Concept
Supplementing and Qualifying
Usage of trade
Supplementing and Qualifying
A reasonable usage can change an agreement in two ways, and Restatement § 221 names both: it may supplement the agreement or qualify it, so long as each party knows or has reason to know of the usage and neither knows or has reason to know that the other intends something inconsistent with it.1 To supplement is to add a term on a subject the writing leaves open. To qualify is to act on a term the writing does state, either by carving an exception out of it or by cutting it down.
The two effects ask different things of a court. Supplementing meets no resistance from the text, because the usage fills a silence and competes with no words the parties chose. Qualifying works beside express language, so the court must decide whether the practice and the text can live together in one bargain. Both effects share a single limit, consistency with the agreement, and that limit follows from where a usage sits. The Code’s word “agreement” is broader than the written contract: it takes in course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage in the parties’ industry.2 The Restatement likewise treats the reasonableness of a usage as part of the meaning of the agreement, not as a factor in enforcing a term under § 204.3 A usage that fits the writing is therefore part of what the parties agreed, and a usage that cannot be fitted to it is not.
The first subsection takes up supplementing, where the writing is silent. The second takes up qualifying, where the question is how far a usage may reach into a term the writing states. Nanakuli is the standard illustration there.
Supplementing With Added Terms
The comments to § 221 say that a usage may supplement an agreement by adding a term consistent with it, and they cross-refer to § 204.4 The cross-reference marks a contrast. Under § 204, reasonableness is a factor in enforcing a term. Under § 221, the reasonableness of the usage is treated instead as part of the meaning of the agreement.5 Because the usage becomes part of the meaning of the parties’ own agreement, § 221 requires that each party know or have reason to know of it; a party who neither knew nor had reason to know of a practice cannot have it read into that party’s bargain.6
The Code gives sales of goods the same permission. The terms set forth in a writing may be explained or supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, so that the parties’ understanding can be determined.7 Section 2-202(a) is drafted broadly enough to let usage add a term, and § 1-303(d) is in accord.8 Some common-law decisions still keep usage out unless the writing is ambiguous or has a gap. One commentator calls those decisions unwise, because the principles of contract law do not turn solely on the moment of formation.9
Silence is what lets the practice in. In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., a lender and an automobile dealer had a written agreement that said nothing about what the lender must do if the dealer’s customer let the insurance lapse on the car sold to him. The court used evidence of trade usage to add a term: the lender had to notify the dealer of the lapse. Evidence of the parties’ own course of dealing recognized the same duty. The lender could easily have drafted a clause negating the term, and absent such a clause courts will likely permit usage, course of dealing, and course of performance to establish additional terms.10
Figgie International, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc. shows a usage adding a limit on remedies. Serralles, a rum distributor, bought bottle-labeling equipment from Figgie under a written agreement, and the equipment gave trouble as soon as it was installed at Serralles’s bottling plant in Puerto Rico.11 On summary judgment, Figgie submitted affidavits from people with long experience in the industry, attesting that sellers always confine buyers to repair, replacement, or return and exclude consequential damages. Serralles said it had not acquiesced in that practice but offered no evidence to contradict the affidavits, and the court agreed that usage of trade limited Serralles to repair, replacement, or return as its exclusive remedy.12 A usage is a fact, and here industry testimony proved it; a buyer’s bare denial of acquiescence did not answer that testimony.
The Code’s warranty provisions apply the same idea: unless excluded or modified, other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.13 A warranty is a promise about the goods that the writing never states, so a practice of selling goods with a given assurance can become, through usage, a promise within the agreement. The words “unless excluded or modified” leave the burden with the party who wants the practice kept out.
Where the writing speaks to the subject, the result changes. In Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., the parties had expressly agreed that a franchise arrangement would end at the close of any current period on notice given at least ninety days beforehand, and the court excluded evidence of trade practice.14
The Code frames the limit in the same terms: express terms and trade usage are construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other.15 When that construction is unreasonable, the express terms control.16 Two mistakes follow from missing this hinge. One treats usage evidence as foreclosed because the writing looks thorough, when the real question is whether the writing speaks to this subject. The other admits any practice that sounds sensible, although the practice must also satisfy the other conditions of § 221, knowledge among them. Whether a usage may operate on a term the writing does state, and how far, is the question of qualifying.
Qualifying Express Terms
A usage that qualifies an agreement works on words the parties chose, which raises the question of how much pull a writing can absorb. Nanakuli gives the leading answer: a usage may modify the apparent agreement, as seen in the written terms, “as long as it does not totally negate it.”18 The court quoted a commentator who reads “qualify” to mean, presumably, “cut down” express terms, “although not to negate them entirely.”19 In working terms, a usage may carve an exception out of an express term or cut the term down, and it may not erase the term.
The facts show how narrow the line is. Nanakuli, a buyer in Oahu’s asphaltic paving trade, dealt with Shell under a 1969 agreement whose price term was “Shell’s Posted Price at time of delivery.”20 Nanakuli claimed that Shell breached the agreement by failing to give it price protection in 1974. The jury agreed, the district judge set the verdict aside on Shell’s motion for judgment n.o.v., and the court of appeals reinstated it, finding substantial evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Shell had breached.21 The question was whether a practice of price protection could be reconciled with an express clause making the posted price at delivery the price.
The court looked at how the usage actually worked in the trade. Price protection came into play only when prices rose, and only for work committed before the increase on non-escalating contracts. It therefore formed an exception to the posted-price term, not a total negation of it.22 The court’s own example of negation marks the contrast: a usage under which the buyer set the price would wipe out the term.23 A usage of the first kind, the court said, “forms a broad and important exception to the express term, but does not swallow it entirely.”24 Outside the narrow circumstance of a price increase on committed work, the posted price still governed what the buyer paid.
The evidence supplied more than consistency. It was overwhelming that all suppliers in the small Oahu paving market routinely protected customers, so Shell knew of the practice. The practice was a realistic necessity in that market and vital to Nanakuli’s ability to win large government contracts. It therefore formed an intended part of the agreement as the Code broadly defines that term.25 The court also insisted that usage evidence be sufficiently definite and widespread to prevent unilateral post hoc revision of contract terms by one party, and it said the Code’s intent is to put usage evidence on an objective basis.26
The leading case on the subject is Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., and federal courts usually have been lenient in not ruling out consistent additional terms or trade usage for apparent inconsistency with express terms.27 The dispute there turned on a usage treating stated quantities as mere projections. The court found that usage reasonably consistent with the express quantity term for five reasons drawn from the contract itself. The contract did not say that usage and dealings evidence would be excluded; it was silent on adjusting price or quantity in a declining market; it expressed the minimum tonnage as products supplied, not products purchased; and its default clause stated no penalty for failure to take delivery. The reason that apparently weighed most was that the parties had deviated from similar express terms in earlier contracts when the market declined.28 The resulting test of admissibility asks not whether the contract appears on its face to be complete in every detail, but whether the proffered evidence of course of dealing and trade usage reasonably can be construed as consistent with the express terms.29 Commentary adds that evidence of this kind, unless carefully negated, becomes an element of the meaning of the words used.30
Columbia Nitrogen has drawn criticism for admitting evidence of a usage that was not proved sufficiently well established and was not clearly applicable to the detailed contract before the court.31 Nanakuli answered with a relevance check. If contracts of similar detail, duration, and negotiation were regarded as estimates by others in the trade, the usage evidence should come in. If the contracts so treated were always form contracts, short-term contracts, or otherwise substantially different, the evidence is irrelevant. The court found that formulation a fair one to follow, and its own record met it: the evidence was overwhelming that all suppliers to the asphaltic paving trade protected customers in the same types of circumstances.32
Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc. shows where the limit bites. The buyer there attempted to cancel more than 80 percent of the quantity it had agreed to take, and the court treated that as a “major departure” that went well beyond the minor quantity variations trade usage contemplates. Each party, the court observed, knows that it may resort to strict enforcement of its contract rights when the other makes such a departure.33 Columbia Nitrogen and Southern Concrete both involved stated quantities and a practice of adjusting them, and they came out differently because of what the usage would have done. In Columbia Nitrogen, features of the particular contract made the practice reasonably consistent with the express minimum. In Southern Concrete, the departure was too large for any usage of minor variation to cover.
Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp. applies the same line to a clause providing that the operator shall pay the contractor. The court called the clause clear and unambiguous and then asked the Nanakuli question: does the usage evidence negate the writing, in which case it is inadmissible, or merely qualify it, in which case it is admissible?34 To say that the operator shall not pay the contractor would negate the clause. To say that the operator shall pay unless the working-interest owners have not paid the operator is only to qualify it.35 A clause the court itself called clear and unambiguous therefore remained open to qualification by usage.
When no reasonable reconciliation exists, the Code settles the conflict by rank. Express terms, trade usage, and course of performance are construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other.36 If that construction is unreasonable, the express terms control both course of dealing and trade usage, and course of dealing controls usage of trade. The same commentary stresses that the rule does not bar evidence but supplies the criteria for evaluating it.37 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(5) points the same way at common law, directing that the parties’ manifestations of intention be interpreted wherever reasonable as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.38 A usage that cannot be fitted to the writing yields to it.
A problem that pairs a fixed term with a trade practice of adjusting it asks where the practice lands between a carve-out and an erasure. Courts divide at the margin, so the steps below follow the inquiries the cases run.
Nanakuli sits at the generous end of the range. Read literally, a clause making the posted price at delivery the price leaves little room for a practice of holding an older price, and the court’s approach to consistency has been called very liberal because the usage is hard to reconcile with the clear language of the contract. The court justified the result on the ground that nothing clearly indicated that the parties did not intend price protection to qualify the express language. On that approach, probably the only reliable way for a contract to exclude the usage is to say expressly that it does not apply.39 A commentator offers a tidier route: the court would have done better to rest on the Code’s provision that usage supplies a common basis of understanding for interpreting the contract’s language, and to hold that the usage established an understanding that changes in Shell’s posted price would not be retroactive. So read, no conflict arises between the express term and the trade usage.40