Concept
Limits on Course of Dealing
Course of dealing
Limits on Course of Dealing
A course of dealing gives meaning to an agreement, supplements it, or qualifies it, but only “unless otherwise agreed.”1 That sentence of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223(2) already holds one limit, and the contract itself supplies two more. Together they decide how far a proven history can reach into a written deal.
Three questions mark those limits, and each tests something different. Can the history be read together with the express terms? That is a test of fit, and it comes first because the law prefers a reading that keeps every part of the bargain alive. If the history and another source of meaning cannot be reconciled, which one prevails? That is a ranking, and it applies only after the test of fit fails. Did the parties agree to leave the history out? That is a choice, and it can remove the history before either other question arises.
Consistency With Express Terms
Restatement (Second) § 202(5) tells a court to interpret the parties' manifestations of intention, wherever reasonable, as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.2 The UCC imposes the same duty on sales of goods and says what follows when it fails: the express terms and an applicable course of dealing or usage “shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other,” and when that construction is unreasonable, the express terms control.3 The rule now sits in § 1-303(e), though the opinions below apply it under its earlier number, § 1-205(4).4
Everything turns on the word reasonable. Section 223(2) hints at its content by letting a course of dealing qualify an agreement as well as explain or supplement it,5 and courts have turned that hint into a working test: does the history qualify the term, or does it negate it?
Nanakuli, a dispute between a paving contractor and its asphalt supplier, Shell, gave the test its best-known statement. The contract's express price term was “Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery.”6 The contractor showed that suppliers in the Oahu paving trade routinely practiced price protection: when the posted price rose, the old price continued, for a period or for a specified tonnage, on work already committed at the lower price under nonescalating contracts.7 Shell objected that the practice let a trade usage control an express term. The court answered that a usage may modify the apparent agreement as long as it does not totally negate it.8
Such a usage, the court said, “forms a broad and important exception to the express term but does not swallow it entirely.”9 A total negation of the posted-price term would have left the buyer to set the price. Price protection did far less. It came into play only when prices rose and only for work committed before the increase, so the posted price still governed every other delivery.10
The test measures a term by what survives. With the usage credited, the posted price still governs every delivery outside the protected work, so the clause bends only when prices rise. Had the evidence let the buyer set the price, nothing would remain for the clause to do. Students often treat any evidence that changes the outcome as a contradiction, but the test is narrower: does the term still do real work once the evidence is added? Courts draw the same line whether the history is a usage of trade, a course of performance, or a course of dealing, because the consistency rule names all three in one sentence and the Code's agreement includes all three.11
Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp. ran the same test on a payment clause. The express term was that the operator would pay the contractor. After Badger resigned as operator, Carter Baron received nothing from Badger but about $950,000 on its account from the well's working interest owners.12 Badger offered evidence of a course of performance that departed from the payment term and of an industry usage under which an operator is not ultimately liable to the contractor who drills the well.13 The court held the evidence admissible as a matter of law and went on to ask whether it was enough to defeat Carter Baron's motion for partial summary judgment.14
The court's reasoning shows the line more clearly than any abstract statement, because only the tail of the clause moves. On Badger's evidence the term would read “operator shall pay contractor unless operator is not himself paid by the working interest owners,” which the court called merely a qualification. A complete negation would read “operator shall not pay contractor.”15 The first rewrite trims the promise, and the second erases it. The court added that, as in Columbia Nitrogen, the contract did not expressly exclude such evidence, was silent on the operator's liability when the owners failed to pay, and was accompanied by allegations of a course of performance that deviated from the express term.16
Courts divide over how much room reasonable leaves, and Carter Baron names the camps. It followed Columbia Nitrogen, Chase, and Nanakuli “rather than the more restrictive approach of Southern Concrete and Luria.”17
The Fourth Circuit led the liberal camp in Columbia Nitrogen. The contract there was silent about adjusting prices and quantities in a declining market, and the court saw in that neutrality “a fitting occasion for recourse to usage of trade and prior dealing.”18 The same court held in Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co. that the parol evidence rule did not bar extrinsic evidence of the parties' intention in using the term “F.A.S. Norfolk, Virginia,” even though the term was unambiguous on its face.19 Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank reversed a lower court that had excluded usage and dealing evidence offered to show that the parties did not intend to limit a subordination agreement to eighteen months, because the evidence “merely delineates a commercial backdrop for intelligent interpretation of the agreement.”20 Chase reaches past the qualify-or-negate line: its contradiction was total, and Carter Baron read it to admit even contradictory terms that arise from performance or usage.21
Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc. sits on the other side. There a buyer of construction materials tried to cancel more than 80 percent of the agreed quantity, and the court held for the seller. Trade usage, it said, “should be considered in determining what variations in specifications is considered acceptable,” but § 2-202 was not meant to invite “a frontal assault on the essential terms of a clear and explicit contract.”22 Parties to such a sale often work out minor quantity disagreements through compromise, yet each knows it may insist on strict enforcement after a “major departure,” and a cancellation of that size was one.23
The two lines meet over similar facts. In Columbia Nitrogen a silent contract left room for dealing and usage to bear on adjusting quantities in a declining market; in Southern Concrete a clear contract left none for cancelling most of the quantity. The contrast shows that consistency is partly a question of how large a departure the evidence would license.
Each camp can point to reasons. The liberal courts give these:
- The Code looks beyond the printed pages to usages and the commercial context to find the parties' true understanding, and one of its purposes is to promote flexibility in commercial practice.24
- A judge who reads a contract outside its commercial setting risks a distorted view and a greater chance of error.25
- The dangers behind the parol evidence rule are muted. A course of performance or dealing is objectively verifiable and usually documented, usage must be definite and widespread, and a judge may exclude a practice that is not regularly observed or does not fit the facts.26
- Words have no fixed meanings and no drafter achieves perfect accuracy and fullness, so a strict reading would demand a precision no one reaches.27
The strict courts give these:
- Usage may inform minor variations, but it may not mount a frontal assault on the essential terms of a clear and explicit contract.28
- Parties who settle small disagreements informally keep their right to demand strict performance after a major departure, so a habit of flexibility does not license a large one.29
Even where courts accept the qualify-or-negate line, applying it takes judgment, because the same evidence can be described two ways. Price protection can be called an exception carved from the posted-price term, or it can be called the meaning of “posted price” all along: a price that does not apply retroactively to committed work. On the second description no conflict arises. One commentator thought the Nanakuli court would have done better to rest on the usage's power to supply a “common basis of understanding for interpreting” the words “Shell's Posted Price,” which would have avoided any clash between express term and usage.30 That overlap with giving meaning, taught earlier in this chapter, explains why a court can reach one result by either route.
Priority Among Sources
UCC § 1-303(e) supplies the ranking for sales of goods. If a consistent construction is unreasonable, express terms prevail over course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of trade; and course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.32 Restatement (Second) § 203(b) states the same order as relative weight.33 All four sources belong to the agreement, which the Code defines as the bargain of the parties in fact, found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.34 The ranking sorts sources inside that bargain when they disagree. It does not decide which of them count.
The order tracks closeness to the particular transaction, and the closer a source sits, the better it describes what these parties intended.35 Express terms head the list because they are the words the parties chose for this deal. Course of performance comes next because it is conduct under the same contract, and the parties themselves know best what their words meant, so what they did under the agreement is the best indication of that meaning.36 Course of dealing grows out of other transactions between the same parties, so it speaks to this deal by analogy. Usage of trade ranks last because it records what is customary in a market, not what these two parties did.37 Nanakuli drew that last line, reasoning that a course of dealing carries more weight than usage because it is a specific usage between the two parties to the contract.38 One treatise calls a course of dealing the parties' own private usage of trade, developed in their prior dealings to control their transactions, so it prevails over a general usage where the two conflict.39
The express term sits above everything else, so a history that collides with it loses.
Remove the clause excluding a grace period and the analysis changes. A bare delivery date and a history of deliveries a few days late may be read together as a date qualified by a short, accepted tolerance, and nothing then needs ranking. The first question is whether a reasonable consistent reading exists, and the ranking arrives only after the answer is no.
The top rung has one statutory exception. Subject to § 2-209, a course of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with it, so conduct under the contract in dispute can sometimes displace an express term.40 The provision gives that power to course of performance and mentions no other source.
Students often read the ranking as an exclusion rule: once a higher source exists, the lower one is out. Nanakuli shows why that reading fails. Performance, usages, and prior dealings are admitted even against a final and complete agreement, and they lose their binding force only when they cannot reasonably be reconciled with the express terms.41 The court there held that a usage of price protection for work committed on nonescalating contracts could reasonably be read as consistent with the seller's posted price at delivery, so the ranking never came into play.42 The same structure governs integrated writings: course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage are admissible to supplement any integration, total or partial, and the order of priority matters only if inconsistencies exist.43 Where all the sources point to the same meaning, the conclusion is at its strongest and the ranking has nothing to do.44 It is a rule of preference, a tiebreaker for the leftover case in which the search for the parties' meaning still leaves two sources pulling apart.45
Unless Otherwise Agreed
The opening words of § 223(2) leave the power of a course of dealing subject to the parties' own choice.48 Unless carefully negated, a course of dealing, a course of performance, and a usage of trade are considered part of the parties' agreement.49 They therefore enter every new contract as background terms, and an express term can displace a background term. The open question is how clearly the parties must write that displacement, and the answer is that the language must speak to the history itself.
The Code's parol evidence provision presumes very strongly that parties contract in light of their own and the market's customary practices, so a contract may include terms from those sources even when the writing is fully integrated and never mentions them.50 That presumption compels parties to use “very clear and specific language” if they truly intend to exclude a course of dealing or a trade usage.51 The burden falls where it is cheap to carry. The party who wants the history out can say so in one sentence at the drafting stage, while the other side may never have thought to mention a practice both took for granted.
In Columbia Nitrogen the contract did not expressly state that course of dealing and usage could not be used to explain or supplement it, and it was silent about adjusting prices and quantities in a declining market. The court held that the test of admissibility is not whether the contract appears complete in every detail, but whether the proffered dealing and usage evidence can reasonably be construed as consistent with the express terms.52 Because the history comes in as part of the agreement, the court also need not first find the writing ambiguous before considering it to explain the terms.53
A general merger clause does not change this result. Such a clause makes the parties' intent express in one or more of three ways: it may show that the writing is the final expression of the terms stated, that these are the only terms the parties agreed to, or that no other agreements of any kind exist on the subject.54 Each of those aims at agreements and terms, not at the interpretive history. One treatise reasons that a clause of that kind would not keep out evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance offered to explain the terms or to supplement them with non-contradictory additional terms, though a more specific clause could.55
Admission in the second version would not end the dispute. The consistency and priority rules still decide how much work the history can do, and a week's delay against a stated date invites the question whether the history qualifies the date or negates it. The next section turns to how the parol evidence rule treats this kind of evidence.
The drafting lesson follows from the pair. A party that wants to exclude prior dealings must say so specifically, and because the Code treats course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade as separate sources, a careful drafter names each one.56 A merger clause drafted only to declare the writing final and complete does its own work and leaves the history untouched. The party that wants the history to apply has to do nothing at all, since silence preserves it.57