Concept
When Neither Meaning Controls
Whose Meaning Prevails
When Neither Meaning Controls
Section 201(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts can resolve a clash of meanings only by finding a party who was more innocent than the other. When the facts supply no such party, § 201(3) takes over: neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.1 If the disputed term is material, no contract exists.2
Two fact patterns produce that result. In the first, neither party knew or had reason to know that the other meant something different. In the second, both did, or their lapses balance so evenly that neither is more to blame. The Restatement’s rule boils down to this: a material misunderstanding precludes formation when the parties were equally innocent in not reasonably realizing it or equally guilty in realizing it but saying nothing. A party who is more accountable than the other for knowing of the misunderstanding loses, and a contract exists on the terms the more innocent party understood.3
Equal Innocence
Equal innocence is the cleaner failure of assent. The parties attach different meanings to a material term, each meaning is reasonable, and neither party knew or had reason to know of the other’s. Each clause of § 201(2) pairs an uninformed party with an informed one, and here no party is informed, so neither clause favors either side.9 Section 201(3) applies, and a court that finds a material difference of this kind finds no contract.10
The standard illustration is Raffles v. Wichelhaus, a mid-nineteenth-century English case. A buyer and seller agreed to the sale of cotton on board the ship Peerless sailing from Bombay. Each reasonably believed that the agreement referred to a particular ship, and neither had any reason to know of the other’s contrary understanding.11
The opinion’s doctrinal basis is obscure, so it has been read as an outmoded subjectivist decision, one that refused to find a contract without an actual meeting of the minds. The better view, now widely accepted, treats the case as the situation in which even an objective approach cannot resolve the misunderstanding. Interpretation looks to what the parties reasonably appeared to intend, and when their understandings differ, the party with the more reasonable understanding prevails. In Raffles both understandings were reasonable, so no objective criterion identifies the ship that must have been intended, and a contract on reasonable terms cannot be established.12
The modern approach of the Restatement (Second) leaves that result unchanged. When a court concludes that the parties attached different meanings to a material term and neither knew or had reason to know the other’s meaning, no contract exists, because mutual assent is absent. See § 201(3) and Comment d.13
The reason is that no one is to blame for the mismatch. Raffles and Oswald were cases in which neither party was blameable for the mistake. When neither party can be assigned the greater blame, nothing nonarbitrary tells a court whose understanding to enforce, and the parties may abandon the contract without liability.14 Vickery v. Ritchie is another case in which rescission was permitted where neither party was at fault.15
Two plausible senses of a word do not by themselves produce the Raffles result. In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., a buyer alleged that the word “chicken” in the contract was used in a narrow sense. Despite the court’s efforts, it could not establish what the parties meant by the word, so it resolved the case on the burden of proof. The buyer lost because it failed to prove that the word was used in the narrow sense it alleged.17 The two problems differ. In Raffles the court knows what each party meant and cannot choose between two reasonable meanings. In Frigaliment the court could not tell what the parties meant, and the allocation of the burden of proof decided the case.
Equal innocence is rare. Cases involving this kind of irresoluble clash of reasonable interpretations are few, and Raffles is one of them.18 The doctrine also stops short of a case in which one party’s understanding is the more reasonable. Permitting rescission there would put the enforcement of every contract at the mercy of a jury that might be persuaded that one party genuinely held an idiosyncratic idea of the words’ meaning.19
Equal Fault
Equal fault reaches the same result as equal innocence from the opposite facts, because notice sits on both sides of the transaction. No contract should be found when each party knew or had reason to know of the different meaning the other intended.21 Section 201(2) cannot choose between them, because each of its clauses requires an uninformed party matched against an informed one. Clause (a) speaks in terms of actual knowledge: the favored party did not know of the other’s different meaning, and the other knew the favored party’s. Clause (b) draws the same pairing in terms of reason to know. The clauses are joined by “or,” so either one suffices, but each needs a party who was uninformed.22
Fault is a matter of degree, and the Restatement asks the court to balance it. A material misunderstanding precludes formation when the parties were equally guilty in realizing it but saying nothing. If one party is more accountable than the other for knowing of the misunderstanding, however, a contract exists on the terms the more innocent party understood.23 Equal fault therefore does not require identical lapses. It requires only that neither lapse outweighs the other.
In Balistreri, the parents failed to read the deed of trust, and the lender drafted a misleading cover letter. Each side contributed to the misunderstanding, and neither contribution outweighed the other. With no way to assign the greater blame, a court has no nonarbitrary basis for deciding which party’s understanding to enforce, so the parties may abandon the contract without liability.24
Konic International Corp. v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc. shows how an ordinary spoken exchange can end in the same place. The seller quoted a price of “fifty-six twenty.” The buyer thought that meant $56.20, and the seller had meant $5,620. Rescission was permitted because both parties were equally at fault, being careless in their utterance and interpretation, respectively, of an ambiguous oral formula.25
Releasing both parties is the one outcome that treats them alike. Enforcing either understanding would require the court to choose between them arbitrarily, because by hypothesis neither party’s conduct is better than the other’s.
The wording of clause (b) carries one more consequence. A claimant who had reason to know of the other party’s meaning cannot rely on clause (b), however much the other party knew, because the clause requires that the claimant had no such reason.27
A party who signs while aware that the words may bear more than one meaning stands differently from either party here. The next section takes up that party.