Concept
Rules of Last Resort
Interpretation Against the Drafter and Favoring the Public
Drafter and Public Interest Rules
Rules of Last Resort
A court that has read the contract, weighed the evidence, and applied the canons may still be unable to say what a disputed term means. The court must decide anyway, and it then turns to rules that no longer ask what the parties meant. Two such rules open this chapter: one prefers the meaning that operates against the party who supplied the words, and the other prefers the meaning that serves the public interest.1 Both belong at the bottom of the interpretive ladder, and a court that reaches for either one before the search for meaning has failed skips a step.
The ladder has a recognizable order. The court first decides whether the disputed term is ambiguous, using the writing and, under some approaches, evidence from the circumstances surrounding its execution; it sometimes applies canons of construction to make that call. A term found unambiguous receives its objective meaning as a matter of law. A term found ambiguous becomes a question of fact, and the jury determines from all the relevant evidence what the parties actually shared as their intent.2 Only after all the admissible evidence is in and the rules of interpretation have been applied can the court remain in the dark about the intended meaning, and that is the situation the standards of preference address.3
The standards of preference form a family. A lawful, reasonable reading is preferred to an unlawful or unreasonable one; a reading that makes the agreement enforceable is preferred to one that does not; and a reasonable reading is preferred to an absurd one.4 The true standards of preference involve the judge’s role as a dispenser of equity, and the rule against the drafter is among them. Once the attempt to ascertain the parties’ true intention is exhausted and has failed, it may be appropriate to construe the language against the drafter, who is, after all, responsible for the lack of clarity.5
That justification rests on policy rather than on meaning. The Restatement classifies the drafter rule, in § 206, under “Considerations of Fairness and the Public Interest” and not with the rules for interpreting “The Meaning of Agreements,” and Corbin calls it “chiefly a rule of public policy.” The Supreme Court cited both points in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, together with two cautions: authority holds that the rule’s application may vary with the sophistication of the parties and the degree to which the contract was negotiated, and the reach of the canon “must have limits, no matter who the drafter was.”6
The public-interest preference shares that character. Its comment says that it rests more on considerations of public policy than on the probable intention of the parties, that it works as a rule of legal effect as well as interpretation, and that it applies only to agreements that affect a public interest.7
The policy footing explains the placement. A rule that rests on policy rather than on probable intention would, if applied first, decide cases that the evidence of meaning could have decided. Applied last, it allocates only the doubt that nothing else resolved, either against the author of the words or toward the public.
Both rules operate only among reasonable meanings.8 A strained reading that one party proposes creates no tie, because a reasonable reading is preferred to an absurd one, and the court is left with a single meaning to enforce.9 The test before reaching for either rule is whether two readings remain that a reasonable person could hold.
The outcome changes if the evidence shows that both sides understood the clause to cover every machine at the location. That shared intent controls, no real doubt remains, and neither preference is needed.
The ordinary canons often keep a tie from forming at all. A general term associated with specifically enumerated items is presumed limited to things of the same nature as those items (ejusdem generis). In a contract to sell “oil, gas, and other minerals,” oil and gas are fossil fuels, so “other minerals” does not reach gold or silver.10 A court that reads the term that way has resolved its meaning and has no tie to break.
A policy argument does not by itself displace a clear clause. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court upheld a clause in a cellular telephone contract that called for arbitration but barred arbitration on a class basis, even though a $30.22 sales tax fee on a phone advertised as free made class treatment desirable and efficient.11 A tiebreaker works the same way: it supplies a reason to choose between readings the words allow, and it does not rewrite words that are clear.
The tiebreakers also stay separate from doctrines that police how assent was obtained. A party may rescind a contract if its assent was induced by a material false representation on which it was justified in relying, even if the representation was made innocently, and it need not show fraud or negligence.12 That inquiry turns on the misrepresentation and the justified reliance, not on a choice between two reasonable readings of the text.