sometimes supplies a default about the standard a party's performance must meet even though the agreement could be understood and enforced without it. The parties can contract to the contrary, but “gap-filler” fits poorly, since nothing was missing.15 The party-freedom analysis is the same for both kinds of default: the term applies if the parties are silent, and an express clause displaces it.
A court that supplies a term does not, for a default, interfere much with freedom of contract. The term operates only where the parties made no choice, and parties who want a different term can write it. Section 204 itself conditions the supplied term on the parties' not having agreed.16 Rewriting an existing agreement is a different matter. After the recession of 2008–2009, pressure on government to “rewrite” contracts in the financial and auto industries grew, and most of the government's responses came through special legislation and bankruptcy.17 A default rule does neither, because it works on silence alone and leaves the parties' chosen terms in place. The next sections apply the same default logic to the UCC's open-term provisions.