Concept
Favoring the Public Interest
Interpretation Against the Drafter and Favoring the Public
Favoring the Public Interest
A contract between two parties can still burden people who never signed it. An exclusive franchise closes a market to everyone but the grantee, and a tax exemption shifts the exempted share of the burden onto every other taxpayer. When the words of such an agreement leave two reasonable readings, the tie matters to those outsiders as much as to the signers, and Section 207 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts tells the court which way to lean: in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise, an agreement, or a term of either, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.1
Like the drafter rule, the preference does not come into play until the earlier steps of interpretation have run out. The court must first search for the parties' shared meaning and the reasonable-person reading, and only if two sensible readings still stand does it turn to § 207. Even then the preference works for a reason that has little to do with what the parties meant. Contracting parties bargain over their own interests, and their words record how they divided risk and benefit between themselves. People outside the bargain have no seat at the table and no chance to clarify the language afterward. If a court settled leftover doubt against them, the cost of the signers' imprecision would fall on people who played no part in creating it. Section 207 places that cost on the signers instead.
The first subsection below fixes the rule's scope, the second follows it through the Restatement's illustration and the cases behind it, and the third marks the limit that appears when a government agency is itself a party.
Scope of the Rule
Three phrases in § 207 set its limits. Reasonable meanings confines the rule to a real contest: at least two readings must survive the search for the parties' own meaning, and a reading no sensible person could adopt does not qualify merely because it would help the public. Generally makes the result a default that a stronger consideration can displace. And serves the public interest presupposes that the agreement touches a public interest in the first place. Treatises list the preference among the general rules of construction: if more than one reasonable meaning exists and the public interest is involved, the court selects the meaning that favors that interest.2
The comment states the third limit directly: the preference applies only to agreements that affect a public interest.3 The limit follows from what the rule protects. When two parties each hold a reasonable reading, resolving the tie either way costs one of them something, so the court needs a principled reason to lean in one direction. Where the agreement affects people who took no part in the bargaining, their interest supplies that reason, since they can neither clarify the language beforehand nor argue the case afterward. Where the agreement affects no one outside the parties, no absent interest exists, and the preference has nothing to protect.
The narrower reading wins because of the subdivision's residents, who stand outside the bargain. An ambiguous clause in a private supply contract between two manufacturers presents the same kind of tie, but the choice between readings affects nobody beyond the two companies, so § 207 gives the court no reason to lean either way.4 The tie then falls to other tools, such as the drafter rule when one side supplied the words. A public-interest tilt in a purely private dispute would turn nearly every ambiguity into a policy question, and the rule would stop being a narrow tiebreaker.
The comment calls the preference a rule of legal effect as well as interpretation, one that rests more on public policy than on the probable intention of the parties.5 A canon of interpretation helps a court find what the parties meant. This rule operates once that search has failed, and it attaches a result the law chooses for reasons of policy. The drafter rule shares the feature: like the contract rule preferring interpretations that favor the public interest, contra proferentem seeks ends other than the intent of the parties.6 In practice, then, the preference never asks which reading the parties more probably intended. A meaning both sides shared ends the matter before the preference is consulted, and the preference is reached only when the evidence of intent leaves the choice open.
Courts most often rely on the preference, the comment observes, to justify narrow construction of a grant of a public franchise or of an agreement for a tax exemption.7 Both take something from the public. An exemption shifts its share of the tax burden onto every other taxpayer, and a franchise limits what the public may do or buy, so doubt about how far the grant reaches is resolved in favor of those who gave nothing and cannot speak for themselves. The comment adds a limit that applies when a governmental agency is a party to the contract; the last subsection takes it up.
Section 207 differs from the doctrine that refuses to enforce a term at all. Under § 178, a promise or term is unenforceable on public-policy grounds if legislation so provides, or if the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against enforcement.8 That doctrine removes the term from the contract, so it requires either legislation or a clear policy weighed against the interest in enforcement. The preference in § 207 removes nothing. It chooses between two readings the words can bear, so it needs only an affected public interest and a genuine tie, and the party who loses the tie loses only one of two readings the language allowed.
The line between the two doctrines matters most when the language is clear. A clear term has one reasonable meaning, so no tie exists for § 207 to break, and the preference cannot rewrite the term however sympathetic the public interest. In a dispute over contractual fee restraints, for example, the district court weighed the policy considerations under §§ 178 and 179 of the Restatement, a question whether the restraints could be enforced at all, which no choice between readings can answer.9 A party who invokes § 207 against an unambiguous clause that offends public policy has therefore chosen the wrong doctrine and must meet the higher threshold of § 178.
Most errors come at the second step. A fact pattern that describes a gap or a tie in a contract has not thereby supplied a public interest; the facts must show that the agreement reaches people outside the bargain, as a franchise or a tax exemption does.
Illustrations in Practice
The Restatement's own illustration shows the preference deciding a real contest. An inventor's employment ends, and in an agreement settling their disputes the inventor promises to assign the former employer all rights in a pending patent application and all improvements on the invention it covers. The inventor later makes a new invention and applies for a patent, and the employer claims it as an improvement. The Restatement concludes that the public interest in encouraging invention supports reading the agreement to exclude future improvements unless they were specifically included.11
The word improvements can bear two reasonable meanings: refinements of the invention described in the pending application, or anything the inventor later develops in the same field. The words alone do not choose between them, and the settlement says nothing more, so the earlier steps of interpretation leave a tie. The preference breaks it by looking to someone neither party represented. If the broad reading prevailed, one settlement would hand a former employer the fruits of an inventor's later work, and an inventor who expects to surrender whatever comes next has less reason to start. The public, which benefits when new inventions appear, would bear that loss although nobody speaking for it took part in the settlement. The narrower reading leaves the inventor the reward of later work and takes from the employer nothing it clearly bargained for.
The preference also stops where the text does. Had the settlement listed future improvements by name, the agreement would carry one reasonable meaning, and the illustration's own qualification, unless future improvements were specifically included, marks the point at which the words take over.12 The public interest selects among readings the language can bear; it cannot rewrite language that bears only one.
The illustration has roots in decided cases. Its reporter's note says it is based on De Long Corp. v. Lucas, and the same note cites Houk v. Ross for a construction favoring the least restriction on the free use of land.13 Inventions and land are different subjects, but an agreement that withdraws something from open use or enterprise burdens the public as well as the parties. The restraint-of-trade cases show the same reasoning at work where that burden is easiest to see.
In State ex rel. Youngman v. Calhoun, a covenant restricted a physician's practice within a defined area. The court held that he was not precluded from making calls within that area, or from treating patients from the area who came to his office outside it, reasoning that the contract was "clearly one in restraint of trade and personal liberty, and as such should not be construed to extend beyond its fair import."14
The quoted reasoning does not say what the parties meant. It rests on the nature of the contract as a restraint on trade and personal liberty, and confining the covenant to the fair import of its words limits the restraint to what the words clearly reach. A restraint of this kind takes a practitioner out of a market, so doubt about its reach is resolved toward the freer reading. That is the logic of § 207: it applies after the evidence of intent has run out, and the law supplies it for reasons of policy.
A shopping-center lease supplies the land-use version. In North Gate Corp. v. National Food Stores, Inc., the lessee prepared a printed lease for use by its retail food stores across the country, and the lease barred the shopping-center owner from leasing to other retail stores. The court observed that the intent of the provision was "to restrict trade and the use of land," and that "[s]uch provisions are to be strictly construed."15 Because the lessee prepared the form, the drafter rule points the same way as the public-interest reasoning, and a later section returns to that overlap. Beyond construction lies a stronger remedy: a contract whose performance would violate a strongly rooted public interest, often expressed in a statute, may be held unenforceable.16 Strict construction is the milder device, used when the words leave room for a narrower reading.
In each setting the agreement withdrew something the public has a stake in (future inventions, a physician's services, competition on land), and the doubtful words were read to withdraw no more than they clearly said. That tilt works only where the language leaves a real choice. Where the words are plain, as with an express list of future improvements or a covenant that names out-of-radius treatment, the words control.
Government as a Party
The comment to § 207 sets a boundary that the rule's name hides: the preference does not, in general, favor the interest of a governmental agency that is a party to the contract, and government contracts are likely to be construed against the government as the drafting party.18 For purposes of a tie, then, a public body that signs a contract is treated like any other author of a form. What resolves its leftover ambiguity is the drafter rule of § 206, under which the preferred meaning is the one that operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom the writing otherwise proceeds,19 and not the public-interest preference.
The limit follows from whom § 207 protects. The preceding subsections showed that the preference tilts a tie toward people who took no part in the bargaining and cannot clarify the language before or after the contract is made. An agency that is a party chose to enter the agreement and is present to argue its own reading, so it does not fit that description. Its stake in the dispute is a stake in the outcome of its own contract, and interpretation law treats that stake as it treats any party's.
A second problem would arise if the agency's stake counted as the public interest. An agency can nearly always say that the reading costing it less saves taxpayers. If that statement qualified, every dispute with a government contractor would break the same way, and the preference would become an advantage for the government as litigant instead of a protection for outsiders.
The drafter rule fits this setting. An agency that supplies its own form controls the wording and can remove a doubt at the cost of a sentence. But the rule's requirements do not relax for a government drafter: two reasonable meanings must survive the earlier steps, and the language in dispute must in fact have come from the party it is charged against.20 A government label adds nothing to that inquiry and removes nothing from it. In a real-estate dispute between experienced parties who bargained from essentially equal positions, negotiated the disputed provision at length, and left no record showing that either side drafted it, a court held that the policy behind the drafter rule was not served and that the trial court erred in applying it.21 The same reasoning would weaken the rule against an agency that negotiated the provision with an informed contractor.
The preference itself remains available in contracts that have a government party, because the limit concerns the agency's status as a litigant and leaves the protection of outsiders in place. The comment's own examples, narrow construction of a grant of a public franchise or of an agreement for a tax exemption, involve a government grantor, and the preference still applies to them.22 In the cable-franchise hypothetical earlier in this section, the narrower reading favored the residents of the annexed subdivision, who signed nothing and would otherwise face a single provider. Their interest exists apart from whatever the city gained or lost under its own agreement, and that independence separates their situation from the highway agency's. Where one reading both protects outsiders and operates against the drafting agency, either rule supports it. Where an agency invokes the public interest only to escape a term it wrote, only the drafter rule is left, and it cuts against the agency.
An exam stem that places a city or agency on one side and mentions that the contract serves the public invites the wrong reflex. Ask whose interest the competing reading protects: people outside the agreement, or the agency as a contracting party. The first answer engages § 207, and the second sends the analysis to § 206 and the identity of the drafter.