Concept
Course of Dealing and Parol Evidence
Course of dealing
Course of Dealing and Parol Evidence
A course of dealing comes from earlier transactions, and a final writing is supposed to close the book on what came before. That tension makes the parol evidence rule the doctrine most often raised against course-of-dealing evidence. UCC § 2-202 resolves it in two clauses. Terms in a writing the parties intended as a final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but they may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance.1 The Restatement (Second) reaches the same place for contracts generally: unless the parties agree otherwise, a course of dealing gives meaning to their agreement, supplements it, or qualifies it.2 Offered evidence therefore lands in one of two categories with different fates, and a good answer begins by deciding which.
Conduct in earlier transactions can be checked in a way that negotiation talk cannot. A course of dealing or a course of performance is objectively verifiable, unlike oral statements of agreement and proof of the parties' subjective intent. Documents usually bear witness to it, so there is little danger of perjury and no faulty memory to rewrite the contract.3
A second reason goes to what these sources are. The Code defines “agreement” as the parties' bargain in fact, found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade.4 The word is therefore broader than the written contract.5 Evidence that forms part of the agreement is not an outside addition in the way a discarded side deal is, which is why § 2-202 treats the two differently. Unless carefully negated, these sources become an element of the meaning of the word used.6
The general common-law rule leaves a gap here. Restatement (Second) § 213 speaks only to terms allegedly agreed during the interaction that led up to the writing and gives no guidance on contextual evidence. Section 2-202(a), by contrast, expressly permits an otherwise integrated agreement to be supplemented by course of dealing and trade usage.7
The Code also removes a gate that ordinary interpretation keeps. At common law the judge first decides whether the disputed term is ambiguous, meaning “reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning,” and if it is not, the judge decides the case on that basis as a matter of law, without a jury.8 A judge who tests clarity from the page alone, however, decides the question without the context that may give the words their meaning. In a sale of goods that approach is not appropriate, because Official Comment 1 to § 2-202 rejects it and calls for consideration of the commercial context in establishing meaning.9 Course of dealing and trade usage are, in the Code's terms, always admissible.10
A cited printing dispute shows the dividing line at work. A seller offered its earlier similar transactions to prove that both sides expected it to use the same materials in printing the cards as it had before, and so argued that the buyer's complaint about the cards was not its responsibility. The court overruled the buyer's objection because the evidence explained and supplemented the written term without contradicting it.11 The question that decided the objection was whether the evidence contradicted the writing, and not whether it came from before the contract.
The pair also marks the limit for other pre-contract evidence. A prior or contemporaneous agreement that adds a consistent term can still come in if the writing is a final expression but not a complete and exclusive one.15 The contextual sources need no finding about completeness, because they may supplement any integration, total or partial.16 A general merger clause that never mentions them therefore does not keep them out.17
The cited tequila illustration shows how the line is drawn when the writing makes an absolute statement. A written contract describes the tequila as free of fat, sugar, and alcohol, and Margie claims a usage under which small quantities of those substances are acceptable. Section 2-202 gives very strong credence to trade usage, which is presumed to enter the contract unless the parties clearly and unequivocally indicate a contrary intent or the usage cannot be reconciled with the writing. Nothing in the writing deliberately excluded the usage, so the general merger clause does not keep out the evidence, and it is admissible unless it is inconsistent with the writing. The writing describes the tequila unqualifiedly, so it could be argued that testimony allowing small quantities contradicts it.18 The contradiction question is the live one in that illustration, and the merger clause does not answer it.
Outside the Code, courts are less uniform. In many jurisdictions a trade usage or course of dealing may be added to a writing as an additional term if the term is not inconsistent with the agreement. Some common-law cases nonetheless continue to exclude evidence of usage, course of dealing, and course of performance unless the written contract is ambiguous or contains a gap, and one commentator calls those cases unwise.19 The criticism has two parts. Contract principles turn on the moving stream of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes formation, and not on the single moment of signing, so a rule that lets the writing alone decide what counts as evidence leaves out much of what the parties relied on. The ambiguity gate is also circular. A judge who reads a clause alone may call a word plain that the parties have used in a special sense for years, and the history that would reveal the special sense is the evidence the gate shuts out.
The modern common-law trend softens the gate without removing it. Under the approach associated with Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., extrinsic evidence is admitted to prove a meaning to which the language of the writing is reasonably susceptible. That approach permits more frequent use of such evidence because it avoids the need to find “ambiguity” in the narrow, historical sense.20 For a sale of goods the Code goes further and imposes no gate at all, so a student who carries the common-law ambiguity requirement into a UCC problem has stopped one step early.
Admission does not end the analysis, because the consistency and priority limits from the preceding sections still govern what the admitted history can accomplish. The Code's rule that express terms control an inconsistent course of dealing or trade usage does not bar evidence; it supplies the criteria for weighing it.21 The order of priority matters only when an inconsistency exists, and where the sources can be read together it never comes into play.22 A history that cannot reasonably be read alongside an express term loses to that term, and a writing that carefully negates these sources keeps them out, as the discussion of “unless otherwise agreed” explained.23