Concept
The Signature Requirement
Whether a memorandum satisfies the Statute of Frauds
The Signature Requirement
A memorandum can identify the subject, indicate a contract, and state every essential term, and still fail the Statute, because Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131 also demands a writing “signed by or on behalf of the party to be charged.”1 The content rules ask what the document says about the deal. The signature rule asks whose statement it is.
The signature is the one element that must come from the person being held to the contract, and the Statute’s purpose explains why. The Statute exists to give reliable evidence that the contract exists and what it says, and to stop a claimant from enforcing an alleged obligation on unreliable, possibly perjured oral testimony.2 Without a signature rule, a claimant could draft a memorandum naming the right land, the right price, and the right parties, and the paper would corroborate nothing, because it records only the claimant’s own account. The defendant’s signature changes what the words are. They become the defendant’s own acknowledgment, which is the evidence the Statute demands.
Three questions follow, in order: whose signature the writing must carry, what qualifies as a signature once you find one, and how the answer changes when the writing is an email or other electronic record. Restatement § 134 supplies the middle answer in terms of authenticating intent rather than a handwritten name.3
The Party to Be Charged
“Party to be charged” does not mean every party the contract binds. The English statute asked for a signature “by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized,” and a second section asked for one “by the parties to be charged by such contract or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.” Both forms are generally read to refer to the party to be charged in the legal proceeding, not the parties to be bound by the contract.4 The difference decides cases. A bilateral contract binds both sides, so a rule keyed to who is bound would demand every signature, while a rule keyed to who is resisting demands one.
Restatement § 135 applies the rule to contracts with several parties. Where a memorandum is signed by fewer than all the parties and the Statute is not otherwise satisfied, the contract is enforceable against the signers but not against the others.5 Each signer has supplied the acknowledgment against that signer, and a non-signer has supplied none unless some other sufficient writing carries the non-signer’s signature.
To apply the rule, find the person who wants out of the deal and look for that person’s signature on the writing.6 Only the party against whom enforcement is sought needs to have signed; the writing need not carry the claimant’s signature, or both parties’ signatures.7 Suppose Cai and Tyra orally agree to a house sale, and only Cai signs a writing that states the essential terms. If Cai wants out, the page is his own signed acknowledgment, the Statute is satisfied, and Tyra can enforce the contract against him. If Tyra wants out, the same page carries no signature of hers, the Statute is not satisfied as to her, and Cai cannot enforce the contract against her.8 The writing and the oral deal are identical in both outcomes. Only the identity of the resisting party changes.
Only the resisting party’s signature counts because the Statute protects that party. It keeps a person from being held to an alleged obligation on unreliable and possibly perjured oral testimony, so the person at risk is the one against whom the claim runs.9 A claimant’s own signature would add no protection, since any claimant, honest or not, can sign a paper that tells the claimant’s story. The label attaches to whoever resists a particular claim in the proceeding. The party to be charged is ordinarily the defendant, but a plaintiff who resists a counterclaim on the same oral contract is the party to be charged on that claim.10 When the parties draft a writing, no one knows who will later resist, which is why careful drafters have both sides sign.
The charged party also holds the cure. An oral agreement of the kind the Statute governs is neither illegal nor against public policy,11 and the defendant in an enforcement action has, in effect, a power to validate the contract and make it fully enforceable merely by signing an appropriate writing. That power could not exist if the contract were deemed never to have existed.12 The Statute withholds a remedy; it does not erase the bargain.
Because the requirement runs against one person, a contract can be enforceable in one direction only. B and S orally agree to a land sale, and B writes the essential terms on the back of a business card and signs his name. S can enforce the contract against B, because B signed, but B cannot enforce it against S, who signed nothing.13 The result looks unfair, and it is: a careful party who signs a confirmation, or even a memo for the files, can be held to the deal by a careless party who never signed anything. A signed memo that the defendant merely placed in its own files is enough to permit enforcement against that defendant.14 Courts nonetheless find no flaw in the bargain itself. If the oral contract is valid, a defense that blocks one party’s enforcement does not destroy the consideration,15 and so long as both promises are genuine and not illusory, no general rule of mutuality prevents one party from being bound because the other has no right of enforcement.16
A signature from the wrong side defeats a writing that otherwise looks adequate. In Buffaloe v. Hart, a buyer claiming an oral contract to purchase barns offered his own check as the memorandum. The court considered whether the check could be a sufficient memorandum and rejected it because the sellers never signed it.17 The sellers were the parties to be charged, and the buyer’s signature could not stand in for theirs. The reverse case is instructive. Had the buyer delivered the check and then stopped payment, the signature at issue would have been his own, so the question would no longer be whose name appears but whether the check says enough. A check can carry signatures, since the drawer signs the front and the payee may endorse the back, but it rarely contains every essential term.18
The sale-of-goods provision uses different words for the same idea. A contract for goods priced at $500 or more is not enforceable by action or defense without a record sufficient to indicate a contract for sale, signed by “the party against whom enforcement is sought” or by the party’s authorized agent or broker.19 A later section takes up that standard.
The words “on behalf of” in § 131 let an agent supply the signature.20 An agent acting within the agent’s authority acts as the principal, so the writing carries the principal’s acknowledgment as surely as a signature by hand. The authority must exist when the agent signs: a reporter’s note describes a decision holding that an agent could not make a memorandum satisfying the Statute after the agent’s authority had been terminated.21 Some states add a formality, because statutes in many states require that the agent’s authority itself be in writing and signed by the principal.22 The logic is plain enough. Without that requirement, a claimant could prove by oral testimony that the principal told someone to sign, and the signature’s corroborating value would rest on the very testimony the Statute distrusts. The written-authority rule moves the safeguard back one step.
A few states depart from this pattern for land contracts, requiring by statute or by decision that the memorandum be signed only by the lessor or vendor.23 Those states fix the required signer by role rather than by who is resisting, so the usual question, which party wants out, does not control there.
When a fact pattern reports that only one side signed, first decide which side is resisting. A claimant’s signature does nothing against the defendant, and a defendant’s signature, personal or through an authorized agent, ends the signature inquiry whatever the claimant did. With several parties, ask the question once for each person against whom enforcement is sought.
What Counts as a Signature
Restatement § 134 defines the signature to a memorandum as any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer.25 Two ideas carry the definition. The first is breadth: the law asks for a symbol, not a handwritten name. The second is purpose: the symbol must have been made, or later taken over, to authenticate, which means the signer assents to the writing and adopts it as the signer’s own.26 In every example below, ask whether the mark was put there for that job.
The test looks to intent and not to the shape of the mark because the Statute wants the party to be charged to have acknowledged the writing, and a mark of any shape can do that. The UCC follows the same logic. It emphasizes the signer’s intent and de-emphasizes the manner of expressing it,27 and it defines “signed” to include “any symbol executed or adopted with present intention to adopt or accept a writing.”28 A rule that demanded one style of mark would reject genuine acknowledgments for no gain.
The accepted symbols run well past the handwritten name. Initials, a logo, or even an “x” will do, and the symbol need not follow the terms: a party can adopt a logo at the top of a page by writing the contract’s terms beneath it.29 In the Restatement’s illustration, a clerk writes out the terms of a contract, and A writes “O.K.” at the top of the statement followed by A’s initials. Those initials are A’s signature.30 A printed letterhead or billhead may be adopted as a signature,31 and under a liberal reading a firm logo on a purchase order qualifies, because the logo is a symbol adopted to authenticate the source of the document.32 The Fourth Circuit treated a seller’s trademark on a sales brochure as a sufficient signature in Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc.33
Whether a preprinted mark was adopted is a question of fact, because the definition makes intent the test. In Owen v. Kroger Co., a federal district court in Indiana held that preprinted wording on memos, which showed a corporate logo and described the memos as “from the desk of” named agents of the defendant, could serve as a signature. The court sent to the jury the question whether the writers, by choosing that pad, meant to authenticate the information they wrote.34 The result tracks § 134: the form of the mark makes it a candidate for a signature, and proof of purpose decides.
A symbol need not sit at the foot of the page. Under a statute in the traditional English form, the signature need not appear on any particular part of the writing, though signing at the end is usual, and wherever it appears it must have been made or adopted with the requisite intention.35 Convention still shapes the proof. A name inscribed at the end is prima facie evidence of authentication, while a name placed elsewhere may raise the contrary presumption and call for other evidence that it was meant as a signature.36 Absent contrary evidence, the trier of fact may infer the intention from the conventional form of the writing. Where A writes a memorandum beginning “I, A, make the following contract with B” and delivers it to B, those words are A’s signature if the trier of fact infers that A meant to authenticate the writing.37 The word “subscribe” adds a wrinkle where a statute uses it instead of “sign”: some courts read the two as synonyms, and others require the signature at the end or foot.38
The intent requirement matters most where a mark is on the page and the signer’s adoption of it is in doubt. In the Restatement’s illustration, A sends B a written acceptance that states the terms on a form with A’s name as a printed heading. At the foot appears the word “Accepted” followed by a blank space for a signature that is never filled in. Absent other evidence of intention, the form is not signed by A.39 The heading tells the reader whose form it is, and the empty space tells the reader that signing was still to come. A form that states on its face that it binds only when signed by an officer of the company is the same kind of case, because the preprinted company name cannot serve as that officer’s signature.40 A sheet with terms and no mark fails more plainly. In a problem involving Wright Recording, an agreed-upon note of the terms was written on a blank piece of paper that bore no company name or logo and no initials or other mark, so no symbol on it could be a signature even under the liberal definition of § 134. Had the paper carried the company name or logo, or had its writer initialed it, the signature requirement would have been met.41
Adoption can also follow the mark. Commonly a document is signed after it is completed, but blanks may be left to be filled in later. If the signer fills a blank or adds a postscript, or if another does so with the signer’s authority, the prior signature is effectively adopted with reference to the added portion.42 Alterations work the same way, because re-adoption of the prior signature is as effective for the Statute as separate initials beside the change.43 Adoption is an act of intent, and a signer who leaves a space for completion and authorizes someone to fill it has accepted what fills the space as the signer’s own words. The authority ties the added words to the signer, which is why an unauthorized stranger’s additions fall outside the rule. In the Restatement’s illustration, A has letters printed ending “Yours very truly, A,” and with A’s authority a clerk fills in one form with the terms of an offer to B and sends it. B accepts orally, and A’s printed name is A’s signature.44
A fact pattern that supplies an unusual mark, an unusual location, or a form carrying a printed name asks one question: did the signer make or adopt the symbol to authenticate the writing? A recognizable symbol such as initials, a logo, or a printed name points toward yes, most strongly where convention puts a signature, unless something on the face of the writing, such as an unfilled space waiting for a signature, shows that signing was still to come. A page that states the terms and carries no mark at all answers no.
Electronic Signatures
Restatement § 134 defines a signature as any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as the signer’s.46 The definition mentions neither ink nor paper, so it reaches a typed name, a message header, or a button on a screen as readily as a pen stroke. The Statute was enacted long before electronic media could have been imagined, and it originally contemplated writing and signature in tangible form on paper. The words “writing” and “signature” now include recording and signing in retrievable electronic form.47 What remains is to see what the electronic-records statutes add to § 134 and where they stop. The earlier discussion of electronic writings asked a different question, whether a message can be a writing at all.
Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) in 2000, requiring states to recognize electronic communications and signatures in transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce.48 E-SIGN and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) provide that, to the extent the law requires a signature, it may not deny effect to a signature in electronic form. That disposes of the objection that a message typed on a keyboard cannot be signed. The wording also marks the limit, because the statutes do not decide whether a signature could be denied effect for some other reason.49 Electronic form therefore removes one objection and leaves the rest of the analysis where § 134 put it. A contract that satisfies the Statute in every respect except that a party’s signature is an electronic one in an email is, in most jurisdictions, signed by the party to be bound.50
Both statutes define an electronic signature by intent. E-SIGN calls it “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record,” and UETA § 2(8) is almost identical.51 The definition has the same two working parts as § 134, a mark and an intention to authenticate with it, and it adds that the mark must be tied to the record. It covers both an identifying symbol that a computer generates automatically, such as the “from” line on an email, and a deliberate placing or adoption of a signature on the communication.52 It promises no more than that. An electronic signature does not by itself ensure the document’s integrity, the sender’s authenticity, or confidentiality, so those remain questions of proof.53
A name the sender deliberately types into the message is quite clearly a signature. An automatically generated name, such as the one in the message header or in a signature block the email program adds at the bottom, is less obviously one. It still qualifies if the party adopts it with intent to sign the record, and that intent is judged objectively. If the name and message are genuine, adoption should usually occur as a matter of course, even when the sender has no specific awareness of “signing” anything.54 The objective test fits the function of the requirement. A person who sends a genuine message under his or her own name has presented it as that person’s own communication, which is the authentication the Statute wants.
International Casings Group is the source’s example. The court treated the sender’s act of pressing “send” as adopting its name in the email header, so the header was a signature.55 In Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that the sender’s name on the relevant emails satisfied the signature requirement.56 Paper raises the same question and gets the same answer. A writer who sets out the terms on a sheet bearing a preprinted name or identifying symbol has apparently adopted it to authenticate the document, and the electronic cases apply that idea to a header or signature block.57
The instinct that any name on an email is a signature fails. The mere fact that a party’s name appears in an email does not make the party the signer; it must be established that, in generating the name, the party reasonably intended to adopt or accept the writing.58 In Buckles Management, LLC v. Investordigs, LLC, the defendant’s name in an email string was not a signature, because he had not intended it as one. The string began as an internal email outlining proposed terms and reached the plaintiff when a junior employee with no authority to bind the defendant forwarded it.59
What separates Buckles from International Casings is who put the message in front of the other side. In International Casings the party whose name appeared sent the message, so sending adopted the header. In Buckles the defendant wrote for internal readers, and an employee who could not bind him made the transmission, so nothing the defendant did adopted his name to authenticate anything for the plaintiff. The result keeps the requirement doing its job, which is to obtain the resisting party’s own acknowledgment. A forwarded string can carry that party’s words without carrying the party’s adoption of them, and treating every name in a string as a signature would let a third party turn a private draft into the defendant’s signed commitment simply by passing it along. The employee’s lack of authority matters for the reason the discussion of agents gave: a signature supplied on behalf of the party to be charged counts as that party’s only when the supplier acts within authority.
Step three does the real work. In the electronic cases the answer usually follows from what the sender did, because sending a genuine message under one’s own name adopts the name, while the failing cases involve someone other than the named person putting the words in front of the other side. A record that clears the signature requirement must still meet the content requirements, and a string of emails like the one in Buckles raises the further question, taken up next, whether several messages can be read together as one memorandum.