Concept
The Modified Objective Approach
Whose Meaning Prevails
The Modified Objective Approach
Two parties sign a contract, and later it turns out each read a key term differently. Whose reading governs? Restatement (Second) answers in two steps. A meaning that both parties actually attached to the language controls; when their meanings differ, the court chooses between them according to what each party knew or had reason to know when the agreement was made.1 The rule takes its shape from the two theories it replaced: one asked only what each party privately meant, and the other asked only what a reasonable observer would have understood.
The subjective approach treated agreement on meaning as a condition of any contract. Raffles v. Wichelhaus shows how it worked. The contract referred to a ship named Peerless, and two ships bore that name; the defendant buyer meant one, and the plaintiff seller meant the other. The Court of Exchequer held for the buyer, accepting his plea that because “the defendant meant one Peerless and the plaintiff another . . . there was no consensus ad idem [no agreement on the same thing], and therefore no binding contract.”2
Holmes defended an external theory of interpretation on two grounds. The subjective approach, he argued, made enforcement of contracts too difficult, and the external method was fair because a speaker should always expect his words to be understood in accordance with their normal usage.3 Williston then presented a systematic objective theory, in his treatise and in the original Restatement. Under it, words and conduct are interpreted by the standard of a reasonable person familiar with the circumstances, not by the subjective intention of either party.4 The court therefore asks what each party's words or actions reasonably conveyed, not what the party privately believed it was agreeing to.5
The objective theory breaks down when neither party holds the meaning a reasonable person would find. An illustration to the original Restatement involves an integrated agreement in which A promises to sell, and B promises to buy, certain patents. A intends to sell only the English patents on an invention, while B understands the promise to cover the English, French, and American patents. If a reasonably intelligent person would read the agreement to cover the English and American patents but not the French, A and B are bound by that meaning.6 Each party ends up with a bargain neither intended: A must deliver American patents A never meant to sell, and B receives fewer patents than B believed had been bought. A critic of the objective approach pressed the point. When a court binds parties to a meaning neither held, it probably believes either that both of them in fact held it or that one did and the other had reason to know it. But to hold that A must convey Greenacre and B must accept it, although A intends to sell Blackacre and B intends to buy Whiteacre, because their integration would be so understood by third persons, “is to hold justice up to ridicule.”7
The difficulty runs deeper than one illustration. As the court said in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., if words had absolute and constant referents, a court might discover contractual intention in the words and their arrangement alone, but they do not. “A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry.”8 A rule that reads the words only from an outsider's standpoint will therefore sometimes give the contract a meaning that neither party used, as the patent illustration shows.
The modified objective approach keeps the objective rule as its baseline and corrects it with actual meaning. Where both parties attached the same meaning to a promise, agreement, or term, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.9 Parties may use words as they please. In TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co., the court made the point with Humpty Dumpty: if the parties want the symbols “one Caterpillar D9G tractor” to mean “500 railroad cars full of watermelons,” that is fine, provided the parties share this weird meaning.10 Enforcing a shared meaning disappoints no one, because each party receives the bargain the party meant to make.
When the meanings differ, private intent still rarely decides the case. Contract liability rests primarily on the intention a party objectively manifests, so an uncommunicated intention usually does not count when the other party had no reason to know of it, and the focus stays on what the person addressed should reasonably have understood.11 A private meaning matters, in other words, when the other party knew or had reason to know of it, and the court compares what each party knew or had reason to know at the time of agreement.12
Corbin's approach is partly subjective, because even where an integration is unambiguous it admits all relevant extrinsic evidence on meaning, including evidence of subjective intention and of what the parties said to each other about meaning.13 The inquiry then resembles the problem of the two ships Peerless. If the parties meant the same ship, there is a contract based on that meaning. If their understandings differ, the court weighs relative fault and applies the meaning of the party who is less at fault.14
Raffles still follows in one situation. If a court concludes that the parties attached different meanings to a material term, but neither knew nor had reason to know the meaning of the other, then even under the Restatement (Second) no contract exists for want of mutual assent.15 What the modified approach gives up is the older assumption that every difference in meaning defeats the deal. A difference that one party knew about, or had reason to catch, is resolved against that party. The sections below take up each outcome in turn: matching meanings, differing meanings, the proof of knowledge, and the cases in which neither meaning controls.