Concept
Hardship and Public Injury
Ancillary restraint on competition
Hardship and Public Injury
Section 188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives two alternative reasons to refuse enforcement of an ancillary promise not to compete.1 The first, treated in the preceding sections, is that the restraint is greater than the promisee's legitimate interest requires. The second is the subject here: the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.2 A covenant can therefore pass the first test and fail the second, because a restraint cut to fit a real interest may still cost more to enforce than the interest is worth.
The scale holds the promisee's need on one side and two costs on the other. Hardship falls on the promisor, who signed the covenant and must live under it. Injury falls on the public, meaning the customers, patients, and competitors who signed nothing. Because a contract binds only its parties, this step is where the interests of outsiders enter the analysis.
The two costs meet different receptions. The promisor's complaint invites an obvious reply: she agreed to the restraint, usually for a price or a job, and she cannot reopen the bargain because its terms now pinch. Courts therefore count only hardship that rises well above the ordinary cost of keeping the promise, and some courts doubt that § 188(1)(b) states their law at all. The public's interest meets no such objection, since the public made no promise.
Hardship to the Promisor
Hardship to the promisor counts against a covenant only when it is excessive. The Wyoming Supreme Court put the standard this way in Oliver v. Quynn: hardship must be “excessive,” as when “the restraint necessitates his complete withdrawal from business.”3 The high bar follows from what a covenant is. Every noncompete costs the promisor something, because the market the promisee wants protected is the market the promisor promised to leave, and that ordinary cost cannot be the hardship that counts. What counts is a restraint that strips the promisor of any means of working in the field.
A covenant crosses that line when it prevents the promisor from doing business anywhere in the relevant market.4 A Rhode Island decision found undue hardship where a covenant completely excluded a company from almost all segments of its market for up to three years.5 An illustration quoted in Wood v. May puts the idea in a single case: A, a lawyer, employs B, a young lawyer, as his clerk and takes B's promise not to practice law anywhere in the State after the job ends. Although A's practice extends throughout the State, the covenant is illegal, since it imposes undue hardship on B.6 The illustration shows that a covenant can match the promisee's territory exactly and still fail, because this prong asks what the restraint takes from the promisor and not how far the promisee's business reaches.
Courts reject the hardship argument when the promisor keeps a way to earn a living in the field. A covenant barring a dentist from practicing within five miles of his former office for two years was held not to impose undue hardship.7 In Oliver itself, the Quynns had promised not to sell alcohol in their bowling alley and argued that their business might fail at its current location. The court agreed that the failure of a business would be a hardship but held it was not the excessive kind: the restriction covered only the alley's current location and did not stop the Quynns from conducting their business, and selling alcohol, somewhere else.8 The Quynns kept a business they could run elsewhere, while the clerk in the illustration was shut out of his profession across the State. The practical test is whether the promisor can still earn a living in the field somewhere.
The promisor's position also matters. Courts have said repeatedly that hardship is likely to be greater for an employee than for the seller of a business, and they are therefore more reluctant to enforce employee covenants than seller covenants.9 Two differences help explain the gap. The parties' bargaining power is typically unequal in employment, and the restraint itself differs: a sale of a business signals one party's exit from competition, while a restraint on a former employee is inherently anticompetitive to the extent that it keeps competing businesses from gaining a personnel resource.10 Courts divide on whether partnership covenants should be treated like employment covenants or like sale covenants.11 Remedy is a separate step: where a covenant is valid but an injunction is denied on equitable principles, the plaintiff may recover damages.12
Discharge sharpens the hardship argument. The shared purpose of an employment agreement with a covenant is to protect the employer from unfair competition while assuring the employee a means of practicing the trade, and an employer that discharges the employee and then enforces the covenant has destroyed the assurance of a job while seeking to keep the employee from working at such a job elsewhere.13 Courts respond in two ways. South Dakota keeps the reasonableness test but scrutinizes the covenant for fairness when the employer terminates the employee for no cause or bad cause; the circumstances of termination do not preclude enforcement, but they dictate scrutiny.14 Courts that begin from traditional contract principles reason that other portions of a contract may be unenforceable once one portion has been breached, so the covenant becomes unenforceable when the employer violates any other part of the agreement.15
Not every jurisdiction accepts § 188(1)(b) as its own. In Oliver, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed that it had cited § 188 in two earlier cases, Hopper and Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., only for the general principle that the common law disfavored restraints of trade, and that those cases had not mentioned hardship to the promisor or injury to the public.16 The court relied on the assertion that personal hardship or public injury “alone have never been dispositive” where a covenant is otherwise reasonable in purpose, geographic scope, and duration, and it concluded that testing a covenant by those three measures fits Wyoming precedent better.17 It did not hold hardship irrelevant. It added that, even under § 188, the Quynns' hardship was not the sort courts rely on, since hardship must be excessive.18 The divergence lies mainly in how the test is framed: where the Restatement governs, hardship is a weight on the scale, and where a court follows the Wyoming approach, the same concern may surface when it examines geographic scope and duration.
Injury to the Public
The public's cost enters the balance because a covenant binds only its signers while enforcement affects everyone else. The common-law test has long said so. The opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. quotes it: a restraint is reasonable if it affords fair protection to the party in whose favor it is given and is not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public, and “[w]hatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void on the ground of public policy.”20 The opinion then gives two reasons for voiding a restraint that exceeds the contract's main purpose: it oppresses the covenantor without benefiting the covenantee, and it tends to a monopoly.21 Those two reasons echo the two costs in § 188(1)(b), hardship to the promisor and injury to the public.
The most common public injury is the loss of a service the public cannot easily replace. The public's interest in the services of the person sought to be enjoined is relevant to enforcement, and a physician will not be enjoined from practicing in an area if the effect would be to deprive the public of that specialty.22 In Dick v. Geist, the Idaho court refused to enforce covenants against two practitioners of pediatrics and neonatology because the restrictions would have had a drastic impact on the care of critically ill newborns in Twin Falls.23 Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker refused enforcement against a physician on comparable public-policy grounds.
In Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, the Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the restrictive covenant between a physician and his practice was enforceable, and it held that it was not.24 The practice, a professional corporation, had hired Dr. Farber, an internist and pulmonologist who treated AIDS and HIV-positive patients and performed brachytherapy, a procedure that radiates the inside of the lung in lung cancer patients and can be performed only at hospitals with the necessary equipment.25 The court did not deny that the practice had protectable interests. It held that public policy concerns outweighed them.26
The public side weighs less when substitutes remain. In the Wyoming veterinary-clinic case, Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, the public was not deprived of similar services within the city itself, where other providers offered small-animal medicine.27 The court held a one-year limit reasonable and sufficiently protective of the clinic's interest without violating public policy, noting that practice development information, especially in a learned profession, loses its value quickly as technological change occurs, and it remanded to reduce the three-year term to one year.28 Place Dick beside Hopper. Each covenant would have removed a professional from a market, but in Dick the removal would have left critically ill newborns without care, while in Hopper other providers of the same service remained. The supply of substitutes separates the two, and it is the fact to look for whenever a problem raises the public's interest in a professional's services.
The second form of public injury is concentration. Where the sole object of both parties is merely to restrain competition and to enhance or maintain prices, the Addyston Pipe opinion saw nothing to justify the restraint and saw a necessary tendency to monopoly.29 The inquiry has a long pedigree. Courts that separated ancillary restraints from naked ones asked for what purpose the restraint was imposed and what effect the agreement had, so that the interests of both the parties and the public were protected.30
Public injury can also reach people who never agreed to the covenant at all; compare Freund v. E.D. & F. Man International, Inc., which concerned a provision that operated against workers who were not parties to it.
Wyoming treats public injury with more caution. In Oliver, the court quoted the observation that no case cited by the commentators denied enforcement “because of the idiosyncratic hardship to the promisor, or any perceived harm to the pubic absent the creation or threat of monopoly,” and it concluded that testing a covenant by its purpose, geographic scope, and duration fits Wyoming precedent better.31 In a jurisdiction that follows that approach, a public-injury argument is strongest when it rests on monopoly or the threat of one. Where § 188(1)(b) governs, a shortage of the promisor's services can carry the argument as well.
Doctors and Lawyers
Professional practice puts the most weight on the public side of the scale, because clients and patients choose a lawyer or a physician for personal reasons and a covenant can take that choice from them. Courts have turned this concern into a rule for lawyers and a contested standard for physicians.
For lawyers, the response is a rule. Covenants not to compete in contracts employing lawyers or in law partnership agreements violate professional ethics and are void because they deprive clients of freedom of choice, and the rule seems to apply to no other profession.33 The rule is categorical as stated: the covenant is void, not merely subject to a reasonableness inquiry.
Courts still ask what the rule protects. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a noncompetition agreement in a law firm's retirement plan because it was not against public policy, not a significant interference with client choice, and not an unjustifiable interference with the attorney's mobility; the firm's existence would have been in jeopardy if the former partner practiced law in the same area.34 Rule 5.6 of the American Bar Association's rules bears on the enforceability of attorney noncompetes.35 Courts also divide on whether an agreement that penalizes a departing lawyer for competing, instead of forbidding it, falls within the rule; compare Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord with Howard v. Babcock.
For physicians, courts divide. According to some courts, “[t]he right of a person to choose the physician that he or she believes is best able to provide treatment is so fundamental that we can not allow it to be denied because of an employer's restrictive covenant.” Murfreesboro Medical Clinic v. Udom.37 Another line of cases reasons that the public interest is equally well served even if the doctor is forced to treat patients in another part of the state.38 A third approach, taken in Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, leaves the public-policy question to the legislature and reviews a physician's covenant for ordinary reasonableness.
When a court does weigh a physician's covenant, the terms matter. In Farber, the trial court found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable,39 that a five-mile radius around each of the practice's three offices was unreasonable because it covered 235 square miles,40 and that the restriction was unreasonable because it provided no exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.41 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and held the covenant unenforceable because public policy concerns outweighed the practice's protectable interests.42
The Emerick litigation shows the same factors weighed against different facts. The trial court there reformed a cardiologist's covenant to a two-mile radius of the practice's current offices and a four-year term, and the physician argued on appeal that physician noncompetes violate public policy as a matter of law and that even the reformed restrictions were excessive.43 The practice had spent forty years building goodwill, a strong reputation, and referral sources before it hired him, and he acknowledged those facts when he signed the agreement.44 The Farber covenant reached 235 square miles and extended beyond the physician's specialty, while the Emerick covenant, as reformed, reached two miles around the practice's offices. The next section takes up how far a court may go in reforming an overbroad covenant.
An answer that calls every physician covenant void overstates the law, because courts divide on the question. An answer that ignores the weight courts give a patient's choice of physician understates the public side of the scale.