Concept
The Two-Part Reasonableness Test
Ancillary restraint on competition
The Two-Part Reasonableness Test
Once a restraint is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship, § 188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts decides whether a court will enforce it. The ancillary promise not to compete is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.1 The word or carries the structure. Either ground defeats the covenant by itself: a restraint that fits the promisee's interest exactly can still fail under (b), and a restraint that burdens almost no one can still fail under (a). Courts apply the text directly. Wyoming, for example, adopted a rule-of-reason inquiry from the Restatement of Contracts and now treats § 188 as its present formulation.2
The prongs ask different questions. Prong (a) asks about fit. The common-law test, as United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. set it out, asks whether the restraint “is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.” Any restraint larger than the necessary protection “can be of no benefit to either” side and “can only be oppressive.”3 Prong (b) asks about cost. A restraint sized exactly to a real interest still fails if the hardship to the promisor and the injury to the public outweigh the promisee's need, and the same passage states the public half of the point flatly: whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void on the ground of public policy.4
Two hypotheticals pull the prongs apart. A bakery's route salesman promises not to work for any competitor in the county for ten years. The bakery's interest in its customer relationships is real, but a ten-year ban reaches well past what that interest needs, so the covenant fails prong (a) whatever the salesman's circumstances. Now take a clinic's covenant that is carefully limited in time, territory, and activity but would remove the only specialist from a rural county. The covenant fits the clinic's interest, yet it can still fail prong (b) because the injury to patients outweighs the clinic's need.
A real case rests on the second prong. In Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, the Arizona Supreme Court held a physician's restrictive covenant unenforceable because public policy concerns outweighed the medical group's protectable interests in enforcing it.5 The same dispute shows what overbreadth findings under prong (a) look like. The court there found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable, that a five-mile radius around each of three offices was unreasonable because it covered 235 square miles in total, and that the restriction was unreasonable because it had no exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.6
Covenants clear both prongs when their limits track the interest. A court enjoined a veterinarian for one year from practicing within five miles of the city where her former employer was located, and the restraint stood for three reasons. It left her able to earn a living, it let the public seek her continued services with only some inconvenience, and it left other small-animal providers in the city itself.7 In Connecticut, an electrical engineer at a firm that used ultrasonics was held reasonably restrained for one year from working in any aspect of that highly technical business in any location.8 A federal district court likewise upheld a one-year bar on a former research manager's dealing with his employer's customers in O'Sullivan Films, Inc. v. Neaves, although the covenant had no geographic limit, because the time and activity limits were narrow and the company's niche market was global. Prong (a) therefore measures fit between restraint and interest, and a missing territorial limit is not excessive when the interest itself has no territorial limit.
How much restraint is “needed” depends on the relationship that produced the promise. Courts are more willing to uphold a noncompetition clause that bars the seller of a business from competing for a reasonable period in a reasonable area, because the seller is in a strong position to poach customers, use trade secrets, and keep trading on the goodwill sold to the buyer. Partnership clauses are usually more justifiable than employment clauses because a departing partner is more closely analogous to the seller of a business.9 A promisee in either position tends to hold a larger legitimate interest, and prong (a) measures the restraint against that larger interest.
Ancillary status makes a covenant neither presumptively valid nor presumptively void. Comment a to § 188 states that ancillary restraints are not per se invalid and that courts may have to balance interests, and comment e adds that the Restatement's list of ancillary relationships is not exclusive.10 The balance depends on the facts. One court, quoting Valley Medical, described the rule of reason as “a fact intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances,” and faulted a trial court whose analysis lacked that inquiry.11
Because courts traditionally disfavor restraints on trade, they construe covenants against the party seeking to enforce them, and that party carries the initial burden of proving the covenant reasonable and fairly related to, and necessary for, the business interests it wants to protect.12 The enforcing party also faces a judge on the ultimate question. In Texas, for example, whether an agreement not to compete is a reasonable restraint of trade is a question of law for the court.13
Courts do not always phrase the test in the Restatement's words, and the variations matter when you meet them on an exam. Texas treats an agreement not to compete as a restraint of trade, unenforceable on public-policy grounds unless it is reasonable, and it finds the agreement unreasonable unless it meets each of three criteria. As in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., the agreement must be ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship, the restraint must be no greater than necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, and the promisee's need must not be outweighed by hardship to the promisor or injury to the public.14 Texas thus lifts the ancillary threshold into its list, but the substance is the same two prongs, and failing any one criterion makes the agreement unreasonable. Connecticut asks five questions instead: the length of the restriction, its geographic scope, the fairness of the protection afforded the employer, the extent of the restraint on the employee's ability to pursue his occupations, and the extent of any interference with the public interest.15 Time, geography, and fairness of protection measure the fit that prong (a) asks about, and the employee and public factors correspond to the two halves of prong (b). The next sections take the prongs in turn, beginning with how courts identify the legitimate interest and measure a restraint's time, place, and activity against it, and then turning to hardship and public injury.