Concept
Combining Several Writings
Whether a memorandum satisfies the Statute of Frauds
Combining Several Writings
Real transactions seldom leave their evidence on a single page. A letter names the parties and the land, a receipt states the price, a note to the file records the closing date, and no one of them satisfies the memorandum requirement alone. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132 lets the memorandum consist of several writings if one of them is signed and the writings, in the circumstances, clearly indicate that they relate to the same transaction.1 A gap in one paper can then be filled from another. The combined papers are measured against the content and signature requirements that the earlier sections of this chapter applied to a single document.
Combination is consistent with the purpose of the writing requirement, which was originally evidentiary: to supply evidence that a contract exists and what it provides.2 Courts have accepted many kinds of writings, including ones that neither party meant as proof of the deal, so long as the evidence shows that a contract was made and gives sufficient detail.3 Several papers can serve that purpose as well as one. The difficulty lies in how the various writings are to be linked together,4 because each added paper raises the question whether it belongs to this deal and whether the party to be charged ever stood behind it. Section 132 therefore sets two conditions. One paper must carry the signature of the party to be charged, which anchors the memorandum in that party's own acknowledgment. The papers must also clearly relate to the same transaction, which keeps the anchor from vouching for stray documents.
Three situations follow, in increasing order of strain on the signature. In the first, the party to be charged signed every paper. In the second, that party signed only one paper and the others must be linked to it. The third is Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., where several office papers had to be combined to prove one employment contract.
Several Signed Writings
When the party to be charged signed two or more documents, they may be read together even though neither refers to the other, and whether they make a sufficient memorandum is substantially the same question as if they had been incorporated in a single document.5 Treat the signed papers as one text. Collect what they say about the subject matter, about a contract made or offered, and about the essential terms, then ask whether the total meets the three content requirements of § 131.6
A cross-reference is unnecessary because the signatures have already done what a reference would do. The Statute wants an acknowledgment by the party to be charged that he or she has assented to the contract the claimant asserts.7 A reference from one paper to another matters when the signer signed only one of them, since it shows the signer standing behind a paper the signer did not sign. A signature on each paper supplies that acknowledgment for each one. The pooled papers then consist entirely of statements the defendant authenticated, and the claimant has contributed none of them. All that remains is to show that the papers belong together.
The Restatement's own illustration shows the pooling at work. A signs and sends B a letter saying he is interested in leasing a parcel of land from B. After six months of negotiation, A and B orally agree on an eight-year lease with an option to purchase, and both sign a memorandum that would suffice except that it does not identify the land. The two documents together are a sufficient memorandum to charge A.8 The memorandum states the bargain but omits the land, so the letter must be what identifies the parcel. That the letter predates the agreement costs nothing, because a signed writing may be made before or after the contract is formed.9
The condition that survives is that the writings, in the circumstances, clearly indicate that they relate to the same transaction.10 One paper can fill a gap in another only if both describe the same deal. Without that limit, a claimant could borrow a price from one transaction, a parcel from a second, and a signature from a third, and the result would corroborate no actual bargain.
When a fact pattern hands you several papers the defendant signed, skip the hunt for a cross-reference. Confirm that the defendant signed each paper, ask whether they clearly concern one transaction, and test the combined content against § 131 as though it sat on one page. A paper the defendant did not sign raises a harder question, which comes next.
Linking Unsigned Writings
An unsigned paper carries no acknowledgment of its own, so something must carry the signer's signature across to it. Restatement § 132 names what can do that: where the signature of the party to be charged is made or adopted with reference to an unsigned writing, the signed and unsigned writings together may constitute a memorandum.12 The rule asks what ties the unsigned paper to the signer, and the answer comes in links of descending strength. Without such a tie, a claimant could attach any unsigned paper to any signed one and write the missing terms of the deal.
The first two links show on the face of the papers. It is sufficient that the signed writing refers to the unsigned writing explicitly or by implication, or that the party to be charged physically attaches one document to the other or encloses them in the same envelope.13 Each is the signer's own act of treating the papers as one, so the unsigned paper arrives already vouched for. The third link shows on the papers only that they describe the same deal, so the signer's adoption of the unsigned paper has to be shown by acquiescence. The inquiry therefore has two parts: how the documents connect, and whether the party to be charged assented to the unsigned one.14 When the party to be charged, or an agent, prepared the unsigned paper and it clearly refers to the signed ones, the combination is easy to support.15
The Restatement's illustrations show the links working. A writes and signs a letter that would be a sufficient memorandum except that it does not identify B, and the letter arrives in an envelope bearing B's name and address. The envelope can supply the missing identification, because it is the signer's own container and the claimant has added nothing. In a second illustration, the memorandum is spread over two sheets of paper that are not connected physically, and A signs one. The sheets may be read together to charge A if an incomplete sentence on one is completed on the other, or if the contract partly disclosed by one is clearly the same contract partly disclosed by the other.16 Both illustrations rest on clues that sit in the papers, so neither depends on the claimant's testimony.
Courts divide over the third link, and the division is about whether the connection must show on the papers themselves. A stricter group insists that the signed writing refer in some fashion to the unsigned one, and decides both the connection and the signer's acknowledgment from the papers alone. A second group, which has gained increasing support, treats a reference to the same subject matter or transaction as enough and admits testimony from outside the writings to show how the documents connect and that the party to be charged acquiesced in the unsigned one.17 Crabtree adopted the second view, and the Restatement's acquiescence language follows the same approach, perhaps somewhat more generously.18
The generous view confines outside evidence to a narrow job. Every term of the contract must still appear in the writings, a signed writing must establish a contractual relationship, and the testimony serves only to connect the papers and show assent. If the testimony fails to do that convincingly, a judge may rule as a matter of law that the Statute is unsatisfied.19 The objection to the generous view is that a signature is the defendant's own authentication, and testimony that extends it to a paper the signer never mentioned does work the signature was meant to do. In practice, it seems likely that the more persuasive the evidence that the plaintiff's story is true, the readier a court will be to combine the writings, so strong corroboration helps a claimant.20
Combination can pool only what the papers contain, and Clay v. Hanson shows the limit. A series of writings was offered to satisfy the Statute, and the court held that they fell short for two reasons. None contained an adequate description of the property, and the first writing did not identify the buyer while the second did not refer to the first to incorporate it by reference.21 The second reason concerns the link. The first would have defeated the claim even with a perfect link, because no combination of papers supplied a reasonable identification of the subject matter. Compare the envelope illustration, where the missing identity sat in a paper tied to the signed letter by the signer's own act.
The signed writing carries the weight of the combination, and jurisdictions differ on how much it must show by itself. Under the stricter approach it must establish a contractual relationship between the parties. In Horn & Hardart Co. v. Pillsbury Co., the Second Circuit described New York law as imposing two threshold requirements: the signed writing must establish a contractual relationship, and the unsigned writing must on its face refer to the same transaction.22 The Restatement is more liberal. The signed writing may be an informal writing, an offer, or even a document that attempts to repudiate contractual liability.23 In the Restatement's illustration, A signs a letter that accurately states the terms of an oral land sale but adds that the agreement was oral and not binding. The letter is a sufficient memorandum to charge A.24 Applied to a signed cover letter that merely forwards an unsigned draft for review, the stricter rule leaves the enclosure nothing to extend, because the letter establishes no contractual relationship. Whether the Restatement reaches the same result turns on whether the forwarded draft amounts to an offer by the signer.
Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden
Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., a 1953 decision of the New York Court of Appeals, applies § 132 alongside nearly every other doctrine in this chapter.26 A writing never meant as a memorandum, memoranda made after the contract, signature by initials, a link between signed and unsigned papers, and an essential term buried in a cryptic phrase all appear in one record, and the employee's claim succeeds only because each link holds. Following the case in order retraces the chapter.
In September 1947, Nate Crabtree negotiated with Elizabeth Arden's company for a position as sales manager. Because he would be leaving a secure job for a field new to him, he insisted on a definite term of employment. Arden had her personal secretary write a memorandum on a telephone order blank that happened to be at hand. It recorded the pay scale and the notation “2 years to make good,” and no one signed it.27 Crabtree accepted, and Arden wired back her “welcome.” When he reported for work, a payroll-change card was prepared and initialed by Mr. Johns, the company's executive vice-president, and forwarded to the payroll department. It recited that it was prepared on September 30, 1947, and was effective October 22, and it named the parties and Crabtree's job classification. It set the pay at $20,000 a year for the first six months, $25,000 for the next six, and $30,000 after one year.28 Crabtree's pay rose to $25,000, but the raise to $30,000 never followed. The company's comptroller, Carstens, then signed a second card recording an increase from $25,000 to $30,000 “per contractual arrangements with Miss Arden,” but Arden refused to approve it, and Crabtree sued.29 The question was whether these papers, taken together, satisfied the Statute.
The proof of the contract's terms was spread across three papers:
- The unsigned office memo that Arden's secretary wrote carried the duration notation.
- The payroll card initialed by Johns named the parties and the position and set out the pay scale.
- The payroll card signed by Carstens recorded the unpaid raise and referred to contractual arrangements with Arden.
The court began with the two cards and held that each was unquestionably a memorandum. That neither card was prepared or signed to evidence the contract, and that both came into existence after it was made, did not matter. It was enough that the signers meant to authenticate the information on the card and that the information evidenced the contract's terms.30 Both points follow rules already seen. A writing need not have been made as a memorandum,31 and a memorandum may be made after formation, even after breach.32 The late date poses no conceptual problem, because the oral contract exists all along. The defendant can validate it merely by signing an appropriate writing, a power that would make no sense if the contract were treated as never having existed.33
The signatures satisfied the next requirement. Johns signed one card by initials and Carstens signed the other, and any symbol made or adopted to authenticate the writing as the signer's counts as a signature.34 The employer was a corporation, so its signature necessarily came through its officers, and § 131 accepts a writing signed on behalf of the party to be charged.35 Because the cards were the employer's own payroll records, they carried the employer's authenticated account of the pay scale, evidence that a claimant had no way to manufacture.
The cards contained every essential term but one. They named the parties, the position, and the salary, but said nothing about how long the employment would last.36 Duration was the very promise Crabtree sought to enforce, and § 131 requires the memorandum to state the essential terms of the unperformed promises with reasonable certainty.37 The cards alone left the two-year term to oral proof. The court therefore asked whether the earlier unsigned memo could supply it, and whether its notation designated a period of employment.
That question put the court in the middle of the split described above. One group of courts requires the signed writing to refer to the unsigned one and decides the connection from the papers alone. The other treats a reference to the same subject matter or transaction as enough and admits oral testimony to show how the documents connect and that the party to be charged acquiesced in the unsigned one.38 The Court of Appeals adopted the second view. The danger of fraud that ordinarily comes with oral evidence is at a minimum when every term must still appear in the writings, a signed writing must establish a contractual relationship, the unsigned paper must on its face refer to the same transaction, and the testimony serves only to connect the papers and show assent.39 If the testimony does not do that convincingly, the judge may rule as a matter of law that the Statute is unsatisfied. Section 132 states the same approach: the documents must clearly relate to the same transaction, and the party to be charged must have acquiesced in the unsigned paper.40
The papers satisfied both inquiries. The memo and the cards set out the same parties, the same position, and the same salary, and it was hardly possible that such detailed information referred to a different agreement. The comptroller's reference to contractual arrangements with Arden pointed, in a general way, to a more comprehensive agreement that testimony could explain.41 Assent was shown from two directions. Arden's own personal secretary prepared the memo, so there was little likelihood that it was fraudulently manufactured or that the employer had not assented to its contents. The parties' conduct when it was prepared confirmed that assent.42 That is the acquiescence § 132 looks for. The unsigned paper came from the employer's side of the table, so the claimant contributed none of the evidence that carried the missing term.
The last question was whether “2 years to make good” fixed a duration, and the court answered that it fixed a definite one.43 The court asked what purpose the notation could serve other than marking the length of the term, since without it the employment would be at will, and it refused to treat the phrase as meaningless. The rising wage scale in the writings also fits poorly with an at-will hiring. At most the phrase was cryptic or ambiguous, and in that case testimony may explain it. Given the parties' relations, the course of the negotiations, and Crabtree's insistence on security, the trier of fact could find that the phrase granted a definite two years, after which he would be subject to discharge if he did not make good.44 Section 131 asks for the essential terms with reasonable certainty, and the case shows that certainty is read in context. A terse notation on an order blank met it because the negotiations showed what the words were for.45
A jurisdiction on the stricter side of the split would ask a narrower question on these facts. It would test whether the comptroller's reference to contractual arrangements, read from the papers alone, points to the office memo, and it would exclude the testimony that tied the papers together in Crabtree.46 An answer to a fact pattern built on a signed card and an unsigned memo should therefore say which approach governs before applying it.