Concept
Applying the Exclusions Together
Additional terms in an acceptance
Applying the Exclusions Together
Section 2-207(2) states its three exclusions in the disjunctive. Additional terms in an acceptance are construed as proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of the contract unless1 the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms,2 the terms materially alter it,3 or notification of objection has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.4 Any one exclusion therefore keeps a term out, and a term gets in only when all three fail.
Each exclusion guards a different route to unwanted fine print. Paragraph (a) serves the offeror who fenced in the offer before any reply existed. Paragraph (c) serves the offeror who spoke up after reading the reply. Paragraph (b) serves the offeror who did neither, because it screens a term by what it does to the bargain, whatever the offeror said. If the exclusions were cumulative, a term would stay out only when all three applied, and an offeror who limited its offer would still lose to the offeree's fine print unless it had also objected and the term also altered the bargain materially. Each precaution would then protect little by itself.
Because the exclusions are independent, a court may stop at the first one that clearly applies. In Option Wireless, Ltd. v. OpenPeak, Inc. the parties argued at length over whether the buyer's purchase order had objected in advance to conflicting terms the seller might introduce, or had given notification of objection to the seller's additional terms. The court did not decide either point. Both parties admitted that the invoice terms materially altered the purchase order, and because subsection (2) is phrased in the disjunctive, additional terms stay out of the contract if any one exception applies.5
That independence makes a fixed sequence possible whenever a reply adds terms to an offer:
Step one comes first because every later step reads the offer. Exclusion (a) looks to the offer's own language, exclusion (c) asks what the offeror said in response, and a term counts as additional only by comparison with what the offer contains. The first document sent is often the offer. In Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Electric Co. the seller's quotations were the first documents exchanged, went out in response to a request from the buyer's personnel, and listed the property, price, payment terms, and delivery terms; the court held that no reasonable factfinder could treat the buyer's purchase order as the offer.6 The label fails when the quotation leaves the seller free to refuse. In McCarty the quotation was not binding when the buyer accepted it and became binding only if and when the seller accepted, with the seller under no obligation to do so. The court reasoned that such a quotation cannot by itself be treated as an offer, since an offer gives another the legal power to create a contract.7 What separates the two cases is whether the quotation gave the buyer the power to close the deal by saying yes. A definite quotation that does so can be the offer. One that reserves the seller's right to refuse cannot, and the buyer's order then stands as the offer.
Step two asks whether the writings formed a contract at all. At common law, a reply that varied the terms of the offer was a counteroffer rejecting the original offer, and a reply conditional on the offeror's assent to additional or different terms was a counteroffer and not an acceptance.8 Subsection (2) assumes the opposite starting point: a contract has formed, and the only question is which of the reply's additional terms belong in it. Timing can complicate that assumption. In the box-top license cases, courts have turned at least in part on whether the parties formed their contract before or after the vendor communicated its terms. In Step-Saver, the parties' conduct in shipping, receiving, and paying for the product demonstrated the contract, and the box-top license was treated as a proposal for additional terms that required the purchaser's express agreement.9 Another court remarked that the buyers before it might have had a better argument had they first learned of the bundled terms after opening the box and been dissuaded from returning the computer by the expense of shipping.10 Terms that arrive after the contract forms receive separate treatment in a later section.
Step five lets the facts set the order of testing. The express limit requires only the text of the offer, the objection requires only a timeline of what the offeror said and when, and material alteration usually calls for evidence about the trade and the parties' history. The first two exclusions therefore clear quickly, and the third absorbs the work. The same economy governs a written analysis. When the offer carries no limiting language, say so in a sentence and turn to the two remaining questions: whether the new language in the acceptance materially altered the offer, and whether the offeror notified the accepting party of its objection within a reasonable time.11
Step three can also turn up a different term, one that contradicts a term of the offer. Courts treat those terms in more than one way, and a later section takes them up. An appeal over retainage shows what is at stake. The offeror, ABI, argued that the retainage term in St. Paul's acceptance was material and had not been accepted, so that the 10% retainage term in ABI's purchase order governed. The trial court had held that the differing retainage terms cancelled each other out, and the appellate court rejected ABI's argument.12
Brown Machine shows the express-limit exclusion at work. The court treated the purchase order of Hercules as the offer and asked whether Hercules, as offeror, had expressly assented to the additional indemnity provision and so waived its condition that acceptance be limited to the terms of its offer. The text of § 2-207 does not itself say so, but the court found the answer in Official Comment 3: terms that materially alter the original bargain "will not be included unless expressly agreed to by the other party."13 The two exclusions thus lead to one requirement, and in both the offeror's express assent is the only way back in.
The forms alone rarely settle every term of the resulting contract, because standard forms often omit material terms that the parties mutually understand from past dealings or common customs and usages in their type of business, and the seller's provisions seldom match the buyer's.14 What the writings leave open falls to those understandings and to Article 2's gap-fillers, and Weisz shows the contest. One party claimed that the contracts for all three orders specified delivery within a twelve-month release period. The other denied any such agreement and argued that, without one, delivery should fall due within a reasonable time.15
The exclusions catch terms that the offeror fenced out or that change the bargain, and a term that is neither gets in. That default keeps subsection (2) from operating as a ban on additional terms in replies, and it rests on a familiar principle: courts do not release a party from an agreement it can fairly be deemed to have made merely because performance turns out to be a hardship.16 An offeror that neither limited its offer nor objected, and whose dealings make the added term unsurprising, can fairly be deemed to have accepted it.17
The bakery problem shows how the exclusions interact. The bakery's silence defeated exclusion (c) and left exclusion (b) untouched, because the exclusions do not depend on one another. Had the order confined acceptance to its own terms, step five would have ended at exclusion (a), and the evidence of custom would never have been needed.