Concept
Recognized Ancillary Relationships
Ancillary restraint on competition
Recognized Ancillary Relationships
Section 188(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists examples of promises that impose restraints ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship.1 Three of these examples organize the rest of this unit: a promise by the seller of a business not to compete with the buyer in a way that injures the value of the business sold;2 a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with the employer or other principal;3 and a promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership.4 In each, the restraint rides on a legitimate main deal, and that is what separates an ancillary restraint from the naked restraint of the preceding section.
The list is not exclusive. Comment e to § 188 explains that “there may be other situations in which a valid transaction or relationship gives the promisee a legitimate interest sufficient to sustain a promise not to compete.”5 Leases show the point. A landlord's promise not to operate or lease other land it controls for a business that competes with the tenant's is usually held valid, and courts deem such covenants an essential part of the lease. The covenantee may seek termination of the lease, damages, or an injunction when the covenantor breaches.6
Ancillary status keeps a restraint out of per se condemnation without making it valid. In Deutsch v. Barsky, the court reviewed §§ 186–188 and held that the restriction in an agreement between Dr. Barsky and Dr. Deutsch was ancillary to a valid transaction or agreement and so was not a per se restraint of trade. It noted that comment a says “ancillary restraints are not necessarily invalid,” while comment d says that restrictions may be limited “by type of activity, by geographical area, and by time.”7 The restraint must still clear the reasonableness test of § 188(1), and that test is taken up in the sections that follow.8
Courts do not scrutinize every ancillary covenant with the same intensity. Agreements between employers and employees are inherently more suspect than agreements incident to the sale of a business, and one reason is the typical inequality of the parties' bargaining power.9 The nature of the restraint is another. A sale signals one party's exit from competition, whereas a restraint on a former employee keeps competing businesses from gaining a personnel resource.10 Courts resist employee covenants most because of their effect on the employee's ability to earn a livelihood, and because an employee is less likely to take away anything more than personal skills.11 Partnership falls between the two poles. Partnership clauses are usually more justifiable than employment clauses, but courts have not settled how closely to equate them with sales.12 The sale of a business comes first below, because the case for enforcement is strongest there.
Sale of a Business
The seller of a business who promises not to compete in a way that injures the value of what was sold gives the paradigm ancillary restraint.13 The buyer is paying for goodwill, and goodwill may be lost entirely if the seller goes into business next door.14 A travel agency makes the point concrete. The buyer of C & T purchases the goodwill that founders Chris and Terry built, but that goodwill disappears if Chris and Terry open a rival agency in town as T & C. Their promise not to compete is therefore an essential part of the sale.15
The covenant also makes the sale itself possible. If the seller cannot validly promise not to compete, the buyer has no assurance of receiving the goodwill it is paying for, so the buyer may not pay for it and the seller cannot sell it.16 For that reason courts enforce seller covenants somewhat more readily than employee covenants. Two further features of a sale support the more lenient review. The seller is exiting the market and bargains on terms closer to equal than an employee typically does.17 The seller is also well placed to poach customers, use trade secrets, and keep trading on the goodwill just sold, so a reasonable restraint is most justifiable in this setting.18
The goodwill that justifies the covenant also limits it. A seller's promise is unenforceable insofar as it exceeds the goodwill purchased. If the restraint covers territory where the seller had no goodwill, or lines of trade in which the seller was not engaged, it is an unreasonable restraint of trade.19 Such a covenant protects nothing the buyer bought and serves only to limit competition, the aim for which the old common-law rule condemned general restraints.20 Many cases hold, however, that a covenant may validly embrace the area of probable expansion of the business sold. On duration, some cases call the length of the restraint immaterial, but the better view is that a restraint is invalid if it outlasts the period for which the seller's goodwill can reasonably be expected to continue.21 Each limit applies § 188(1)(a), under which a restraint greater than needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest is unreasonable.22 Time, place, and activity receive fuller treatment in a later section.
Substance counts for more than labels. A former owner who agrees to stay on as an employee is treated as a seller, while in a corporate merger, key personnel without a significant ownership interest are treated as employees.23
Employment Relationships
A promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with the employer or other principal is the second recognized ancillary restraint,25 and courts examine it more closely than any other. Two interests collide in it. The employer wants assurance that the customers the employee meets through a relationship of trust will not leave with the employee. At the same time, the employee stands to lose the ability to earn a living.26 Because an employee is likely to suffer greater hardship than the seller of a business, courts have said repeatedly that they are more reluctant to enforce employee covenants.27 The second prong of § 188(1) writes that concern into the test: a restraint is unreasonable when the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.28
Legislation can displace the common law altogether. California has banned all noncompetes in employment, including partial restraints, since the founding of the state, and its courts read the ban as a policy favoring open competition and each citizen's right to pursue the employment and enterprise of his or her choice. In states that stop short of a ban, courts decide enforceability by reasonableness, balancing the public interest in competition, the employer's legitimate business interest, and the employee's right to pursue her profession.29 In a minority of states, legislation severely limits covenants not to compete, and even where covenants are permissible, courts refuse to enforce those that do not comply with certain restrictions.30
An employer must therefore point to an interest beyond competition itself. Jurisdictions that enforce noncompetes look for an underlying justification, primarily trade secrets or customer goodwill.31 In this setting goodwill usually means the employer-customer relationship. The employee, on joining the business, acquires knowledge of and access to the employer's customers as part of a relationship of trust, and it is considered wrong for the employee to appropriate those customers on leaving, at least when the employee has agreed not to.32 Covenants are frequently upheld where the former employee had contact with the customers under circumstances that let the employee obtain their goodwill. The present tendency, though, is to enforce only where the customers were developed over a period of time with great effort. Enforcement is refused if the customers are the kind listed in standard directories, because the customer list must be akin to a trade secret.33
General skill does not count as a protectable interest. The law does not regard an employer's interest in human capital as one that merits protection, even when specialized training produced it.34 Nor is an employer entitled to protection against ordinary competition. It may seek protection only from improper and unfair competition by a former employee. Courts disfavor these restraints and construe covenants against the party seeking to enforce them, so the employer bears the initial burden of proving that the covenant is reasonable and has a fair relation to, and is necessary for, the business interests it seeks to protect.35
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic shows how such a dispute typically reaches court. All Pet's president heard a rumor that Dr. Hopper was investigating the purchase of a competing practice and suggested that she buy her way out of the covenant about competition. She replied that she could do anything she wanted, and the clinic discharged her. In July 1991 she began operating the Gem City Veterinary Clinic, having purchased the other practice, and in November All Pet sued for an injunction and damages.36 The clinic could enforce the covenant only to the extent it could tie the restraint to customer goodwill or something akin to a trade secret, and not to the ordinary competition of a practitioner setting up on her own.
An employer with nothing of that kind to point to is in a weaker position. In the Jimmy John's litigation, the opinion doubted that a sandwich chain's methods could count as protectable secrets. Whatever deep, dark secrets of the sub-making arts the chain had concocted, it suspected, could be pretty easily reverse engineered by buying a sandwich and looking at what is inside.37 If outsiders can learn the product by buying it, a covenant that rests on secrecy has little to protect.
The covenant must also be supported by consideration, and the timing of the promise matters. Entering into a covenant during employment creates special problems: consideration must still exist, and for many courts continued employment alone does not suffice unless a change has occurred.38 An employee who signs mid-job and receives nothing new gives up post-employment freedom for nothing.
Classifying a restraint as an employee covenant thus qualifies it for review and tells the court how closely to look, but it does not decide whether the restraint is reasonable. Duration, geography, the scope of the barred activity, and the balance of hardship against public injury come in the sections that follow.
Partnership Relationships
A promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership is the third recognized example.40 The partnership supplies the valid relationship, so the covenant clears the ancillary threshold, but it must still satisfy the reasonableness test of § 188(1).41 The harder question is how closely a court will look. Noncompetition clauses in partnership agreements are usually more justifiable than those in employment agreements, because a departing partner is more closely analogous to the seller of a business.42 Yet the cases are divided on whether covenants attached to partnership agreements should be treated on a par with employment agreements or with sales of businesses.43 The label “partner” therefore opens the question of scrutiny without answering it.
Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood stands at the lenient end. A law firm's retirement plan contained a noncompetition agreement, and the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld it. The agreement was not against public policy, did not significantly interfere with client choice, and did not unjustifiably interfere with the attorney's mobility, and the firm's existence would have been in jeopardy if the former partner practiced law in the same area.44 That last point is the seller's rationale in a new setting: a former partner who competes nearby endangers the enterprise the covenant protects, much as a seller who reopens next door destroys the goodwill sold. The setting was a law firm, and American Bar Association Rule 5.6 bears on noncompetes for attorneys, a subject for a later section.45
Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber shows that a protectable interest does not end the matter. The case involved a restrictive covenant between a physician, Dr. Steven Farber, and Valley Medical Specialists. The opinion recounts findings that any covenant longer than six months would be unreasonable, that a five-mile radius around each of three offices was unreasonable because it covered 235 square miles, and that the restriction was unreasonable because it contained no exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.46 On review, the court held the covenant unenforceable, because public policy concerns outweighed Valley Medical's protectable interests in enforcing the agreement.47 That result applies the second branch of § 188(1), the balance of the promisee's need against hardship and injury to the public, which later sections develop.48
Read together, the two decisions show that the partnership label tells a court where to begin and not where to end. The court must still ask what the covenant protects and whether public policy tolerates the restraint.