Concept
Applying the Tools Together
Rules in Aid of Interpretation and Standards of Preference
Applying the Tools Together
Interpretation runs in a set order, and the order has a reason. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives the interpreter two kinds of tools. Section 202 governs the search for meaning: words and other conduct are read in light of all the circumstances, and the parties' principal purpose, if it can be ascertained, gets great weight.1 Section 203 governs the choice among readings the evidence leaves standing, and it starts with a preference for a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning over one that leaves part of the agreement unreasonable, unlawful, or without effect.2
A court uses the aids to interpretation first to find what the parties meant. If the aids do not settle the question, the rules of preference come next. Only when neither helps, and the parties expressed no intention on the point, does the court treat the gap as an omitted term.3 That order makes a workable outline for an essay answer.
Bend the steps to the facts. Technical meaning has no work to do when the transaction lies outside a technical field, and a one-time sale gives course of performance nothing to examine.10 The analysis can also end early. The conclusion about meaning is strongest when evidence from every aspect of the context points to the same reading, and then the ranking in step five has nothing to resolve.11
Two canons sometimes do the work inside step two. Under ejusdem generis, general words that follow an enumeration of specific things are limited to things of the same kind. Under noscitur a sociis, a word takes coloration from the words around it.12
Frigaliment as a Worked Example
In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., a buyer and seller disagreed over one word in a contract for chickens, and the court used nearly every tool in the sequence without finding a winner.13 The contract priced the larger birds lower per pound than the smaller ones. When the larger birds arrived, the buyer protested that they were stewing chickens, unsuitable for frying, and claimed that 'chicken' meant frying chicken. The seller answered that 'chicken' is a generic term covering both kinds, and that the price difference showed the cheaper birds would be stewers.14
The writing alone did not settle the matter, so the court went beyond it to the whole context of the transaction. Trade experts testified, but their testimony conflicted and did not clearly support either party. The court then turned to course of performance. It showed no common intention, because the buyer had protested the stewing chickens immediately on delivery.15 No source emerged that favored one party, so the ranking in step five had no winning source to raise above the others.
The court could not establish what the parties meant, and it decided the case on the burden of proof. The buyer had alleged the narrow sense of 'chicken' and failed to prove that the word was used in that sense, so the buyer lost.16 An essay should draw the lesson here. Using every tool does not guarantee that a meaning will emerge. When none does, the question becomes which party had to prove its reading, and what the evidence did to that proof.
Other disputes end sooner. Where reading the writing as a whole yields one reasonable meaning, steps three through six may never be reached; see the earlier discussion of reading the writing as a whole.17 What separates the outcomes is whether the evidence converges on a single meaning.
When the Tools Fail
The tools can run out in two different ways, and each ending has its own fallback. The first occurs when the parties never addressed the point at all. The court admits parol evidence to see whether the parties expressed any intention on the matter outside the writing. If none appears, and neither the aids nor the preferences help, the court faces an omitted term.18
The court then supplies a term that comports with community standards of fairness and policy, and it does not analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process. Many courts instead ask what the parties would have included had they anticipated the event they overlooked, and they rarely look to the parties' relative bargaining strengths.19 Courts are wary of devising an agreement the parties did not make. Yet building from what they know of the transaction a meaning the parties probably would have agreed on is sometimes better than demanding clear proof of intent for every gap, which would defeat contractual expectations.20
A percentage lease shows the problem. A retailer agrees to pay a stated percentage of its retail sales as rent and is later franchised to sell lottery tickets, postage stamps, and postal money orders. Are those revenues 'retail sales'? Courts have concluded that they are not, although the retailer's commissions on those sales are calculated as retail sales.21
The second ending occurs when the parties did address the point and the evidence still does not decide it. Frigaliment is the example: the case went to the party who failed to carry its burden. Another tiebreaker sometimes offered is construction against the party who chose the word. That rule rests on a policy theory that such a party is more likely to have protected its own interests, to have known of uncertainties, and perhaps to have left the meaning deliberately obscure. It is therefore usually applied in adhesion contracts or where one party has stronger bargaining power. One court held it improvidently invoked where the parties dealt at arm's length and were equally sophisticated.22
The amount of context available also varies by jurisdiction. Critics, the UCC, the Restatement (Second), and a number of courts have condemned the plain meaning rule, because meaning cannot be found simply by reading the document. Even so, the great majority of jurisdictions employ it, and some that moved toward more liberal approaches seem to have returned to it.23 The generally prevailing meaning rule in step three is a watered-down version of that rule.24 An answer should identify which approach governs before deciding how much of the sequence is available.
Finally, confirm that the dispute is about meaning at all. A party who says it was misled into assent is not asking what the words meant. Under general contract principles, a party may rescind if its assent was induced by a material false representation on which it was justified in relying, even if the representation was made innocently, and it need not show fraud or negligence.25