Concept
Formation Versus Terms
Additional terms in an acceptance
Additional Terms in Acceptances
Formation Versus Terms
A buyer sends a purchase order for 500 pumps. The seller returns an acknowledgment that matches the order on goods, quantity, price, and delivery date and adds an arbitration clause on the back that the order never mentioned. Two questions follow, in this order: did the parties form a contract, and, if they did, does the arbitration clause belong to it? Section 2-207 answers them in separate subsections, and most errors in this area come from answering the second question while the first is still open.
Subsection (1) answers the first question. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time, operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to those terms.1 Subsection (2) answers the second. Additional terms are construed as proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of it unless one of three exclusions applies.2 The exclusions come in the sections that follow. First, the reason the statute splits the problem in two.
The split replaces the common-law mirror-image rule, which could not handle the way businesses trade. Until the offeree accepts, the offeror is free to revoke,3 so whether a reply counts as an acceptance decides whether the offeror is bound at all. A rule demanding an exact match would turn any mismatch in fine print into a failed acceptance, with no bound offeror and no contract. Yet the forms that businesses exchange are never mirror images. They omit terms the parties understand from past dealings and common usage, and the seller's provisions seldom match the buyer's. The parties still treat the forms as the basis of their contract, and applying the mirror-image rule would defeat their intention to be mutually bound to the basic bargain.4 The divergence follows from how the forms come to exist. The seller's lawyer drafts the seller's form to favor the seller, the buyer's lawyer does the same for the buyer, and underlings at each end sit with a telephone and a stack of forms. The two sets diverge in substantive terms and sometimes in the permissible methods of formation too.5
Where the parties performed anyway, the common law's usual fallback was the last-shot rule, which let the last form sent supply the terms. That put the order of mailing in charge of whose fine print governed. Many sales contracts are not fully bargained or carefully drafted,6 and the order of mailing is a poor reason to prefer one side's boilerplate over the other's when neither side bargained over it.
Article 2 divides the work instead, and subsection (1) makes formation lenient. An expression of assent to the bargain operates as an acceptance, not a counteroffer, even though it contains different or additional terms.7 The offeree must definitely express an intent to accept, and the acceptance must not be expressly conditioned on the offeror's assent to the new terms. If both hold, neither side can later refuse to perform by pointing to a boilerplate discrepancy that meant nothing to either of them when they struck the bargain. The proviso at the end of subsection (1) is the one device by which an offeree can prevent that result, and a later section takes it up. Brown Mach., Div. of John Brown, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc. shows the ordinary case. Hercules sent a purchase order with no indemnity provision, and Brown Machine returned an acknowledgment whose fourth page of printed conditions of sale contained one. Nothing in the acknowledgment showed that Brown Machine was unwilling to proceed unless Hercules assented to those terms, so the acknowledgment operated as an acceptance rather than a counteroffer.
That holding settles formation and nothing more. Subsection (2) answers the terms question from a fixed starting point. The contract formed under subsection (1) is on the offeror's terms, and the offeree's extra terms are proposals to modify it.8 The offeror may reject or ignore them and enforce the contract as formed.9 Subsection (2) mentions only additional terms, so different terms receive their own treatment below.10 Which proposals enter is what the three exclusions decide. In Brown Machine, the indemnity clause became a proposal once the acknowledgment was an acceptance. It stayed out because the purchase order expressly limited acceptance to its own terms, and the court added that the clause would have materially altered the parties' agreement. Hercules was free to ignore the clause and hold Brown Machine to a contract on the purchase order's terms. The clause lost, and the contract for the goods survived.
Subsection (1) relaxes the mirror-image rule without dropping the requirement that the reply be a genuine expression of acceptance. A response that differs radically from the offer, particularly on dickered terms such as price, may fail as an acceptance and end the inquiry right there.11 In Koehring Co. v. Glowacki, the buyer's telegram offered to purchase at $16,500 "FOB, our truck, your plant, loaded," which put loading on the seller. The seller answered at the same price but on an "as is, where is" basis, which left that burden with the buyer.12 The court held the reply a counteroffer, found no meeting of the minds, and never reached the question whether additional or different terms entered an agreement, because no valid contract existed in the first place.13 Set beside Brown Machine, the pair shows which fact moves the answer. The acknowledgment there left every dickered term alone and added fine print the offer had never addressed, while the telegram in Koehring reversed a term the parties had actually bargained over.
Timing can also decide which question a court is asking. At least in part, the cases turn on whether the court finds the parties formed their contract before or after the vendor communicated its terms. Where shipping, receiving, and paying already show a contract, a later box-top license is a proposal for additional terms under § 2-207, and it requires the purchaser's express agreement.14 One court, writing about such a case, suggested that buyers might have a better argument if they first learned of the bundled terms after opening the box and wanted to return the computer but were deterred by the cost of shipping. It then asked what remedy would follow and whether it could exceed the shipping charges.15 The later section on terms that arrive after the deal returns to that problem.
Students most often err in the other direction. They find an acceptance under subsection (1), move to subsection (2)(b), decide the added term materially alters the contract, and conclude that no contract exists. That conclusion imports materiality into the formation question, where it has no place. The acceptance already created the contract, and materiality decides only whether the proposed term joins it.16 Brown Machine shows the correct result. The indemnity clause materially altered the agreement, the clause fell out, and the contract stood. The structure of the statute confirms the point. If a material term defeated formation, subsection (2)(b) would have nothing to do, because every term it screens would already have destroyed the contract.
Merchant status gets misplaced the same way. It bears only on whether a proposed term can enter without the offeror's express agreement. A consumer and a merchant both have a contract under subsection (1), but unless both parties are merchants, added terms enter only if the original offeror agrees, and mere performance does not supply that agreement.17