Concept
Contrary Intention and Exclusion
Usage of trade
Contrary Intention and Exclusion
A usage that is regular, reasonable, proved, and known to both parties can still stay out of the agreement. The third condition of Restatement § 221 explains how: neither party may know or have reason to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent with the usage.1 The earlier conditions examined the practice and each party's knowledge of it. This one examines what each party knew about the other's plans for it. A usage can fail here in two ways, and the subsections below keep them apart. A party's known contrary intention defeats it through state of mind, measured by what the other side knew or should have known. A clause in the contract defeats it through text, and because usage is so strong a signal of what the parties meant, the clause must be clear.
Known Contrary Intention
A usage enters an agreement because the parties are taken to have assumed it when they made their deal. One party's known intention to depart from the practice breaks that assumption. The party with the contrary plan did not take the usage for granted, and the party who knew of the plan cannot claim to have done so either. Holding the first party to the usage would bind it to a term the second party knew it had not accepted. The phrase “has reason to know” keeps the test objective, so a party cannot preserve a usage by overlooking what the other side's statements and conduct plainly signaled.2
Walls v. Bailey collects the older authorities on the point. It reports that in Caldwell v. Dawson the court required it to appear that the party had actual knowledge of the usage, or that the evidence clearly authorized a presumption of knowledge, and it adds that one party's knowledge of a usage, together with that party's supposition that it would enter the contract, is not sufficient.3 It also notes that in Higgins v. Moore the plaintiffs showed affirmatively that they understood the usage to be the reverse of the one the defendants set up.4
That last position is stronger than ignorance. A party who merely lacks knowledge of a practice leaves a gap that the usage's proponent may try to fill by proving the party had reason to know of it. A party who understood the practice to run the other way has filled the gap with a contrary understanding of its own, and the premise that both sides contracted with reference to the usage can no longer be maintained. The two failures are different. Knowledge on one side alone defeats the knowledge condition, whereas a known inconsistent intention defeats the third condition even when both sides have heard of the practice.
Restatement § 201 supplies a close parallel, because it asks a similar question about a term whose meaning the parties dispute. Apart from the exceptions the section states, neither party is bound by the meaning the other attached, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.5 Those exceptions rest on what each party knew or had reason to know when the agreement was made, as the contrary-intention condition does, and in both settings a party who understood what the other meant cannot profit from the difference. The consequences diverge. Unresolved conflicting meanings can end in no contract at all, but a failed usage condition leaves the agreement standing on its own terms, only without the usage.6
The buyer in that scene never agreed to pay for delivery, and agreement is not what the condition asks. It asks only whether the buyer knew or had reason to know that the yard intended something inconsistent with the practice. Had the representative said nothing about delivery, and had the other conditions been met, nothing would have disturbed the shared background, and the practice would have been added to the order. A fact pattern that includes a pre-signing remark, a letter, or a stated plan to depart from the custom is usually testing this condition.
Clear Exclusion by Agreement
Parties who can write a bargain can write around a usage, and a clause saying that usage does not apply is the contrary intention in its strongest form: shared, written, and known to both sides. Because an established and applicable usage is such a strong indication of intent, however, courts usually require the term excluding usage to be very clear and unequivocal.9 Where the writing is silent, usage fills the silence. In one case a written agreement between a lender and a dealer said nothing about whether the lender had to notify the dealer if the dealer's customer let the insurance lapse on the car sold to him. The court used trade usage, together with a course of dealing that recognized the duty, to add that term. A lender who wanted the duty out could easily have drafted a clause saying so, and without such a clause courts will likely permit usage, course of dealing, and course of performance to establish additional terms.10
The two halves of that rule have different reasons. The freedom to exclude follows from the source of a usage's force, since a practice binds because the parties are taken to have contracted with reference to it, and parties who say in plain words that they did not can displace that assumption. The demand for clarity follows from what stock contract language is for. A merger paragraph or a no-oral-understandings paragraph is printed form language written to settle other questions, such as whether earlier negotiations survive. Reading it as a decision to strip out the trade's whole background would let a sentence nobody thought about delete the assumptions the rest of the document was phrased against. The party who wants the usage out, by contrast, can say so in one sentence at almost no cost, so the clarity requirement puts the drafting burden where it is cheapest to carry.
The Code's own text points the same way. A final writing may be explained or supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, and also by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms.11 Completeness therefore limits one source of added terms and leaves usage on a separate track.
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. shows how a court frames the question when a writing looks complete. The test of admissibility, it said, is not whether the contract appears on its face to be complete in every detail, but whether the proffered evidence of course of dealing and trade usage reasonably can be construed as consistent with the express terms.12 The contract did not state that course of dealing and usage of trade could not be used to explain or supplement it, and it was silent about adjusting prices and quantities to reflect a declining market. That neutrality, neither permitting nor prohibiting adjustment, was a fitting occasion for usage and prior dealing to supplement the contract and explain its terms.13
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. reached the same place on Shell's printed terms. The court below relied on paragraph H and on paragraph E, a classic merger clause, to shut out evidence of prior dealings. The appellate court held that paragraph H did not carefully negate all uses of such evidence. It added that a merger clause at most shows the agreement to be a complete and exclusive statement of its terms, which excludes evidence of additional terms but not evidence of prior dealings, and which leaves prior dealings admissible under the Code's provision on explaining or supplementing a writing even if the court finds the writing complete and exclusive.14 Nanakuli also shows the consistency half of the analysis. The court held the price-protection usage consistent with the contract's express term that the price was Shell's posted price at the time of delivery.15
Language aimed at usage itself does the work these clauses cannot. A clause making the writing final, complete, and exclusive would not keep out evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance offered to supplement with non-contradictory terms or to explain the meaning of terms, although a more specific clause could.16 New wording can also do it. When the parties use new and different language to convey their agreed intention to abandon a past practice, practice under the old language is irrelevant to the contract containing the new language, and the court will exclude the evidence.17 The baseline against which all this operates is simple: where both parties are active participants in a trade, its usages are readily attributable to their contract, except to the extent that the contract clearly excludes a usage.18 Exclusion also differs from the inconsistency limit covered earlier. That limit asks whether a usage can sit beside an express term, while an exclusion clause removes even a usage that could have sat there.
The same practice would survive if the new agreement contained only a standard entire-agreement clause, for the reasons Columbia Nitrogen and Nanakuli give. Students most often lose this point by seeing the words “entire agreement” or “no oral modification” and concluding that usage is out. Those clauses answer questions about prior negotiations and additional terms, while usage comes in by another route. The next section takes up integration clauses and the parol evidence rule more fully.