Concept
Overbroad Restraints and Modification
Ancillary restraint on competition
Overbroad Restraints and Modification
A restraint that is greater than needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest is unreasonable under § 188(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, but that finding does not say whether the promise dies or survives in smaller form.1 The answer turns on what the court found wrong. If the promisee has no legitimate interest to protect, or no consideration was given, the covenant is unenforceable and there is nothing to salvage. If a legitimate interest and consideration are both present and the covenant simply reaches too far, a reasonable core remains, and the court has an option: it may issue an injunction enforcing only the portion it finds reasonable.2
Courts have taken three approaches to that option: nullification, striking the offending portions, or rewriting the agreement.3 Each is easiest to see through the cases that illustrate it.
- The all-or-nothing rule treats an overbroad covenant as unenforceable in its entirety. In Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, the three-year covenant was unreasonably long, and the employer asked the court to enforce it for a shorter time. The court refused. Georgia took the same position, holding that if any provision is unreasonable, all are unenforceable, although a statute now permits courts to alter that rule for agreements made after 2009.4 The theory is that courts are not in the business of rewriting contracts and that the employer, as the party in the superior negotiating position, should have an incentive to draft with caution.5 Other courts share this reluctance to "reform" or "red-line" a covenant and then enforce it.6
- The blue-pencil rule lets a court delete grammatically severable words and enforce what is left. Suppose a covenant bars the ex-employee from doing business with the former employer's "prospective, past or present clients." A court that found the restraint on prospective and past clients unreasonable could disregard those provisions and enforce the covenant as to present clients.7
- The reformation rule enforces the covenant to the extent it is reasonable, whether or not a grammatical severance is possible. The weight of recent authority takes this view, reasoning that an equitable decree is a flexible instrument and that its flexibility need not rest on a theory of severability.8 In John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, an employee of an insurance adjusting company promised not to compete for five years within fifty miles of the employer's home base in Wilmington, Delaware. The court enforced the covenant but narrowed the territory to the immediate Wilmington area, which left the former employee free to compete in the Philadelphia market, and it cut the time limit by a year.9 In the dispute between All Pet and Dr. Hopper, a court held a one-year limit reasonable and the covenant's three-year term a partially unreasonable restraint, and it remanded for a judgment enjoining Dr. Hopper from unfair competition for one year.10
The line between the second and third approaches is the line between wording and substance. The Alaska Supreme Court has called the blue-pencil rule unacceptably mechanical because it "values the wording of the contract over its substance." To show why, the court compared two covenants. A promise not to compete "anywhere in England" would be void in full, because no words could be deleted to narrow it. A promise not to compete "in London or elsewhere in England" would be enforceable as to London, because "elsewhere in England" could be struck. The court found that difference merely semantic and rejected the rule.11
Overbreadth often shows up in several dimensions at once. In Valley Medical, the court found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable, that a five-mile radius around each of three VMS offices was unreasonable because it covered a total of 235 square miles, and that the restriction was unreasonable because it made no exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.12 A covenant like that raises the modification question in its sharpest form, because a court that wants to save any part of it must decide how much it may cut or rewrite.
The choice among the approaches is a trade-off between two incentives. Strict rules make the employer bear the cost of overreaching, which gives drafters a reason to write narrow covenants and keeps courts out of the business of rewriting private bargains, but they can destroy a covenant whose core protects a real interest.13 Flexible rules preserve that core at a price. The flexible approach doubtless encourages employers to draft overbroad covenants that have an in terrorem effect, a threatening effect, on employees who can ascertain their rights only through costly litigation.14 The Valley Medical court recognized the same danger: employers may intentionally write overbroad covenants in anticipation that few employees will have the inclination to challenge them.15
Two limits answer that danger. Some courts deny enforcement entirely where the employer made no effort to protect the legitimate interests of the employee.16 And comment b to § 184 says a court's discretion to reduce a covenant should be exercised only when there is no evidence of overreaching or bad faith by the promisee, a qualification that lets courts guard against deliberate overdrafting while still allowing partial enforcement.17
The stakes of refusing to reform can reach past the covenant itself. When a covenant not to compete in a lease is invalid and the court is unwilling to reform it, most courts hold that the entire lease is invalid and unenforceable, on the theory that the covenant is essential to the tenant's use and enjoyment of the demised premises.18 The qualifier matters, because the rule applies when the court is unwilling to reform, so a jurisdiction's approach to modification can decide whether a lease survives. The first step with any overbroad covenant is therefore to identify which approach the jurisdiction follows, since the same covenant can be void, trimmed to its grammatical remainder, or enforced in a narrower form.