Concept
Where the Rules Converge
Interpretation Against the Drafter and Favoring the Public
Where the Rules Converge
Two Restatement rules break a tie among reasonable meanings, and they ask different questions. Section 206 asks who wrote the words: it prefers the meaning that operates against the party who supplies them or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.1 Section 207 asks whom the agreement affects: it prefers a meaning that serves the public interest.2 Because the questions are independent, a clause may call for either rule, for both, or for neither.
Each rule has its own entrance requirements. Both operate only when the words leave two or more reasonable meanings. The drafter rule also needs a party who can fairly be called the author. The public-interest rule applies only to agreements that affect a public interest; it is a rule of legal effect as well as interpretation, and it rests more on public policy than on the parties’ probable intention. Courts have often relied on it to justify narrow construction of a public franchise or a tax exemption. It does not prefer the interest of a government agency merely because the agency is a party, and government contracts are likely to be construed against the government as the drafting party.3 A court cannot open one rule’s door with facts that belong to the other.
When more than one reason points toward the same reading, the case for resolving doubt against a clause is at its strongest. The author could have removed the doubt with one more sentence, and people the clause reaches beyond the signers had no say in its wording. That agreement adds no third rule, and it creates no tie where the words have only one reasonable meaning. It only makes a choice among truly open readings easier to defend. Two kinds of provisions produce the overlap often enough to study on their own. Clauses that release or disclaim liability pair the drafter rule with a policy of reading negligence disclaimers narrowly. Clauses that restrict trade, assignment, or the use of land can engage both Restatement rules at once.
Exculpatory Clauses
An exculpatory clause is a provision by which one party gives up in advance the right to sue for injury or loss. The party it protects usually wrote it, which makes it a textbook setting for § 206: a release is a contract, and an ambiguity in it is resolved against the party who supplied the words.4
The stakes explain the extra pressure. Tort law still rests mostly on fault, and strict liability has gone hand in hand with distribution arguments only in certain kinds of cases.5 A clause that waives liability for negligence therefore gives up, before any harm occurs, the most common basis for recovery. Alongside the drafter rule sits a second policy, that negligence disclaimers are to be read as narrowly as possible.6 The two push in one direction: toward finding that a doubtful clause does not reach the claim.
Brooks v. Paul shows the interpretive route. The court called the purported release “rife with ambiguity and uncertainty.” The exculpatory provision appeared in smaller font below a statutory notice about the doctor’s decision not to carry malpractice insurance; it did not expressly release any particular type of claim; and its three sentences, read together, were contradictory.7 The small type made the clause easy to miss, the missing claim made its reach uncertain, and the contradiction supplied the tie that § 206 needs: two readings a reasonable person could hold. The party that wrote words in that condition carries the cost of the doubt.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. applies the same logic to a car warranty. The court observed that the draftsmanship reflected great care and skill in avoiding warranty obligations without drawing attention to the effort, and that a manufacturer who wished to disclaim liability for injury claims could easily have told buyers so. The Plymouth Owner Certificate, which the factory directed the dealer to hand to the purchaser, carried an “Explanation of Warranty” whose whole tenor concerned replacement of defective parts and said nothing to suggest that personal injury claims were excluded.8 The ease with which the drafter could have been plain is what makes it fair to charge the drafter with the silence.
A court can decide that case without questioning the clause’s validity. The policy of reading negligence disclaimers as narrowly as possible, combined with the rule of construction against the drafter (contra proferentem), could persuade the court that the clause does not cover personal injury at all. If the court accepts that reading, the disclaimer is simply inapplicable, and the passenger need not argue that some doctrine of avoidance should set it aside.9 A forum-selection clause covering “any dispute arising out of the transaction” gets the same treatment: a court may confine it to disputes about the services the contract promised, and if it does, the suit proceeds without any decision on whether that clause is avoidable.10 Interpretation comes first because it can end the dispute without disturbing the clause.
The opposite problem is a release that leaves no doubt at all.
The argument fails at the first step. The release has one reasonable meaning, and it reaches the claim. No tie exists for § 206 to break, because that section operates only in choosing among reasonable meanings, and the gym’s authorship changes nothing.11 Section 207 joins only if the agreement affects a public interest, so an ordinary private release rests on the drafter rule and the narrow-reading policy alone.12 A challenge to a clear release must therefore rest on another doctrine. Agreements whose performance would violate a strongly rooted public interest, often one expressed in a statute, may be held unenforceable, but that question concerns whether a clause may be enforced at all, not which of its meanings controls.13
A stem in which a hospital, gym, or carrier hands a form to an individual invites you to stop at authorship and rule for the signer. Resist that. Ask first whether the release, as written, leaves two reasonable readings on this claim. A release that is small, vague, silent about the claim, or self-contradictory presents the tie. A release that is plain and specific presents none.
Restraints and Restrictions
A clause that restricts trade, competition, assignment, or the use of land often engages both rules at once. The party it benefits usually wrote it, which satisfies § 206. It takes something from the signer and sometimes from people outside the contract, such as would-be competitors, which is what § 207 asks for.15 A restriction of doubtful scope can therefore stand on two supports.
In North Gate Corp. v. National Food Stores, Inc., a food-store chain prepared a printed shopping-center lease for use at its stores around the country, and the lease barred the owner from leasing to other retail stores. The court observed that the intent of the provision was “to restrict trade and the use of land. Such provisions are to be strictly construed.”16 Both hooks are present. The lessee prepared the form, so doubt about how far “other retail stores” reaches falls on the party that chose the words. The ban also limits competition in the center and the use of the owner’s land, matters in which people beyond the two signers have a stake. The reporter’s note to § 207 points the same way, collecting a decision that favored the construction that least restricts the free use of land.17
Strict construction keeps a doubtful restraint from reaching further than its words clearly go, and it leaves the risk of imprecision with the author, who controlled the language. Both rules still require a genuine tie. A restraint whose words have only one reasonable meaning is applied as written, and whether a clear restraint should be enforced at all is a separate question of public policy.18
A restriction on assignment or subletting shows the drafter hook doing the work. A landlord may restrict assignment or subletting, but an express restriction is strictly construed against the landlord.19 Courts often say that a restriction on alienation is construed against its beneficiary, the landlord, who is typically its drafter in any event, and a lease, like any contract, is construed against its drafter.20 The stated reasons are authorship and benefit, and neither depends on any effect on outsiders.
Had the form instead barred the tenant from “assigning this lease or subletting any part of the premises,” the clause would have a single reasonable meaning that reaches the bookkeeper, and neither the drafter rule nor strict construction could narrow it. The same line marks off a restraint that peers bargained over line by line. Section 206 then has no single author to charge, because neither side alone chose the words, and § 207 matters only to the extent the restraint reaches outsiders.
How much weight the drafter rule carries depends on what is at stake. In Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc., the court described the principle as a rule with diverse uses. In cases involving conscience or strong policy, such as forfeiture cases, it complements strict construction to favor lenient results; in other cases it serves as an aid in resolving otherwise intractable ambiguities.21 A provision restricting trade and the use of land is the kind that North Gate strictly construed, which fits the first role. The dispute in Essex fit neither. The question of defining the risks ALCOA assumed was one of interpretation; it implicated no strong public policy and presented no intractable ambiguity, so the drafter principle had no work to do.22