Concept
Timely Objection
Additional terms in an acceptance
Timely Objection
Section 2-207(2)(c) supplies the third exclusion: between merchants, an additional term stays out of the contract when notification of objection to it has already been given, or is given within a reasonable time after notice of it is received.1 Paragraphs (a) and (b) examine the offer and the term. Paragraph (a) asks whether the offer expressly limits acceptance to its own terms, and paragraph (b) asks whether the term materially alters the contract.2 Paragraph (c) examines the offeror’s conduct. The exclusions are phrased in the disjunctive, so any one of them keeps a term out, and paragraph (c) reaches a term whether or not it is material.3 A clause that clears (a) and (b) can therefore still fail under (c) if the offeror said, early enough, that it did not agree.
The exclusion qualifies a default. Additional terms in an acceptance are proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of it unless an exclusion applies.4 The default rests on a sensible premise: a merchant offeror, a person with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both, can read a reply and answer it.5 Paragraph (c) tests that premise. An offeror who objects in time shows that consent cannot be inferred, and the term remains a proposal that never enters the contract. An offeror who has notice and stays silent leaves the default in place, and silence then supports an assumption of assent to terms that are not material.6 Under this route the party that sent its form first prevails, which reverses the common-law last-shot result, although one commentator finds no compelling reason to favor the first sender when neither party reads the forms.7
The statute lets the offeror object at either of two moments because an offeror can meet the fine print in either of two ways. An offeror who expects the other side to answer on its own form can object before any reply exists, and the objection is then in place when the form arrives. An offeror who never anticipated the term reads it for the first time in the reply and has a reasonable time to respond. The first moment is the subject of the next subsection, and the second follows it.
Advance Objection
The first timing in § 2-207(2)(c) covers an objection the offeror has already given when the additional term arrives.8 An offeror drafting an offer cannot know what fine print a reply will carry, so the paragraph lets the offeror object ahead of time, in the offer or in an earlier communication, to whatever the reply may add. The objection still has to say something. A silent offer objects to nothing, and one commentator observes that the drafters apparently did not contemplate that an offer’s own term would notify the offeree of an objection to a contrary term, so the offeror must state the objection explicitly.9 The cases sort advance statements by whether they told the offeree that its additions would not be accepted.
Power Engineering & Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Krug International supplies the clearest example of a statement that did. The seller’s quotation provided that no waiver, alteration, or modification of its provisions would bind the seller unless agreed to in writing, and the buyer’s purchase order then added a force majeure clause, a term excusing performance for events beyond a party’s control. The Iowa Supreme Court read the quotation as telling the buyer, before it replied, that the seller would contract only on its own terms and objected to any others, so the added clause stayed out.
The quotation’s sentence about alterations can serve two paragraphs at once, and the two ask different questions. Paragraph (a) asks whether the offer confines acceptance to its own terms; paragraph (c) asks whether the offeror told the offeree that it objects to what the reply adds. The sentence is aimed at exactly what an additional term is, an alteration of provisions the offeror put forward, so an offeree who read it knew, before sending any form, that silence would not carry extra terms into the contract.
A purchase order that says nothing about additional terms stands on weaker footing still. One federal court refused to treat a silent buyer as having objected in advance to every seller term that conflicts with a Code gap-filler, meaning a default rule that supplies a term when the parties have not.11 Such a purchase order neither expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer under paragraph (a) nor necessarily amounts to prior notification of objection under paragraph (c), so the buyer must look to some other Code provision to exclude the seller’s term.12 The result follows from what paragraph (c) asks of the offeror. If a Code default counted as an objection, an offeror would never have to say or do anything, and paragraph (c) would become a standing presumption against seller fine print.
The harder case arises when the offer already contains a term on the same subject as the reply’s addition, and the sources point in different directions. The commentator quoted above would require the offeror to say explicitly that it objects, even where its own offer carries a contrary term.13 Another line of authority skips the question of objection and cancels both terms. Some courts that knock out conflicting terms rest on Comment 6, but a careful reading, one source notes, shows that the comment addresses confirmations of existing contracts, the subject of subsection (3); others defend knockout as fairer because it applies neither party’s term and substitutes the Code’s defaults.14 In ABI’s dispute with St. Paul, ABI’s offer set a 10% retainage term and St. Paul’s acceptance proposed a different one. ABI argued that St. Paul’s term was material, that ABI had not accepted it, and that ABI’s own 10% term therefore became part of the agreement.15 The trial court held that the different retainage terms cancelled out, and the appellate court rejected ABI’s position.16
Courts also sidestep the question when they can. In Option Wireless, Ltd. v. OpenPeak, Inc. the parties argued at length over whether the buyer’s purchase order had objected in advance to the seller’s conflicting terms or had given notification of objection to the seller’s additional terms. The court declined to decide, because both parties admitted that the invoice terms materially altered the purchase order, and because the exclusions are phrased in the disjunctive, any one of them keeps a term out.17
Objection After Notice
The second timing in § 2-207(2)(c) covers the offeror who first learns of the term by reading the reply: the term stays out when the offeror gives notification of objection within a reasonable time after notice of the term is received.20 This is the likelier situation when the offer said nothing about the subject. The effect matches that of an advance objection, because the term remains a proposal the offeror has declined and never joins the contract.21
The reasonable time runs from the offeror’s receipt of notice of the term, not from the day the offeree wrote or mailed its form.22 An offeror can fairly be taken to consent by silence only after it has had the chance to see the proposal and answer it, and a clock that started before the form arrived would charge the offeror with silence about something it had never seen. Anchoring the period to receipt also leaves the risk of a delayed or misdirected form with the party who chose to send it. The statute fixes no number of days, so the length of a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of the exchange.
The paragraph requires notification of objection and says nothing about its form.23 A buyer that reads the seller’s acknowledgment on arrival and promptly emails that it will not submit disputes to binding arbitration has therefore given notification, even though its purchase order contained no limiting language. A writing is the safer course, because the party relying on the objection must be able to prove it was given. A refusal to sign points the same way from the other direction. In Step-Saver, TSL twice asked Step-Saver to sign agreements containing warranty-disclaimer and limitation-of-remedy terms like those in the box-top license; Step-Saver refused both times, and TSL kept selling to it anyway.24 A seller who keeps shipping after such a refusal cannot easily rest on the buyer’s silence.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger shows the exclusion removing a term that would otherwise have entered. The seller’s acknowledgment carried the notation “price in effect at time of shipment to apply.” The Kentucky Court of Appeals observed that such a term ordinarily becomes part of a contract between merchants, but it held that the buyer’s timely objection excluded it.
The other side of the exclusion is the offeror who says nothing. Where the non-assenting party does not respond to additional terms, Official Comment 6 treats it as “both fair and commercially sound to assume that [the additional terms’] inclusion has been assented to.”25 The assumption fits merchants, who have specialized knowledge of the goods or of business practices, can read a reply, and can answer it in a sentence if they disagree.26 In the dispute between Sethness-Greenleaf and its buyer, GRC, GRC ordered concentrate without specifying a time for payment, and Sethness-Greenleaf’s invoices supplied one. The court held the terms not so surprising as to materially alter the arrangement, noted that the Code’s own default of payment on delivery was even less generous, and observed that GRC had accepted the invoices “without a peep,” so that it was too late to complain.27
Silence also confirms terms that earlier dealings supplied. Where the written forms said nothing about release dates, specific letters and numbers, or typeface, the court found those missing terms part of the contract through prior course of dealing, confirmed by a course of performance to which the other party never objected.28
Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group shows how notice and silence work together. Rocheux sent confirmations and invoices containing additional terms that the buyers never noticed or rejected, and the court, relying on Comment 6, assumed their assent.29 Receipt was disputed, however. The buyers presented evidence that they never received the terms-and-conditions pages Rocheux said it sent with its order acknowledgments, which raised a genuine issue of material fact over whether the acknowledgments contained the terms at all.30 Because Rocheux claimed that the later invoices carried the same terms, the court turned to them, and it concluded that the buyers should have known of the additional terms appearing on hundreds of sales forms.31 Silence counts only against a party who had notice, and each form that did arrive was another opportunity for notice.
Silence has this effect only for terms that are not material. In the dispute between Hercules and its seller, Hercules’s purchase order was the offer, and the reply added an indemnity provision. The court looked for Hercules’s express assent, because under Official Comment 3 a term that materially alters the original bargain stays out unless the other party expressly agrees.32 Set beside Sethness-Greenleaf, the two cases show where silence stops: a non-material payment term entered through the buyer’s silence, while the indemnity clause required express assent. An arbitration clause shows how the line gets drawn case by case. Where an acceptance added an arbitration provision to an oral offer, whether it materially altered the offer was a question the trial court had to resolve on further findings of fact, and if it did, the clause could not become part of the contract unless the offeror expressly agreed to it.33 A material term is already excluded under paragraph (b) unless the offeror in fact consented, so the duty to speak does its real work on routine terms.34