Concept
The One-Year Provision
Whether the contract is within the Statute of Frauds
The One-Year Provision
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110(1)(e) requires a writing for “a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.”1 The other classes on the Restatement’s list are defined by what the promise concerns: another person’s debt, a decedent’s estate, a marriage, an interest in land. This class is defined by time alone, so it reaches contracts on any subject, including employment, services, and supply arrangements that no other provision would touch. It catches the party who assumes that a long-running oral agreement is safe.
Courts have cut the provision down to size. Read literally, “not to be performed within one year” describes any agreement the parties expect to take longer, but the cases read it to mean an agreement that cannot be performed within the year.2 The provision applies only when the terms of the agreement leave no way to complete performance inside that span. If the terms allow completion within the year, however unlikely or improbable, the contract is outside it.3 A contract that is long, that the parties expect to last long, or that in fact lasts long therefore escapes the provision unless its terms rule out earlier performance. The Restatement’s working rule is framed the same way, around a promise that cannot be fully performed within a year of the making.4
When a defendant raises the statute of frauds, the court asks two questions in order. First, is the contract one of the types to which the statute applies; is it “within” the statute? If not, the plaintiff may prove the contract by any relevant evidence, written or oral. If it is, the court asks a second question: does a signed memorandum satisfy the statute?5 This unit concerns the first question for the one-year class. A contract that clears it may still fall within another class, a possibility taken up under contracts within several classes.
The one-year period is arbitrary,6 and the provision has generated more controversy, and a larger and more unsettled body of case law, than any other part of the modern statute.7 The arbitrariness shows in the results: an oral promise to work for a single day thirteen months from now is within the provision, while an oral promise to work for a full year beginning tomorrow is not.8 The narrow reading follows the pattern of judicial exceptions generally. A formality requirement produces underenforcement, and each narrowing reduces it at the price of some overenforcement.9
The subsections below take the provision apart one feature at a time: how the year is counted, what it means to be capable of performance within a year, how a life or other contingency bears on that test, how a right to terminate bears on it, and what a party’s full performance does.
Measuring From the Making
The year runs from the day the parties make the contract to the day performance would be complete.10 The closing words of § 110(1)(e), “from the making thereof,” fix the starting line.11 Neither the length of the performance nor the day it begins controls. This subsection assumes a contract whose terms fix when performance ends; the next asks when the terms permit earlier completion.
A one-hour television appearance promised on April 10, 2009 for February 1, 2011 asks almost nothing of the performer, yet the contract is within the statute, because the appearance cannot occur until well after April 10, 2010.12 Long performances that start later follow the same logic. An oral agreement made on June 1 to work for one year beginning July 10 is within the statute, because the work ends around July 10 of the next year, more than a year after the making. In one review problem, a recording company’s president orally hired Juan for a year on May 15, with work to begin about two weeks later. The contract was within the statute for the same reason, and neither party had a right to accelerate performance and finish early.13 The common mistake is to count from the first day of work, which makes every one of these contracts look as if it fits inside a year.
A hotel booking shows how little it takes to cross the line. A guest who orally books a room on July 2, 2020 for the night of July 3, 2021 has made a contract that cannot be completed until two days after its first anniversary, so it is within the statute even though the hotel’s performance occupies a single night. Had the guest booked on July 5, 2020, the year would run to July 5, 2021, the stay would end on July 4, and the statute would not apply.14 The hotel, the room, and the night of the stay are the same in both bookings; only the date of making moved, by three days.
In Boone v. Coe, Kentucky plaintiffs orally arranged in the fall of 1909 to rent the defendant’s farm in Texas for twelve months, the term to begin on their arrival at the farm.15 The defendant owned a large farm in Ford County, and the plaintiffs sued for breach of a parol (oral) contract of lease for one year to commence at a future date.16 Because the year of occupancy would start only after the making, it could not end within a year of the making, and the oral lease fell within the statute.17
The line between starting tomorrow and starting later is the sharpest in this topic. A promise to work for one year, with work to begin the very next day, is outside the statute. The same promise, with work to begin more than a day after the making, is inside it, because the law disregards fractions of a day.18 Treating the day of making as a single point means that a year of work beginning the next day ends on the anniversary of the making, still inside the period. A start one day later pushes the last day of work past it.
A one-day difference reverses the outcome while the burden on the parties stays the same. That is the arbitrariness noted above, and the arithmetic follows the statutory words regardless. One qualification affects the starting point. If the parties restate their agreement when the work begins, and the restatement can be regarded as a making or remaking of the contract, the year runs from that later date, and courts have been very liberal in holding that a restatement was itself a contract.19 A second conversation at the start of work should therefore prompt the question whether it remade the contract.
Capable of Performance Within a Year
Capability is the working test. Under Restatement § 130(1), a contract is within the statute when any promise in it cannot be fully performed within a year of the making.21 Section 110(1)(e) speaks of a contract “not to be performed” within the year, and the gap between not to be performed and cannot be performed decides most cases.22 Under the prevailing approach, the inquiry concerns what the contract permits, not what the parties expect or what is likely.
The rule is old. Surveying the English cases decided before the Declaration of Independence, the Supreme Court concluded in Warner v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. that an oral agreement which, according to the parties’ intention as shown by its terms, might be fully performed within a year was not within the statute, even though the time of performance was uncertain, and might probably extend, and be expected by the parties to extend, and did in fact extend, beyond the year.23 Probability, expectation, and actual duration all drop out if the terms allow performance within the year.
Courts compress the test into one question: would it be a breach of contract to perform in less than a year? Only if the answer is yes is the contract within the provision. A promise made in October 1920 to cut and deliver timber on or before April 1, 1922, and a promise to build a house within fifteen months, are outside the provision, because each sets a latest date for performance and does not forbid earlier performance.24
Contracts of indefinite duration show the test at work. Nothing in them fixes an end beyond the first year, but some event might end performance inside it. In Browning v. Poirier, romantic partners had an agreement, in force for many years, to share lottery winnings. They intended it to last as long as their relationship did but never fixed a term. The court held it outside the one-year provision, because the parties could have won in the first year or could have ended the arrangement; the question is whether performance cannot be completed within the year, not whether completion is unlikely.25 The same reasoning governs an oral promise to pay a sales agent “life of the part” commissions for as long as a vehicle maker keeps ordering the carpet the agent helped win. Orders will probably continue for many years, but the maker could change suppliers or stop ordering at any time, even in the first year, so the obligation could end within it. The court in the case behind this example assumed that the parties contemplated performance well beyond a year and still held that the possibility of ending within the year removed the contract from the one-year rule.26 A commission payable on completion of a chemical plant escaped the clause for the same reason in Freedman v. Chemical Construction Corp., although completion took years.
A missing end date does not by itself take a contract outside the provision. What matters is whether some course of events inside the year could complete the promised performance. In Tucker v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette-in-Indiana, a victim of abuse by a church employee agreed not to pursue legal recourse in exchange for the diocese’s promise to strip the employee of his duties and to ensure that he had no contact with children at the parish. The diocese could have fired him within the year, but its promise about contact was an ongoing obligation with no time limit, and the court held that it could not be treated as performable within a year.27 The carpet commissions could stop because orders could stop. Nothing the diocese did in its first year could finish a promise that had no endpoint.
Contracts that fix a term longer than a year are the plain cases. A promise to work for another for two years is within the statute,28 because the duty is to keep working for the whole period, and stopping early would be a breach. An oral loan repayable in installments that by their terms run past a year was likewise held within the statute in Holloway v. Bucher.
A distinct minority of courts look instead to what the parties intended and expected, and place a contract within the statute if they expected performance to last beyond a year.29 One court required a writing for a contract hiring a first-year law student to manage an apartment house for as long as he remained in law school, because the parties contemplated a three-year program and so intended performance to extend more than two years beyond the making. A contrary result would have been unsurprising, since the student could leave school at any time.30 In McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., an employee who allegedly gave up existing employment for an oral offer of permanent employment was barred by the one-year statute, because a relationship of more than a year was clearly contemplated; a strong dissent called the holding contrary to the statute and to the great weight of authority.31 And Sawyer v. Mills applied the provision to a bonus agreement because the parties did not contemplate performance within a year, even though performance was possible.32
Both contracts are long. The schedule terms in the warehouse agreement, and not the length of the job, change the result.
The next two subsections take up circumstances that complicate the capability question: a performance measured by a life or other contingency, and a right to terminate early.
Lifetime and Death Contingencies
A person may die in the first week, a war may end in the first month, and a house may burn on the first night. Contracts tied to events like these can look as though they might be finished inside the year, and the question under § 130(1) is whether the event completes the promised performance.34 When it does, the contract can be fully performed within the year. When the event instead releases a party from a promise left undone, the promise is discharged and not performed, and the contract stays within the provision.35
A promise of lifetime employment is the clearest case of an event that completes performance. The service promised is measured by a life, so if the life ends in the first year, the service has been rendered for exactly as long as the promise required. Because death can come at any time, the contract can be fully performed within a year, and the provision does not reach it.36 The same holds for a promise to leave a bequest by will or to pay a sum at the death of a named person.37 The result does not turn on how long the life actually lasts. A worker who serves thirty years under a lifetime promise was working under a contract outside the provision from the day it was made, because the terms, and not the course of events, decide whether performance within a year is possible.
Four variations on one employment promise mark the line between performance and excuse. The first two are easy, and the last two are where errors occur.38
- A promises to work for B for five years. The term is fixed, no event inside the first year completes it, and the contract is within the provision.
- A promises to work for B for the rest of A’s life. A’s death inside the first year would complete the promise, and the contract is outside the provision.
- A promises to work for B for five years or for the rest of A’s life, whichever is shorter. Death is one of two ways to perform, and the contract is outside the provision.
- A promises to work for B for five years, but A’s performance is excused if A dies. Death releases A without completing the promise, and the contract is within the provision.
Promises 3 and 4 produce the same practical result: if A dies in the second year, A owes B nothing more. They differ in what death does. In promise 3, A has undertaken alternative performances, and the promise is kept in full if either occurs. A promise with alternatives is outside the one-year provision if any alternative can be performed within a year, and it does not matter which party has the right to choose.39 In promise 4, A’s only way to perform is five years of work, and death is a background excuse for a promise that was never kept. The provision follows that line, placing promise 3 outside and promise 4 inside, because nonperformance remains nonperformance even when the law excuses it.40 Authority is less uniform when a contract phrased in years expressly provides for termination at death.41
To a person untrained in the law, promises 3 and 4 are two ways of saying one thing, and B, who relies on an oral version of promise 4, may be surprised to find it unenforceable.42 The line nonetheless follows from the statutory test. That test asks whether the promised performance can be completed within the year, so it turns on what the promise itself defines as completion. A contract that defines completion as the end of a life is completed by death, and a contract that defines completion as five years of work is completed only by five years of work. The likelihood of death changes nothing. A promise to employ a healthy young man for life is outside the provision although he will probably work for decades. A promise to employ a 98-year-old man for 366 days is within it even if he is terminally ill, because his death would end the contract but would only excuse the performance, never complete it.43
Promises to support another person draw the same line. An agreement to pay an annuity for life can be fully performed within a year because the annuitant may die at any time. A promise to support a sixteen-year-old until age twenty-one is within the provision, since full performance requires the minor to live five more years, and an early death would merely discharge the promise.44 Authority on the second kind of promise is not unanimous. In Duncan v. Clarke, a promise to pay sixty dollars a month toward the support of a four-year-old child until age twenty-one produced a majority holding that the child’s death would have fully performed the agreement, so the promise might have been performed within a year. The opposing view, apparently accepted by the court below, was that death would have defeated the contract instead of achieving its purpose.45
The reasoning reaches any uncertain event whose occurrence completes the promised performance. A promise to pay $10,000 when certain property is sold is outside the provision, because the sale and the payment may both occur inside the year. A promise to supply services for the duration of a war is outside it because the war may end inside the year. Some jurisdictions have legislated differently, extending the Statute of Frauds to contracts that are not performable before the end of a lifetime and to contracts to make testamentary dispositions, so the controlling statute can reverse these results.46 A jurisdiction that follows the expectation approach, as in McInerney, may likewise treat a promise of permanent employment as within the provision because the parties contemplated a relationship longer than a year.
Termination Rights
A contract that runs longer than a year but lets one or both parties end it sooner, usually on notice, strains the capability test. The right to end the contract is a way the relationship could stop inside the year, yet it is not obviously a way of performing. Courts divide over which description controls, and the question that organizes the cases is how a court will characterize the event of giving notice.48 Termination closes the relationship; performance carries out what the contract promised.
Breach and excuse supply the baseline. A contract for a fixed term of years is within the provision even though one party might breach it in the first year, or death or impossibility might excuse it. Defeasance, the undoing of a contract before its term has run, is possible within a year; performance is not.49 The reasoning is that any contract can end early through breach, so if that possibility made a contract performable within a year, every contract would qualify and the provision would disappear. A breach leaves the promised performance undone and exposes the breaching party to liability, and an excuse, though it relieves the party of liability, is still not performance.50 A contractual right to terminate resembles breach and excuse because it cuts the relationship short. It differs because the parties wrote it into the agreement, and that difference is why courts divide.
Most courts treat a termination right like breach and excuse. A contract for a fixed term longer than a year stays within the statute even though one or both parties may end it within the year.51 On that view, giving notice is a rightful but premature ending of the contract. Nobody has delivered the promised term of work or pay, so the contract cannot be fully performed within a year and is unenforceable from its inception unless the statute is satisfied.52
A minority treats the same agreement as a promise of alternative performances: the promisor will either perform for the full period or perform until the option to terminate is exercised.53 A promise with alternatives is outside the provision if any alternative can be performed within a year, so on this reasoning the notice right takes the contract out of the statute.54 If giving notice counts as full performance, the contract is enforceable against both parties for the whole term whenever the right is not exercised.55 In a jurisdiction that follows this view, Linda’s suit against Susan meets no writing requirement under the one-year provision, and she need only prove the promise. Knigge v. B&L Food Stores, Inc. held that a long-term employment contract did not fall within the one-year rule because one party could terminate within the year, and Leon v. Kelly held that a partnership of indefinite term was outside the provision because a partner could dissociate and dissolve it at any time.56 Browning, discussed above, points the same way: the court counted the partners’ freedom to end their arrangement as one way it could be completed within the year.
The distinction between a term that fulfills a contract and one that prevents its fulfillment helps with the cases in between. A court on facts like the law-student case found a difference between the two kinds of term. Graduation after three years is the term that fulfills the contract, and dropping out is a term that prevents fulfillment. Terms that prevent fulfillment, the court reasoned, do not determine the contract’s duration, so the contract cannot be performed within a year and requires a writing.57
Two decisions show how fine the line can be. In D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., an oral beverage distributorship was to continue as long as the products were satisfactorily distributed, and the court held it within the statute, because the arrangement could end inside the first year only through termination for breach. In Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., an oral employment agreement was read to allow termination only for just cause, and the Second Circuit held it outside the clause, because some events that gave the employer proper grounds to terminate would not be an unexcused breach by the employee. The difference lies in what an early end would look like. In the distributorship, the only way out within the year was a wrong by one side, which is nonperformance. In the employment case, the agreement itself recognized events that could end it within the year without any failure to perform.
New York adds a variation that depends on who holds the right. The one-year provision does not apply when the option to terminate is bilateral or belongs to the defendant, but it is a defense when only the plaintiff holds the option.58 When only the party seeking to hold the defendant can end the arrangement, the defendant’s liability continues indefinitely, subject only to that party’s voluntary act, and it would be illusory to treat the contract as terminable within a year from the defendant’s standpoint. Applied to Susan and Linda, a right held by both of them, or by Susan alone, takes the contract outside the provision in New York, and Linda may sue without a writing. If only Linda holds the right and she is the one suing, Susan has the defense. Options to extend or renew follow the same logic: a contract that the plaintiff may extend beyond a year is within the provision, while one that only the defendant may extend is outside it.59
The split cannot be resolved from general principles, so the controlling rule is the one the jurisdiction in the facts has adopted. The usual error is to announce that any right to terminate automatically takes a contract outside the provision, or to treat a possible breach as if it were a termination right. Neither answer survives the performance-versus-termination question. Even a contract found to be within the provision may still be saved by a memorandum or an exception, and those are separate questions.
The Full-Performance Limit
Once one promise in a contract is found incapable of performance within a year, the consequence reaches the whole contract. Under § 130(1), all promises in the contract are within the statute until one party completes performance.61 A bilateral contract is an exchange of promises, and the provision treats it as a unit: where any promise on either side cannot be fully performed within a year, the entire contract is within the provision, and neither party can enforce it without a sufficient record or performance.62 An employer who orally promises to pay a lump sum on the first day of work in return for two years of service has made a promise that could be completed in a day. That promise is within the statute all the same, because the employee’s promise cannot be completed in less than two years.
The bar lifts when one party completes performance. Section 130(2) provides that once one party has completed performance, the one-year provision does not prevent enforcement of the other parties’ promises.63 Completed performance means that the party has done everything the contract required of that party, such as paying the entire price or rendering the entire service. If the promisor’s promise is the one that cannot be performed within a year, the promisee’s completed performance takes the contract out of the statute.64
A review problem of this shape reaches the same result: the service promise is within the provision, but the promisee’s full payment makes it enforceable under § 130(2).65
Part performance is different, and it does not lift the bar. Part performance may affect the enforceability of contracts for the sale of goods or of interests in land, but that doctrine is not ordinarily used to enforce oral contracts that violate the one-year provision.66 Traditionally, part performance on one side entitles neither party to sue on the contract, unless, according to some authorities, the contract is divisible. The performing party recovers quasi-contractually, that is, in restitution for the value of what was supplied, and some cases have granted enforcement on the basis of estoppel. Traditions change, and there is contrary case law.67 The usual error is to import the part-performance doctrine of land contracts, where possession and improvements can support enforcement. Only completed performance lifts the one-year bar.68
Had the engineer worked all twenty-four months and the employer then refused to pay the last month’s salary, completed performance would have lifted the bar, and the employer’s promise to pay would be enforceable.
Why full performance should lift the bar while part performance does not is hard to explain. One suggestion is that it avoids the messy valuation problems that restitution would raise.69 Jurisdictions also differ on how far full performance reaches. The majority rule is that a plaintiff who has fully performed meets no one-year defense. A minority of jurisdictions hold that performance is ineffective to render the contract enforceable and restrict the performing party to a quasi-contractual remedy.70 An answer that names no jurisdiction should state the majority rule and flag the split.
Unilateral contracts follow the same logic. A unilateral contract exchanges the promisor’s promise for the promisee’s performance, rather than for a return promise. Considerable authority holds such contracts enforceable without reference to the one-year provision, in part because of the majority rule on full performance: once the promisee has acted, nothing remains to be performed on that side.71 New York is a notable holdout. In Martocci v. Greater N.Y. Brewery, a brewery promised an agent a commission on its sales to a particular customer if the agent introduced the two companies, and the agent did so. The court nonetheless held the promise within the statute, because the brewery’s liability could continue indefinitely.
Full performance removes only the one-year bar. The party who performed must still prove that the contract was made on the terms alleged, and a contract that also falls within another class needs its own writing or exception.