Concept
Ancillary Versus Naked Restraints
Ancillary restraint on competition
Ancillary Restraints on Competition
Ancillary Versus Naked Restraints
Courts sort a promise not to compete before they weigh it. Standing alone, an agreement to refrain from a trade or calling is illegal and contrary to public policy, because it is inimical to a free competitive market and, for an individual, to the interest in earning a livelihood.1 Place the same promise inside a legitimate transaction and different rules govern: the covenant becomes an “ancillary restraint,” and the transactions that most often host one are sales of businesses and employment contracts.2 The Restatement draws the same line. Section 188 addresses a promise whose restraint is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship and asks whether that restraint is unreasonable,3 while § 187 treats a promise that is not ancillary as unreasonably in restraint of trade. Classification therefore comes first, because duration and geography matter only for a restraint that has already qualified as ancillary.
The distinction has deep roots. In Mitchel v. Reynolds, Lord Parker separated general restraints, which are invalid, from particular restraints, which are valid.4 General restraints were condemned because their aim is to limit competition. Viewing such a restraint as a pact “of no benefit to either party, and only oppressive,” the court justified its rule by the need to protect the person agreeing not to use his trade from himself.5 The promisor’s own consent, in other words, could not rescue a restraint whose aim was to limit competition.
Two public policies pull against each other whenever a covenant is tested. Courts describe the freedom to contract and the freedom to work as principles that conflict when they test the enforceability of covenants not to compete.6 Freedom of contract is itself a public policy: it calls for enforcement of freely made contracts to facilitate private exchange, and a party who wants out of a term on public-policy grounds must persuade the court that the policy it urges is more important.7 Ancillary status changes the contest, because a covenant tied to a legitimate transaction is no longer an agreement standing alone, and different rules govern it.8
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. explains why no amount of weighing can save a naked restraint. Where the sole object of both parties is merely to restrain competition and to enhance or maintain prices, nothing justifies or excuses the restraint, which would necessarily tend toward monopoly and so would be void.9 Nor is there any yardstick, for the only measure of what either party needs is “the vague and varying opinion of judges” about how much competition men ought to be allowed to restrain.10 A contract with a main lawful purpose supplies what that one lacks. Partial restraint is permitted to serve that purpose, and the purpose measures the restraint’s reasonableness.11
Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher shows an ancillary restraint in a setting that is neither a plain sale nor a plain job. The defendant contributed his bakeries, Omar in effect contributed the Wigwam bakeries, and Dutch Maid served as the instrumentality that took over the bakeries and carried on the business with the defendant as manager. The court treated the defendant’s promise as ancillary to that transaction, which it viewed as a joint business venture in the nature of a copartnership even though a corporation carried it on, and it observed that the parties could hardly be said to have dealt at arm’s length.12
The recognized relationships do not all raise the same concerns. Sale and partnership restraints differ from employment restraints in two ways. One is the typical inequality of the parties in bargaining power. The other is the nature of the restraint: a sale of a business or partnership interest does not ordinarily contemplate competition between the parties, because the sale signals one party’s exit from competition, whereas a restraint on a former employee is inherently anticompetitive to the extent that it keeps competing businesses from gaining a personnel resource.13 The sections that follow take each relationship in turn.
Ancillary status earns a covenant a hearing, not enforcement. Once a restraint qualifies, courts test how much of it the situation can bear. One court found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable, that a five-mile radius from each of three offices was unreasonable because it covered 235 square miles, and that the restriction was unreasonable because it made no exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.14 In the Hopper litigation, the court held a one-year durational limit reasonable as a matter of law, because practice-development information in a learned profession loses its value quickly as technology changes and new reference material becomes available, but it found the covenant’s three-year term a partially unreasonable restraint and remanded for modification to one year.15 Those measures belong to later sections; the point here is that none of them is reached unless the restraint is ancillary first.
Timing of the Promise
A promise is ancillary only if it is made as part of the transaction or relationship it protects. Comment b to § 187 adds that a promise made after the transaction or relationship is not ancillary to it.17 The rule tracks what justifies a partial restraint in the first place, a main lawful purpose that the restraint serves.18 Once a sale has closed and the price has been paid, a later promise serves no main purpose still being carried out; it simply adds a restraint to a deal already finished.
Ongoing relationships relax the rule. When the transaction or relationship is still running, it is enough that the promise is made before the relationship ends, provided consideration supports it and the other requirements of enforceability are met.19 Employment shows both halves. A covenant agreed to at hiring raises no consideration problem, but one signed by an at-will employee after being hired can, and some cases hold such a covenant void for lack of consideration.20