Concept
Standards of Preference
Rules in Aid of Interpretation and Standards of Preference
Standards of Preference
Interpretation sometimes ends in a draw. A court may read the writing as a whole, weigh the circumstances, and harmonize every term it can, and still face two readings that fit the language or two sources of meaning that disagree. Section 203 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the tiebreakers. It declares four standards of preference generally applicable to the interpretation of a promise, an agreement, or a term of either:1
- An interpretation that gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.2
- Express terms outweigh course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; course of performance outweighs course of dealing and usage; and course of dealing outweighs usage.3
- Specific terms and exact terms outweigh general language.4
- Separately negotiated or added terms outweigh standardized terms and other terms not separately negotiated.5
The four do different work. The first chooses between competing readings of the same language. The second ranks competing sources of meaning. The third and fourth rank competing clauses within the writing. Each is a preference and not a command. Courts treat canons of construction as aids; those aids sometimes conflict, and some seem to lack any grounding in policy or common sense.6 The writing itself remains the starting point, read as a whole, with every writing that forms part of the same transaction interpreted together and harmonized if possible.7 Other preferences exist beyond the four listed in § 203. The best known, construction against the draftsman, appears in § 206 and returns in the last subsection of this unit.8
Reasonable and Effective Meanings
Section 203(a) states the first standard: an interpretation that gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.9 The three adjectives name three ways a reading can fail. It can yield a result no sensible party would want, commit a party to what the law forbids, or leave a clause with nothing to do. Each failure is a reason to doubt that the reading is the one the parties held, and the standard turns that doubt into a direction: when the language supports two readings, choose the one that works.
The direction rests on a sensible assumption about bargaining parties. People who make a deal ordinarily want one that functions and that a court will enforce. A literal reading that produces nonsense more likely reflects a drafting slip, such as a misplaced phrase or a figure whose effect nobody checked, than a shared plan. The preference does yield to proof of what the parties actually meant. If both parties in fact attached the same meaning to a term, that mutual understanding governs even when a reasonable person would read the term differently.10
Courts apply the same instinct to commercial documents generally. Fishman v. LaSalle National Bank is a loan-document example in which a court read the term governing a prepayment premium to produce a rational result and declined the implausible meaning a literal reading would have produced.
The lawful branch of the standard works like the others, because each branch selects the reading under which the deal makes sense. All three share a limit. The preference ranks meanings the language can bear and gives a court no authority to write a term the language cannot bear. Policing a bargain that is merely harsh falls to other doctrines, such as the court's power to refuse to enforce an unconscionable term.11
Students often treat a harsh outcome as proof that a reading is unreasonable. In § 203(a), 'unreasonable' describes a meaning that makes no sense as a deal, such as a royalty that shrinks as output grows. A term that merely turns out badly for one side does not qualify. The royalty clause could be read another way, and the flat-fee clause could not. The question to ask is whether the language can fairly bear a second reading.
Hierarchy of Interpretive Evidence
Section 203(b) tells a court which source wins when the sources of meaning contradict each other: express terms outweigh course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; course of performance outweighs course of dealing and usage of trade; and course of dealing outweighs usage of trade.15 The rule works as a ladder. Express terms occupy the top rung. They are the words the parties used, whether spoken, written, or otherwise recorded, and the ordinary meaning of those words is always the primary indicator of what the parties intended.16 A court reads a disputed term in light of the agreement as a whole and not in isolation.17 Three rungs of conduct and practice lie below the words. Read from the top, the ladder runs as follows:
- Express terms, the language the parties used for this transaction, outrank every source below them.
- Course of performance, the parties' conduct after the contract was made, outranks course of dealing and usage of trade.
- Course of dealing, the parties' relationship in the period before the transaction in question, outranks usage of trade.18
- Usage of trade, the customary practice in the trade, carries the least weight of the four when it conflicts with the others.
Each step down moves further from the parties' own deliberate choices about this deal, and the weight falls with the distance. Express terms are words the parties selected for this very transaction. Course of performance is conduct under the same agreement, and it shows how each side understood the terms when applying them to real events. Course of dealing comes from different transactions, and it bears on this one only if the earlier transactions are substantially similar, the disputed term appeared in them, and the past conduct is relevant to the meaning in issue.19 Usage of trade is the most remote, because it records what people in a market commonly do and these two parties may never have considered that practice. A market may not speak with one voice. In the Frigaliment litigation over the meaning of 'chicken,' the trade experts disagreed and their testimony did not clearly support either party.20 Even the three lower sources carry great weight in determining intent, in that order of significance.21 The same ranking appears in the Uniform Commercial Code, in §§ 1-303(e) and 2-208(2).22 Because express terms outrank the rest, parties who do not want a trade practice or an earlier habit to color their deal can say so in the contract.
The ladder decides only which source wins when two sources contradict each other. Before a court reaches it, the court reads the parties' manifestations of intention as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, wherever that is reasonable.23 A source that fills a gap in the writing, or explains a word in it, contradicts nothing, so no higher rung outranks it. The Uniform Commercial Code draws the line in the same place for sales of goods. A course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance may supply a consistent additional term even to a writing the parties intended as their final statement, and only a contradiction between an express term and one of the three is resolved in favor of the express term.24
The usage in the first contract supplements the writing, and the usage in the second contradicts it. A student who ranks usage below the writing the moment the word 'usage' appears has skipped the step of asking whether the two sources collide at all. A student who lets a trade practice override a clear term has erred in the opposite direction. A court may also look beyond the written agreement to the whole context of the transaction, including trade testimony and the parties' course of performance, to decide what a disputed word means.25
The middle of the ladder produces the other common pairing on an exam, an earlier relationship set against the parties' current behavior. The Restatement gives a course of performance great weight when the agreement involves repeated occasions for performance, the party performing has knowledge of the nature of the performance, the other party has an opportunity to object, and the performance is accepted or acquiesced in without objection.26
The conduct under the current agreement wins because it sits one rung above the earlier dealings, and because it meets the conditions for great weight. A seller who had objected to the first late payment would have left no acquiescence to count, and the strict earlier practice would then stand without a competing source.
The ordering has drawn a minority objection. An empirical study has questioned the wisdom of assigning such an important role to course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade. It points to the lack of uniform customs in many lines of business, to merchants who grant concessions to keep a relationship together and do not expect them to be imposed if the relationship ruptures, and to standardized contracts that already incorporate trade custom, so that adherence to the written contract should not be undermined in litigation. Even the source reporting the study calls it a contrarian view based on data that may reflect the turmoil created by the emergence of national and international markets in the twentieth century.27
Specific Over General Terms
Section 203(c) gives specific terms and exact terms greater weight than general language.30 A specific term targets one identified subject, such as repainting a building's exterior. An exact term uses precise words or figures, such as a date or a dollar amount. General language covers a whole category, as a promise to keep the premises in good repair does. When the two pull in different directions on the same question, a specific provision prevails over the more general ones.31
Two reasons support the preference. First, parties who write a clause about one matter have turned their attention to that matter, while a general clause often works as a catch-all drafted with none of its possible applications in view. The specific clause records a decision about the point in dispute; the general clause records only a broad intention that nobody tested against that point. Second, letting the general clause override the specific one would leave the specific clause with no effect, the result § 203(a) tells a court to avoid.32 Both clauses can have a job only if the specific clause controls its own subject.
The lease dispute also shows the limit on the rule. The preference settles a conflict on the subject the specific term addresses, and it leaves the general clause in force for everything else. The tenant still answers for a broken window or a leaking faucet, because nothing specific says otherwise, and a court keeps both clauses working. The preference also applies only where the clauses truly conflict. When two clauses address different subjects, or one merely adds detail to the other, the court reads them as consistent with each other wherever reasonable, and no ranking is needed.33
A related canon, ejusdem generis ('of the same kind'), applies the same instinct inside a single clause. Where a clause lists specific things and closes with general words, the general words are read as limited to things of the same kind as those listed.34 The list shows what the parties had in mind, so the closing words most plausibly sweep in stragglers of that kind and do not grant unlimited reach. A companion canon, noscitur a sociis ('known by one's associates'), holds that a word takes coloration from its verbal context.35 Section 203(c) ranks one clause above another on a shared subject, whereas these canons limit how far a single clause extends.
Canons of this kind are tools and do not operate mechanically. They sometimes conflict with one another, and some lack any grounding in policy or common sense.36 A party relying on specific over general must therefore show that the specific clause really speaks to the disputed point and that the two clauses truly conflict. The opponent can answer with a competing consideration, such as the preference for readings that give every term effect.
Negotiated Over Standardized Terms
Section 203(d) gives separately negotiated or added terms greater weight than standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated.39 A standardized term is language prepared in advance for use across many transactions of the same type, such as the printed clauses of a lease, a loan, or a sales form. A separately negotiated term is one the parties bargained over for this deal. An added term is one inserted into the form for this deal, as a typed rider or a handwritten line in the margin is. When a term of either kind conflicts with a printed clause, the court gives the term written for the deal more weight.
The preference follows from why forms exist. One purpose of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over the details of individual transactions, and that purpose would be defeated if many customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard terms. Employees who regularly use a form often understand its terms only dimly and have little authority to vary them, and customers ordinarily neither read nor understand the standard terms. They trust the good faith of the party using the form and the tacit representation that others similarly situated are accepting like terms.40 A printed clause therefore shows what the form's author wanted across many transactions and reveals little about what these two parties decided on the point now in dispute. A typed rider or a negotiated clause shows the opposite, because someone chose to write it for this deal. A rule that preferred the printed clause over a term added to contradict it would also leave the added term with no effect, the result § 203(a) disfavors.41
The typed warranty wins because of what it shows, and the disclaimer is not struck down. It continues to govern everything the typed line leaves alone, such as the transmission or the tires, so the court keeps both terms working wherever they can coexist. The preference also applies only to a true conflict. A typed line that fills in a price or a delivery date contradicts nothing in the form, and the court simply reads the two together.
Physical separation does not settle which term counts as negotiated or added. The question is what the extra writing reflects.
In both scenes the variable is whether the term reflects specific attention to this deal. Who held the pen does not matter. A rider the seller typed for this buyer outranks the printed form even though the seller wrote it, so the preference stays distinct from the separate rule construing doubtful language against the draftsman. A printed clause the parties genuinely bargained over counts as separately negotiated despite its type. An addition the seller copies onto every form in identical words reflects the seller's routine and shows no attention to this customer.
Joyner v. Adams shows from the other side why the source of language matters. The court there concluded that the rule construing language against its drafter was improvidently invoked where the parties were at arm's length and equally sophisticated.42 The rule rests on a public-policy theory: the party who chose the word is more likely to have protected its own interests, more likely to have known of uncertainties, and may have left the meaning deliberately obscure. The rule is usually applied to adhesion contracts or where one party is in a stronger bargaining position, though it is not limited to those situations.43 Joyner concerns the drafter rule and not § 203(d), but the two turn on a related question, whether the language came from bargaining between informed parties or was imposed by one side.
None of this makes standardized terms suspect in themselves. Apart from regulation, standard terms imposed by one party are enforced. They may be superseded by separately negotiated or added terms, they are construed against the draftsman, and they remain subject to the overriding obligation of good faith and to the court's power to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term.44 A form used with many customers is also interpreted, wherever reasonable, to treat all of them alike, whatever each one knew or understood about the fine print.45 That uniformity explains why boilerplate carries little weight as evidence of one customer's meaning, and why a term added for one customer's deal stands apart from the crowd. Enforcement of standard terms also leaves other defenses intact. A customer whose assent was induced by a material false representation on which the customer was justified in relying may rescind, even if the other party made the representation innocently.46