Concept
Related Sources of Meaning
Course of dealing
Related Sources of Meaning
Course of dealing has two close relatives, and a court that finds a pattern of conduct must decide which of the three it has found. The Restatement states the rule for the first: unless the parties agree otherwise, a course of dealing between them gives meaning to, supplements, or qualifies their agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223(2).1 Course of performance and usage of trade do the same work, clarifying the express terms of a contract or adding to them.2
The Code treats all three as evidence of the bargain itself. It fills gaps in a contract with default provisions that apply “absent an agreement otherwise,” and it defines agreement as the bargain of the parties in fact, found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.3 Lease law follows the same pattern. When a lease does not say when rent is due, virtually all courts hold that rent falls due at the end of the period it covers, unless some understanding or agreement between landlord and tenant provides otherwise.4
Sorting the three takes two questions: whose conduct is offered, and when did it occur? Course of performance is how these parties have been performing the contract now in dispute. Course of dealing is how these same parties performed prior contracts between themselves. Usage of trade is how others in the trade or community do it. Of the three, course of performance is the most directly relevant.5
When the sources cannot reasonably be read as consistent with one another, the Code ranks them. Express terms prevail over all three, course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of trade, and course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.6 A later section develops that ranking. Whether a court will hear this evidence at all is a separate, gateway question. Many courts first ask whether the disputed term is ambiguous, meaning reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, and they decide an unambiguous term as a matter of law, without a jury.7 Some cases push the gate further and exclude usage, course of dealing, and course of performance unless the writing is ambiguous or has a gap, a position one authority calls unwise.8
Course of Performance
UCC § 1-303(a) defines a course of performance as a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction, and it sets two conditions. The agreement must involve repeated occasions for performance by a party, and the other party, knowing the nature of the performance and having an opportunity to object to it, must accept the performance or acquiesce in it without objection.9 The phrase particular transaction marks the line between this source and course of dealing. A course of dealing comes from earlier contracts between the parties.10 A course of performance comes from what the parties do after they make the agreement, under that same agreement.11 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(4) gives performance accepted without objection the same evidentiary value.12
Courts weigh this conduct heavily because performance tendered and accepted without objection is a strong indicator of what the parties must have intended.13 The Code treats actual performance as the most relevant evidence of how the parties interpreted the terms of their own contract.14 That reasoning explains the ranking in § 1-303(e). When express terms and the other sources cannot reasonably be read together, course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of trade, though the express terms still prevail over all three.15
A lease that bars “animals” without defining the word shows what each step screens out. Suppose the lessee keeps a pet duck in the yard for several months and the lessor sees it repeatedly without complaint. That conduct supports an inference that both parties understood “animals” not to include ducks.18 A single sighting proves far less. The more extensive or repetitious the conduct, the stronger the inference, and an isolated instance may be only a waiver or a disinclination to enforce on one occasion.19 If the lessee kept the duck indoors where the lessor never saw it, the conduct shows only what the lessee thought the lease meant, because conduct that the other party neither knew of nor acquiesced in does not prove that the other party shared the view.20 And a lessor who objected on every sighting never accepted or acquiesced without objection, so the definition is not met.21
An installment contract supplies the repetition cleanly. Road Runner, Inc. (RRI) contracts with Acme for 100 anvils, ten a month for ten months, delivered to RRI’s place of business by the first of each month. Acme delivers ten anvils in each of March through June, but they arrive on the third through the fifth. RRI accepts every shipment without complaint. Those late deliveries are repeated occasions for performance accepted without objection, so they are a course of performance,22 and a course of performance accepted without objection is relevant to what the agreement means.23
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co. shows the doctrine at work in a commercial dispute. Nanakuli relied on Shell’s conduct under their 1969 contract. In 1970 and 1971, the only times Shell raised prices between 1969 and 1974, Shell held its old price for four months and then three months after announcing the increase.24 Shell’s own people treated that conduct as more than a favor. Blee, who had negotiated the contract and knew its terms, wrote of the need to “bargain” with Nanakuli over the extent of price protection, which indicated that some protection was a legal right under the 1969 agreement.25 Shell protected Nanakuli again on the only two post-1974 increases, in 1977 and 1978, and that evidence, which Shell itself offered, bolstered the jury’s reading of the pattern as a course of performance.26
The case also shows the main hazard of this doctrine. Conduct under a contract is not always a course of performance. It can be a waiver or a modification instead, and those are subject to different rules.27 The preference for treating conduct as waiver applies only where the acts are ambiguous, and it was for the jury to decide whether the acts were ambiguous and, if not, whether they were waivers or a course of performance.28 The same difficulty arises when a party uses performance to add to the writing. A course of performance follows the writing, so the parol evidence rule’s treatment of additional terms does not apply to it, and using it to add a term raises an issue of modification or waiver. It may add a term to the agreement or subtract one.29 Section 1-303(f) separately treats course of performance as showing waiver or modification, and the line between that use and using performance to fix a term’s original meaning under § 1-303(d) is not sharp.30
Usage of Trade
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222 gives a usage of trade the same work that § 223 gives a course of dealing. Unless the parties agree otherwise, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged, or one they know or have reason to know of, gives meaning to, supplements, or qualifies their agreement.32 A usage differs from the other two sources in where it comes from. Course of performance and course of dealing grow out of the parties’ own conduct, one under the contract in dispute and the other before it. A usage comes from the community, meaning how others in the trade do business, whether or not these parties ever did it together.33
The difference in source produces a difference in proof. The parties’ own testimony can establish a course of performance or a course of dealing, but a trade usage is usually established by expert testimony.34 The practice belongs to the trade, so neither party can establish it from personal experience. In Wolf v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, the author of the book behind Who Framed Roger Rabbit was owed a royalty of 5 percent of “gross receipts” and offered an expert to testify that the film industry understood the phrase to include noncash consideration. The court of appeals held that excluding the testimony was error. Once a usage that binds the parties is proved, it can give meaning to the words, as in Wolf, and it can add a term, so long as the term is not inconsistent with the agreement.35
The Code defines a usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.” The test is regularity and expectation, not perfection. A usage need not be “certain and precise” to fit the definition, and where a well-established usage varies from the Code’s general rules but the precise amount of variation has not been worked out into a single standard, the party relying on it is entitled to the minimum variation demonstrated. Where a dominant pattern has been fairly evidenced, that party may go to the trier of fact on whether the pattern was incorporated into the agreement.36 The Ninth Circuit in Nanakuli read the Code the same generous way, holding that courts should not stand in the way of new commercial practices by insisting on narrow and inflexible old rules.37
Proving that a usage exists is only the first step, because the party relying on it must also show that the other side is bound. A party is always held to conduct generally observed by members of its chosen trade, because the other side is justified in assuming it unless the party indicates otherwise. A party is held to more general business practices only to the extent of its actual knowledge, or to the degree its ignorance is inexcusable because the practices were so generally followed that it should have been aware of them.38 The mechanism is expectation. Membership in the trade supplies the assumption automatically, and an outsider supplies it only through knowledge or circumstances that make ignorance inexcusable. Course of dealing, course of performance, or the usage of trade in which both parties are engaged can also exclude the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, but the key is that the buyer is on notice.39
The outsider’s protection is clearest when a usage is real but the party it is pressed against was in no position to know of it. In Frantz v. Cantrell, roofer Frantz argued that its contract to install asphalt shingles on homeowner Cantrell’s house excluded the implied warranty of merchantability because of a trade usage in the roofing industry. Frantz’s expert testified that roofers did not provide warranties on the shingles they used. Cantrell was not in the roofing trade and did not know of the practice. The court concluded that to exclude the warranty, both parties had to be engaged in the relevant trade, or the usage had to be one of which both parties were aware or should have been aware.40 The expert proved that the practice existed, but that proof said nothing about whether Cantrell could have expected it.
Nanakuli’s price-protection claim also rested on a usage. The court concluded that the manner in which the usage of price protection was carried out had been shown with enough precision for the jury to calculate damages at $220,800.41 The dispute therefore reached the same term by two routes. Shell’s own conduct under the 1969 contract was a course of performance, and the practice of price protection was a usage of trade. One route ran through the parties’ own history and the other through the community’s practice, and each had its own proof. When the two point in different directions, the parties’ own history ranks higher, because it is the better evidence of what these two parties meant.42