Concept
Knowledge of the Usage
Usage of trade
Knowledge of the Usage
Proof that a trade follows a practice does not settle whether the practice enters this contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 221 adds a second condition: a reasonable usage supplements or qualifies an agreement only if “each party knows or has reason to know of the usage.”1 The preceding section asked whether a practice exists and deserves the name usage. This condition asks whether these parties can fairly be treated as having dealt against it. A third condition, taken up later, withdraws the usage when either party knows or has reason to know that the other intends something inconsistent with it.2
The condition follows from the reason a usage binds at all. The older cases say so plainly: evidence of a usage is admitted only on the ground that both contracting parties are cognizant of it and must be presumed to have made their agreement in reference to it.3 Contract law protects the reasonable expectations of the parties, not those of the court,4 and a party cannot reasonably expect a practice it had no way to see. A usage that is regular, reasonable, and proved by a dozen industry witnesses therefore adds nothing to the agreement of a party who neither knew of it nor had reason to know of it.
“Knows or has reason to know” sets an objective standard. Parties in a dispute usually did not share a subjective intent,5 and the objective standard is the one courts use to decide whether a party should be subject to a usage.6 A party who actually knows of the practice satisfies it. So does a party who lacks actual knowledge but whose ignorance is not excusable because the practice was so generally followed that the party should have been aware of it.7 The text also runs to both sides, since it says each party. The proponent of a usage will usually know of it plainly enough, so the contest centers on the party who resists.
A dispute over one word shows what is at stake. In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the issue was “what is chicken?” The plaintiff said the word meant a young chicken suitable for broiling and frying.8 The defendant said it meant any bird of that genus meeting the contract’s weight and quality specifications, including what it called “stewing chicken,” and dictionaries gave both meanings.9 A party who tried to break such a tie with a trade meaning would have to show more than that the trade uses the word its way. It would have to show that the other party can be held to that usage.10
How a court answers the knowledge question depends on where the resisting party stands. The UCC reaches usages “in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware,” and the repeated disjunctive “or” marks two separate routes to binding a party.11 A party engaged in the trade is charged with its usages through the trade itself. A party outside the trade must be reached by the second route, which depends on what its own circumstances revealed. Members come first.
Members of the Trade
A party engaged in a trade is bound by that trade’s usages even if it is personally ignorant of them, on the theory that everyone in the trade should know them.12 Engagement in the trade therefore supplies the reason to know, and a member’s testimony that it never heard of an established practice does not defeat that practice.13
Two reasons explain why the law imputes knowledge to a trade member instead of demanding proof that the member learned the practice. The first is the counterparty’s reliance: a party is held to conduct generally observed by members of its chosen trade because the other party is justified in assuming that conduct unless the party indicates otherwise.14 A seller who deals with a trade member prices the goods and drafts a short writing on the assumption that both sides share the trade’s routines, and the member’s silence at signing gives the seller no sign that the assumption is wrong. The second is that the member can learn the trade or contract out of its usages. Nothing prevents a party who knows its own limited grasp of trade practice from opting out of the usage or becoming informed, so the obligation falls on the novice, at least one who does not signal that status.15
Once a usage is established, then, the member’s lack of knowledge drops out. When both parties are active participants in the market or trade, its usages are readily attributable to their contract except to the extent that the contract clearly excludes a usage.16 Disputes between two trade members therefore seldom turn on what either one knew. They turn on whether the usage exists and whether the agreement excluded it.
The burden of avoiding a usage rests on the party who wants it out. In one decision, a court used trade usage to add a term to a writing that was silent on the point: a lender’s duty to notify a dealer when the dealer’s customer let the insurance lapse on the car sold to him. A course of dealing recognized the same duty. The lender could easily have drafted a clause negating the term, and without such a clause courts will likely permit parties to use trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance to establish additional terms.17 Because an established usage is such a strong indication of intent, courts usually require the excluding term to be very clear and unequivocal.18 Careless boilerplate rarely qualifies. One court, dealing with evidence of prior dealings, held that a clause failing to negate such evidence carefully did not exclude it, and that a classic merger clause at most might show the agreement complete and exclusive, which would bar evidence of additional terms but not evidence of prior dealings.19
Courts apply the member rule to parties who never joined, and never saw, the source of the usage. Foxco Industries, Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc. held a fabric buyer to quality standards issued by an industry association although the buyer was not a member of the association and had not known the standards existed. Association membership was not the test. The buyer’s engagement in the industry was.
The member rule has a limit that students often miss. Imputed knowledge answers only whether this party can be charged with a usage that is already established. Whether a usage exists is a prior question: the party relying on a practice must first prove it, and only then does the question arise whether the parties are bound by it.20 Trade membership supplies the second link in the chain and cannot supply the first. That the resisting party has worked in the trade for decades is a fact about knowledge. It says nothing about whether the practice is regularly observed.
Had the same witnesses shown that nearly every importer and roaster in the market works within the margin, the roaster’s protest of ignorance would fail, unless the agreement clearly excluded the usage.21
Outsiders and Reason to Know
A party outside the trade has no shortcut through the trade itself. Where one party is not involved in the market or trade, its usages are relevant to the contract only if the nonmember knew or should have known of the usage and the circumstances show that the parties reasonably expected it to apply to the transaction.23 The test is objective, so the court asks what a person with this party’s dealings and experience should have appreciated when the contract was made, not what the party says it knew.24 Proof that the trade follows a practice therefore answers only whether a usage exists.
An older, stricter line of authority shows what the modern standard relaxes and what it keeps. Its starting point was the reason a usage binds at all: evidence of the usage of a particular place was admitted only because the contracting parties were both cognizant of it and so presumed to have made their agreement in reference to it. In Kirchner v. Venus, a Liverpool shipping usage was invoked on a freight question against a party living in Sydney, and proof that the usage was unknown at Sydney prevailed.25 Caldwell v. Dawson demanded either actual knowledge or evidence that clearly authorized a presumption of knowledge, and it held that one party’s knowledge, joined to a belief that the usage would govern, was not enough.26
Two features of that approach matter here. The first is the demand for proof of what a party actually knew, which is hard to establish and easy to deny. The second is the insistence that both parties be tied to the practice, so that the proponent’s own familiarity cannot carry the day. Section 221 keeps the second feature, since its text again says each party, and it relaxes the first by adding “has reason to know.”27 The UCC measures in the same way: a party is held to general business practices to the extent of its actual knowledge, or to the degree its ignorance is not excusable because the practices were so generally followed that it should have been aware of them.28 Proof therefore need not reach into the outsider’s mind. It can come from the outsider’s dealings.
The relaxation stops short of binding strangers to the trade. A usage regularly followed within the trade does not by itself bind a party who is not involved in it; the nonmember must have known or should have known of the usage.29 The decisions look for a connection between the outsider and the trade that would have exposed the outsider to the practice. Three recur:
- A party that regularly deals with members of the relevant trade has reason to know how the trade does business.30
- A party that belongs to a second trade that commonly deals with the first has reason to know something of the first; the Nanakuli opinion’s example is that farmers should know something of seed selling.31
- A party that sells in a small market, especially almost exclusively to one customer, can be expected to be knowledgeable about that market.32
These connections tell a court where to look. They do not replace facts about the party in question, and the circumstances must also show that the parties reasonably expected the usage to apply to the transaction.33
Nanakuli shows reason to know found in a party’s own dealings. The evidence of custom and usage on price protection in the asphaltic paving trade was not contradicted in major respects.34 The usages at issue were practiced toward only two major pavers, and the court found it not unreasonable to expect Shell to be knowledgeable about so small a market.35 The record supported that view. Shell had made a half-million-dollar investment on Oahu because of Nanakuli’s long-term commitment, had acted as a partner in promoting Nanakuli’s expansion, and sold there almost exclusively to Nanakuli for use in asphaltic paving, and at trial Shell’s agent in Hawaii was shown to have stayed in close contact with Nanakuli and to have known the asphaltic paving market and Nanakuli’s bidding procedures and economics.36 The result applies the objective test. Shell’s business put it close to its principal customer’s bidding economics, and nothing turned on whether any individual at Shell had heard of the practice.
Judge Kennedy’s concurrence shows where the knowledge showing sits in the case. He stressed that the jury could find that the parties knew or should have known of the practice at the time of making the contract, and he called that finding a necessary predicate to either theory the case presented, interpretation based on the course of performance or a finding that good faith required the seller to hold the price.37 He added that the opinion should not let juries import a specific term from a general idea of good faith unless it rests on well-established custom and usage or other objective standards of which the parties had clear notice.38
Frantz v. Cantrell shows the other side of the line. Frantz offered expert testimony that roofers do not provide warranties on the shingles used in their roofing jobs. Cantrell, however, was not a member of the roofing trade and was unaware of the usage. The court concluded that to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, both parties had to be engaged in the relevant trade, or the usage had to be one of which both were aware or should have been aware.39 The expert proved the practice among roofers. The court’s test asked about the party to be bound.
Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc. applies the same allocation to parties in different trades. A seed seller invoked a trade usage to exclude its implied warranty of merchantability against a farm buyer. Because the seller sold seeds and the buyer planted them to produce crops, the two were not in the same trade, and the seller could exclude the warranty only by establishing that the buyer was or should have been aware of the usage. The pairing is the very example the Nanakuli opinion gave of a second trade expected to know something of the first.40 The two fit together once the categories are read as grounds for finding reason to know. The proponent must still prove them about the particular buyer, and a second-trade connection adds weight to that proof without supplying it automatically.
What separates Shell from Cantrell is the depth of the connection to the trade. Shell’s Oahu business ran almost entirely through one paver, and its agent stayed in close contact with that paver.41 Cantrell stood outside the roofing trade and knew nothing of its practice.42 A party that makes its inexperience evident stands even further from a usage. The source that assigns the obligation to learn the trade, or to opt out of its usages, to the novice does so “at least” when the novice does not signal its status.43
A newcomer can also fall on either side of the line, depending on its own position. In Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Construction Co., the court reasoned that a neophyte minority painting contractor on its first substantial subcontract did not have reason to know of the trade usage asserted against it. The Foxco buyer was an established participant in the industry whose standards were invoked, so its unawareness was beside the point. The Flower City contractor was a newcomer whose experience had given it no occasion to learn the practice.
A common error is to treat proof of a usage as proof that it binds. The testimony in Frantz established that roofers do not warrant their shingles, and the evidence in Nanakuli established that price protection was customary in asphaltic paving, yet in each case the live contest was whether the particular outsider could be charged with the practice. The inquiry looks at the outsider’s own dealings when the contract was made. The proponent’s familiarity with the practice cannot substitute for the outsider’s, since each party must know or have reason to know of the usage.44