Concept
What Counts as a Usage
Usage of trade
What Counts as a Usage
Not every practice that someone in an industry follows can add to or narrow a written contract. Restatement § 221 gives that effect only to “a reasonable usage with respect to agreements of the same type,” and only when each party knows or has reason to know of the usage and neither knows or has reason to know that the other intends something inconsistent with it.1 Under the UCC, a usage that clears those conditions becomes part of the “agreement,” a term broader than the written contract that also reaches course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage in the parties’ industry.2
The earlier sections assumed a usage and asked what it could do to a writing. This section asks the threshold question: what must a party show before a practice earns the name? The answer starts with the reason a usage binds at all. The Code treats usage as a way of determining the parties’ probable intent, not as a rule of custom imposed without their consent,3 and contract law protects the parties’ reasonable expectations, not the court’s.4 A practice can support such an expectation only if people in the relevant setting follow it reliably enough that a party could count on it. One firm’s private routine fails that test. So does a habit that some competitors follow and others ignore. Knowledge of the usage and the absence of a contrary intention, the later conditions in § 221, test a usage that already exists; they cannot create one.5
Four questions organize what follows. How regular must a practice be? What work does the word “reasonable” do? Whose practice counts? And how does a party prove that a usage exists and what it covers?
Regular Observance
The UCC defines a usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”6 The definition runs from the community’s conduct to the parties’ expectations. It asks how steadily people in the relevant setting follow the practice, and whether that steadiness lets a party entering this deal count on the practice governing it. A practice that falls short gives the parties no reason to suppose either of them assumed it.
Early common law demanded far more. A usage had to be “(1) legal, (2) notorious, (3) ancient or immemorial and continuous, (4) reasonable, (5) certain, (6) universal and obligatory.”7 Those tests fit a custom understood as binding without consent. The Code abandoned that understanding and views usage as a way of determining the parties’ probable intent, which removed the reason to require universality.8 The official comment states the result: the ancient English tests are abandoned, a usage need not be “ancient or immemorial” or “universal,” and full recognition is available for new usages and for usages “currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.”9 Restatement § 222 moves the same way. It rejects any requirement of great longevity and universality and admits new usages, although some courts still apply the stricter test to contracts other than sales of goods.10
An older formulation shows how much dropped away. No usage was admissible unless it was “so well settled, so uniformly acted upon, and so long continued, as to raise a fair presumption that it was known to both contracting parties, and that they contracted in reference thereto.”11 Antiquity and uniformity there stood in for knowledge. Section 221 now makes knowledge its own condition, so a recent practice that dealers follow regularly can qualify.
Some of the old requirements survive in softer form. Notoriety lives on in the demand for “regularity of observance,”12 and trade usages, though no longer required to be universal, “still must be well settled.”13 Rejecting universality therefore does not make every common habit a usage. The comment looks to the great majority of dealers, with only dissidents departing. A market split evenly between two ways of doing business gives a party no basis for expecting either.
A different record changes the result. Had the witness testified that every dealer in the county except one shop delivers free, the regularity would suffice, because a dissident does not defeat a practice that the great majority follow.
The floor guards against a risk that comes from the timing of proof. A party proves a usage after the dispute has begun, and the writing may not favor that party. If an occasional practice sufficed, a disappointed party could search the trade for a habit that rescued it. One commentary observes that trade usage cannot be manipulated as long as the court requires it to be definite and widespread.14 Regularity also makes the claim checkable. An outside standard exists for judging a usage assertion, because the existence and scope of the usage can be determined from other members of the trade.15 The party who alleges the usage must prove that it exists in the applicable trade or market,16 and the judge may exclude the evidence when it fails to show that the practice is regularly observed.17
Regularity concerns whether people follow a practice, not whether they follow it identically. The UCC comment says that when a well-established usage varies from the general rules and nobody has worked the precise variation out into a single standard, the party relying on the usage is entitled to the minimum variation demonstrated. A fairly evidenced dominant pattern goes to the trier of fact on whether it was incorporated into the agreement.18 A usage need not be “certain and precise” to fit the definition,19 and the common-law requirement of certainty is gone.20 In Nanakuli, the manner in which suppliers carried out price protection was presented with enough precision for the jury to calculate damages of $220,800.21
Nanakuli also shows what strong proof looks like. The largest paving contracts on Oahu were let by government agencies, and none of the local, state, or federal governments allowed escalation clauses for paving materials. A paver that bid at one price and then faced a different price before the award would lose a great deal, because it could not pass the increase on to any government agency or to most general contractors. As a consequence, aggregate suppliers routinely price-protected paving contractors in the 1960s and 1970s, as did the largest asphalt supplier on Oahu, Chevron, and Nanakuli backed that showing with documents and two witnesses.22 The Ninth Circuit held that a “regularly observed” practice of protection, of which Shell “should have been aware,” was enough to constitute a usage that Nanakuli had reason to believe was incorporated into the agreement.23 Breadth across the suppliers in the market, a commercial reason that explains why the practice arose, and documentary and testimonial proof are the features to carry to other problems.
The subsections on defining the trade and proving a usage develop steps two and four. Steps one, three, and five carry the regularity test itself.
Reasonable Usage
The word “reasonable” in § 221 invites the reading that a court reviews a practice for fairness and admits it only if the resulting term seems sound. The Restatement rules that reading out. Section 221 gives effect to “a reasonable usage with respect to agreements of the same type,”25 and its commentary adds that “[t]he reasonableness of the usage is treated as part of the meaning of the agreement, rather than as a factor in its enforcement under the rule stated in § 204.”26 Under the Restatement, then, reasonableness bears on what the agreement means. It does not open a separate fairness review of the term at the enforcement stage.
Comment b describes the evidentiary role: “the fact that a usage is reasonable may tend to show that the parties contracted with reference to it or that a particular party knew or had reason to know of it.”27 That sentence ties reasonableness to the two things on which a usage’s binding force rests, namely that the parties contracted with reference to the practice and that each knew or had reason to know of it. The inference runs through commercial sense. A practice that serves an evident purpose is one that people in the trade have reason to adopt and expect from one another, so a party dealing in that setting more likely had it in mind. Because the comment says reasonableness “may tend to show” these facts, it supports the knowledge element and does not replace it.
Nanakuli supplies a usage whose commercial sense is plain. Government agencies at every level refused escalation clauses for paving materials, so a paver that bid at one price and then met a different price before the award could not pass the loss along. The court found the key to price protection’s prevalence in that reality of the Oahu paving market, which made the practice so common in 1969 that both parties would intend to incorporate it into their contract.28 The practice answered a real need, and that need makes it credible that suppliers and pavers alike had it in mind when they contracted.
The Uniform Commercial Code handles reasonableness in two parts. Reasonableness no longer needs to be proved by the party relying on a usage, so that party’s task is to show regular observance and the parties’ knowledge. A court may still disallow an “unconscionable or dishonest practice.”29 The two parts do different jobs. Dropping the proof requirement spares the proponent a separate showing that ordinary commercial practice is sensible, and the reserve power keeps a trade custom from carrying a dishonest term into a contract.
Together, the common-law and Code treatments suggest a working method. Ask whether the practice makes commercial sense for people in the trade, and treat a yes as evidence that the parties contracted with reference to it. Then turn to the knowledge condition, which reasonableness supports but cannot replace. Harshness alone is not the Code’s test, since its reserve power is aimed at practices that are unconscionable or dishonest.
Defining the Trade
Regularity of observance is a ratio, and a ratio needs a denominator: a practice that nearly everyone in one group follows may be followed by only a minority of a larger group. Restatement § 221 points to the group when it speaks of a usage “with respect to agreements of the same type,” and the UCC names it by defining a usage as a practice with regularity of observance “in a place, vocation, or trade.”31 Which place, vocation, or trade supplies the denominator is often the contested step in a usage dispute, because the answer can decide whether a usage exists. Whether this party knew or should have known of the usage is a separate condition, developed in the next section. This section keeps the two inquiries apart.
The usage of the parties’ own industry is the paradigm case, since “agreement” includes trade usage in the parties’ industry.32 The definition does not stop there. It joins its three communities with “or,” and in Nanakuli the Ninth Circuit took the conjunction at face value: “parties can be bound by a usage common to the place they are in business, even if it is not the usage of their particular vocation or trade.”33 The court found support in the repetition of the disjunctive “or” in the operative subsection, which gives effect to usages “in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware.” It found further support in a separate provision requiring that an applicable usage in the place where any part of performance is to occur be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part.34 It also read the drafters’ comment, which requires “not universality but only the described ‘regularity of observance,’” as confirming that a usage need not belong to the party’s own trade if it is so commonly practiced in a locality that the party should be aware of it.35
The wide reach follows from why a usage binds. A party is always held to conduct generally observed by members of its chosen trade, because the other party is justified in so assuming unless the first indicates otherwise. It is held to more general business practices to the extent of its actual knowledge of them, or to the degree its ignorance is not excusable because they were so generally practiced that it should have been aware of them.36 A usage may also be limited to a particular area, to a particular activity, or to both.37
A television example shows how much hangs on the choice. Is the relevant market the distribution of televisions, of home electronics, of all electronics, or of the electronics industry as a whole? The choice could be crucial, because the existence and nature of a usage can be different, or relatively stronger or weaker, if the market is defined more broadly or narrowly.38
A principal factor in drawing the boundary is how the parties relate to the market. When both parties are active participants in a market or trade, its usages are readily attributable to their contract unless the contract clearly excludes them. When one party stands outside the market, that market’s usages bear on the contract only if the outsider knew or should have known of them and the circumstances show that the parties reasonably expected them to apply.39 The party’s connection to the market thus feeds back into the boundary.
The usual instinct is to confine the trade to the product the contract names, and that was precisely Shell’s argument in Nanakuli. It urged that the trade was the purchase and sale of asphalt in Hawaii, because asphalt was the subject of the contract and the only product Shell supplied to the paving trade.40 The definition mattered because the trial judge, ruling on Shell’s motion in limine, had adopted the broader one. That choice admitted evidence that all suppliers of aggregate, the crushed rock mixed with asphalt in a hot-mix plant, routinely price-protected pavers.41 The judge defined the trade as asphaltic paving in Hawaii, and the Ninth Circuit held that he did not abuse his discretion, given what it called the “unusual, not to say unique, circumstances” of the case.42 The court rested the holding on these facts about the Oahu market and the two companies:
- The marketplace was small, and only two suppliers served the island.43
- Shell’s asphalt sales on Oahu were inextricably linked to Nanakuli’s own expansion. Shell made a half-million-dollar investment because of Nanakuli’s long-term commitment, acted as a partner in promoting Nanakuli’s expansion, and sold almost exclusively to Nanakuli for asphaltic paving.44
- Shell’s Hawaii representative knew the aggregate business and understood that Nanakuli’s bid estimates included only two major materials, asphalt and aggregate.45
- No level of government allowed escalation clauses for paving materials, so a paver could not pass increases along and depended on its suppliers’ protection.46
The court’s reasoning explains why those facts mattered. It read the Code comments as defining trade more broadly than the single transaction and as binding parties both to the usages of their own trade and to usages of trade in general in a given locality, an application it called equitable where the usage is almost universally practiced in a small market.47 Shell’s agent stayed in close contact with Nanakuli and knew both the paving market and Nanakuli’s bidding procedures and economics.48 The court’s stress on the smallness of the market suggests why the paver’s other suppliers formed part of the shared background there. In a large and diffuse market that connection would be harder to show.
The breadth has an edge. On Shell’s motion in limine the judge excluded evidence of cement suppliers and held Shell only to the routine practices of the suppliers of the two major ingredients of asphaltic paving, asphalt and aggregate.49 Aggregate suppliers fell inside the community and cement suppliers fell outside it. The line tracks the two materials on which the bid economics Shell’s representative understood rested. The trade can therefore reach past the contract’s own product, and it still stops where the connection to the transaction runs thin.
Two cautions keep Nanakuli from being over-read. First, the Ninth Circuit held only that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in a market it described as unusual, not to say unique.50 The case shows a permissible definition on distinctive facts and does not establish that a seller answers for the practices of its customer’s other suppliers. A seller with many customers in a large market would likely lack the connections on which the court relied. Second, the court’s discussion runs the community question into the awareness question, because it justified the broad definition partly by saying that Shell should have been aware of the practice.51 The overlap is natural, since the party’s connection to the market drives both inquiries, but they remain separate conditions.
Proving a Usage
The UCC divides the work of proof. “The existence and scope of such a usage must be proved as facts,” but “[i]f it is established that such a usage is embodied in a trade code or similar record, the interpretation of the record is a question of law.”53 Restatement § 222 allocates the work the same way: existence and scope are questions of fact, and the court interprets a written trade code as a question of law.54 The first half of the rule follows from what a usage is. A usage is a practice that a community actually follows, so whether it exists and how far it reaches are questions about the world, and a judge cannot answer them by reasoning about what would be sensible. Existence asks whether the practice has the regularity described above. Scope asks what the practice covers and how it works. The second half of the rule covers the one situation in which the fact has already been written down. Once the trade has recorded its practice in a code, deciding what the code’s words mean is the ordinary task of reading a text, and the court performs it as it would for any writing.
Because the facts concern a community, the evidence comes from the community. A trade usage is usually established by expert testimony, whereas a course of performance or a course of dealing can be established by the testimony of the parties.55 The parties lived through their own earlier conduct and can describe it, but neither party’s private experience reveals what a whole trade does.
The dispute between Figgie and Serralles shows this proof at its simplest. Figgie, in support of its motion for summary judgment, submitted affidavits of persons with extensive experience in the bottle-labeling and packaging industry. They attested that sellers in the industry always limit available remedies to repair, replacement, or return and specifically exclude consequential damages. Serralles asserted that it had not “acquiesce[d]” in the practice, but it offered no evidence to contradict the affidavits, and the court upheld the conclusion that usage of trade limited Serralles to the exclusive remedy of repair, replacement, or return.56 The Wolf litigation shows the same machinery working on a contract term. In Wolf v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, expert evidence of a usage was offered to explain a term. On remand the expert testified but apparently did not persuade the jury to interpret the term in light of the alleged usage, which shows that even when usage evidence is offered, its probative weight is ultimately for the factfinder.57
The first two steps repeat ground covered above, since the community must be identified before regularity can be measured within it, and the affidavits in Figgie are what satisfy the second. The last two steps screen out usages that are real but useless to the proponent. A genuine practice may speak to some other subject than the one in dispute. It may also be one that cannot reasonably be read alongside what the parties wrote: the UCC requires express terms, trade usage, and course of performance to be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, while a writing that is silent leaves courts likely to permit usage to establish additional terms.59 Proof that a usage exists also leaves the case unfinished. Section 221 gives a usage effect only if each party knows or has reason to know of it and neither party knows or has reason to know that the other intends something inconsistent with it, and the sections that follow take up those conditions.60
Judge and jury share the proof along the line between screening and weighing. The judge decides whether the evidence is the kind a jury should consider at all, so that the jury weighs only usages that are genuine and that bear on this contract. The Ninth Circuit’s discussion in Nanakuli describes three situations in which the judge keeps the evidence out:61
- The evidence fails to show that the practice is regularly observed, so it does not show a usage of trade as the Code defines one.
- Members of the trade confirm an actual usage but do not support the claim that it applies to the facts in litigation, so the evidence is irrelevant.
- The parties used new and different language to abandon the past practice, so the practice under the old language says nothing about the contract with the new language.
The second screen tests the fit between a real usage and the particular contract, and the Columbia Nitrogen discussion illustrates it. The question there was whether contracts of similar detail, covering similar time periods, and negotiated with similar care were regarded as estimates by others in the trade. If so, the usage should have come in. If the contracts treated as estimates were always form contracts, short-term contracts, or otherwise substantially different, the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant to the dispute.62 A trade’s habit of treating quantities on short form orders as estimates says little about whether the parties to a long, heavily negotiated agreement meant their figures to flex. The judge rejects such evidence at the threshold, and the jury never has to weigh it.
Evidence that passes the screen goes to the factfinder, because existence and scope are facts. When Shell objected in Nanakuli, the Ninth Circuit replied that the extent of a usage is ultimately a jury question.63 Where a well-established usage varies from the general rules and its precise amount has not been worked out into a single standard, the party relying on it is entitled to the minimum variation demonstrated, and evidence of a dominant pattern goes to the trier of fact on whether that pattern was incorporated into the agreement.64 A rule that demanded a single worked-out standard would let imprecision in the trade’s own habits defeat a practice that the proof shows is real. The judge therefore decides whether a genuine and applicable usage is in the case, and the jury decides what it covers and how far the agreement absorbed it.
A separate protection addresses timing. Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not admissible unless that party has given the other party notice that the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.65 The best answer to a claimed usage is usually more usage evidence, meaning other members of the trade who say that the practice does not exist or does not work as the proponent describes. Finding those witnesses takes time. A party who first hears of the claimed custom in the courtroom has no chance to find them, so the proponent’s account of the trade would go unanswered for reasons that have nothing to do with its truth.
Everything above concerns what the proponent must establish and who decides it. Whether the written contract itself keeps usage evidence out is a separate question, taken up in the later section on usage evidence and written contracts.