Concept
Offer Limits Acceptance
Additional terms in an acceptance
Offer Limits Acceptance
An additional term stays out of the contract when the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer. That is the first exclusion in § 2-207(2).1 It matters because subsection (2) makes inclusion the default between merchants, meaning persons with specialized knowledge of the goods or of business practices.2 An offeror who wants the offeree's fine print kept out must therefore act, and paragraph (a) is the cheapest way to act: the offeror writes the limit into its own form before any reply exists. From then on, the offeree's extra terms remain proposals that cannot enter, and the offeror need not prove that a term is material or send an objection after reading the reply.3
The offeror holds this control because the offeror proposes the deal, and an offer marks out what the offeree is invited to accept. Section 2-207 gives the offeree a matching device. At common law, a reply that is conditional on the offeror's assent to additional or different terms is a counteroffer and not an acceptance,4 and the proviso to subsection (1) preserves that result for an acceptance expressly made conditional on the offeror's assent to the offeree's terms, so the writings form no contract. Each side thus has a tool suited to its place in the exchange. The offeree who wants its terms or nothing can say so and forgo a contract on the writings; the offeror who wants its terms and nothing else can say so and keep the contract on those terms. Without paragraph (a), the fate of every added term would turn on its materiality and on whether the offeror noticed it and objected in time.
The exclusion decided the outcome in Brown Machine. Hercules' purchase order was the offer, and it expressly limited acceptance to its own terms. Brown Machine's acknowledgment, which the court had already held to be an acceptance, carried an indemnity provision among its printed conditions of sale. Because of the express limitation, the additional terms, including the indemnity provision, did not become part of the contract.5 The court added that the clause was also a material alteration, which gave a second and independent reason for the same result. The contract for the goods stood on Hercules' terms, and the only casualty was the seller's fine print.
Only the offeror can give up the limit, and the Missouri court required that the waiver be express. It could conclude that Hercules intended the indemnity clause to be part of the contract only if Hercules had expressly assented to the added terms and so waived its own condition.6 The seller argued that the buyer had agreed to the seller's terms by writing that, with one exception, all other specifications were correct. The court rejected the argument and held that express assent cannot be presumed from silence or from a mere failure to object.7 The result follows from the word expressly. The offeror drew its line in advance, and a general nod at the rest of the form does not show that the offeror knowingly stepped across it. Courts take the same view of printed forms generally, refusing to infer awareness of a form's contents from the use of forms that “are all too often never read.”8
The first form sent is not necessarily the offer, and only the party that made the offer can limit acceptance. McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. shows why. The seller's conditions of sale tried to make any purchase order an acceptance of all the seller's terms. The Illinois court agreed that an offeror has total control over its own offer and may condition acceptance on the terms of that offer under paragraph (a), but it denied that the first party to a sales transaction always gets its own terms, because which party gets its terms onto paper first is usually fortuitous.9 The buyer's purchase order stated clearly and repeatedly that it was an offer and that no contract existed until the seller accepted it, and the court refused to bend that definite offer into an acceptance of the seller's terms. The seller's enclosed conditions became mere proposals, and they failed because they materially altered the contract.10 The first step in any battle of the forms is therefore to identify which document was the offer.
The words of the offer decide whether it limits acceptance. A Maine federal court gave effect to a purchase order that provided for the sale on the order's terms and rejected any term in the seller's acceptance that added to, varied from, or conflicted with them, and that wording kept a forum-selection clause in the seller's invoice out of the contract.11 The offer need not recite the statute's phrase to do this work. In Power Engineering & Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Krug Int'l the first form was a quotation providing that no waiver, alteration, or modification of its provisions would bind the quoting party unless agreed to in writing. The Iowa Supreme Court read that wording two ways. As an insistence that any acceptance contain all of the offeror's terms, coupled with an objection to any others, it made the buyer's purchase order an acceptance whose force majeure clause was excluded under paragraphs (a) and (c). As a requirement that the offer be accepted only by a document with no added or different terms, it prevented a contract on the writings, and the clause stayed out of the contract the parties' conduct created.12 A no-modification clause can therefore do double duty as a limit and as an advance objection, and the discussion of timely objection returns to that point. The limit is also cheap insurance: one standard sentence in the first form can decide the fate of every added term, material or not.13
The phrases expressly limited and expressly conditional are easy to confuse, but they sit in different documents and answer different questions. Expressly conditional appears in subsection (1), describes an acceptance, and decides formation. Expressly limited appears in paragraph (a),14 describes an offer, and decides content: subsection (2) assumes a contract exists and asks which terms are in it. An offeror's limiting language therefore does not stop the offeree's reply from operating as an acceptance. In Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp. a purchase order provided that the seller's acceptance was expressly limited to the order's terms, and the Tenth Circuit held that the language did not preclude formation of a contract by the exchanged writings, because the parties had objectively manifested agreement on specifications, price, shipment, and payment.15 Courts read the conditional-acceptance proviso narrowly and ask whether the response clearly shows an unwillingness to proceed without assent to the added terms.16 A statement that acceptance is subject to printed terms has generally been held too weak.17 Paragraph (a) uses the same adverb, so an offeror should state the limit in words and not leave a court to infer it from the form.
A confirmation falls outside paragraph (a) altogether. It follows a completed contract, so no unaccepted offer remains for a limit to attach to, and it makes no sense to ask whether an offer was expressly limited when the question is whether a term in a memorandum joined an existing agreement. The filter for confirmations therefore runs on the other two exclusions, material alteration and timely objection, which answers the question left open in the discussion of confirmations.