Concept
Informal and Electronic Writings
Whether a memorandum satisfies the Statute of Frauds
Informal and Electronic Writings
The Restatement’s test turns on the word any. A contract within the Statute is enforceable when it is evidenced by any writing, signed by or on behalf of the party to be charged, that reasonably identifies the subject matter, indicates that a contract has been made or offered by the signer, and states the essential terms of the unperformed promises with reasonable certainty, unless the particular statute adds requirements.1 The test conditions the writing on its signature and its content. It says nothing about the writing’s form or about why it was written. This section asks how far “any writing” stretches, first across ordinary paper documents and then across email, fax, and other electronic records.
Informal Writings
Courts have accepted a long list of everyday documents. The Statute has been satisfied by a letter, a receipt, a check, a price list, the minutes of a meeting, and a will.2 Land cases add a series of letters between the parties, a deed, an affidavit in a separate lawsuit, and a set of escrow instructions,3 along with an informal note and a civil pleading.4 The writing need not be devoted to stating the contract, and it need not look like a contract.5 Each document on the list carries the signer’s own words about a deal, and that is what the Statute asks a writing to supply.
Courts go further and accept writings that form no part of the contract. A letter to a third party will do, and so will a deed or will prepared pursuant to the oral contract.6 A written statement addressed to a stranger to the contract can satisfy the Statute if it amounts to an acknowledgment by the party to be charged that he or she assented to the contract the other side asserts.7 Either an offer or an acceptance standing alone will do if it contains the necessary elements, including an appropriate signature.8 A written offer signed by the offeror, for example, may bind the offeror.9
The author’s purpose does not matter. Courts have allowed writings that neither party intended as evidence of the contract, because the Statute’s function is evidentiary: if the proffered writing shows that the parties made a contract and supplies enough detail, it does not matter who made it or why.10 A writing need not have been intended to satisfy the Statute, so long as it does so in fact.11 It may even show no intent to contract at all. Suppose you write Alice a letter referring to the sale of your house at 313 Windsor Drive before the two of you reach a final agreement. The letter may satisfy the Statute against you, yet that does not make you liable. You can still prove that you never completed a contract to sell; you simply cannot raise the lack of a writing as a defense.12
Timing imposes no limit either. A memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute may be made or signed at any time before or after the contract is formed, even after breach or repudiation.13 The rule reflects what the Statute does to an oral contract: it makes the contract unenforceable, not nonexistent. The defendant in the enforcement action can validate the contract merely by signing an appropriate writing, a power that could not exist if the contract had never come into being.14 The next section treats timing in detail.
Rosenfeld v. Basquiat shows how little form matters. The Second Circuit accepted that a short memo the artist wrote and signed in crayon on a large piece of paper could be a sufficient memorandum of an asserted sale of three paintings for a total of $12,000, paintings eventually worth more than $350,000.15 Critics answer that a few words, numbers, and initials scrawled on a scrap of paper can qualify even though such an informal event does little to serve the evidentiary, cautionary, or channeling functions, and that judicial interpretation and judicially created exceptions have so eroded the Statute that it may no longer serve those functions in any meaningful way.16 The dispute is an instance of the twin problems that run through the law of assent. Underenforcement is the failure to enforce a real agreement; overenforcement is the enforcement of an agreement that never occurred; and almost any effort to avoid one error produces the other.17 A rule demanding a formal document would risk the first error for real deals, and the any-writing rule accepts some risk of the second.
Informality of form leaves the content requirements in place. A note on a napkin must still reasonably identify the subject matter, indicate that the parties made a contract or that the signer offered one, and state the essential terms with reasonable certainty.18 It must also carry the signature of the party to be charged, a requirement the later sections develop.19
When a problem hands you a napkin, a diary page, a draft that was never sent, or a letter to a third party, the analysis turns on what the signed words say about the deal. The medium, the audience, and the writer’s purpose settle nothing. The subject matter, the indication of a contract, and the essential terms settle everything.
Electronic Records
Email, fax, and other electronic records fit within “any writing” because federal and state statutes forbid rejecting a record solely for being electronic. The federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) provides that a “signature, contract, or other record” relating to a transaction in interstate or foreign commerce “may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”21 The state counterpart, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), declares the same rule.22 Because the vast majority of real estate transactions affect interstate commerce, an electronic contract or electronic signature appears to meet the Statute of Frauds.23 Under E-SIGN and UETA, emails and other electronic communications satisfy the signature requirement.24
Two cases show the rule at work. In Waddle v. Elrod, an email laying out the terms of a land transfer as part of a settlement agreement satisfied the Statute under Tennessee’s version of UETA.25 In International Casings Group v. Premium Standard Farms, a court applying UETA found the Statute satisfied by email correspondence. The sender did not challenge the emails’ authenticity, and the court held that by pressing “send” the sender intended to adopt the name in the email header to authenticate the message, so the header qualified as a signature.26 A later section returns to electronic signatures. For now, the point is that the emails themselves served as the memoranda.
The statutes carry a limit in their wording. They say a record or signature may not be denied effect solely because it is electronic, so they remove one objection and leave the rest in place. To the extent the law requires a signature, a signature in electronic form cannot be rejected for its form, but the statutes do not purport to decide whether the signature could be denied effect for some other reason.27 An electronic record must therefore still contain the essential terms and be properly signed, like any other document.28
A few items sit at the edges of the category. A signed fax satisfies the Statute, and an oral stipulation made in court satisfies it even though the party to be charged signed no record.29 In sales of goods, UCC § 2-201(1) asks for a “record” sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made, signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by that party’s authorized agent or broker, and a later section develops that standard.30
A problem that recites an exchange of emails or texts raises two questions that the analysis should keep apart. The first is whether the medium disqualifies the message, and the answer is no: a record is not rejected as a writing solely because it is electronic. The second is whether the message is sufficient, and that is the same content-and-signature analysis the Restatement applies to paper.