Concept
Contexts for Unconscionability Claims
Unconscionability
Contexts for Unconscionability Claims
The same question governs every unconscionability claim: was the contract, or a term of it, unconscionable when it was made? If so, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder without the offending term, or limit the term’s application so as to avoid an unconscionable result. UCC § 2-302(1) puts the question for sales of goods, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 puts it for contracts generally.1 Neither text mentions consumers, businesses, arbitration, or leases. The setting enters through the elements that courts built on the text, procedural and substantive unconscionability weighed together, and the facts that satisfy those elements change from one setting to the next. A clause can trap a signer who could neither understand nor avoid it and still serve as an ordinary allocation of risk between signers who could do both.
Three settings produce most of the decisions. The identity of the parties comes first, because a household buying on credit and a business negotiating a supply contract stand in different positions on the process element. Arbitration clauses come next: they are standardized terms, they generate the most heavily litigated unconscionability disputes, and a federal statute limits what state courts may do with them. Contracts outside the sale of goods come last, where § 2-302 does not apply by its terms and the same standard reaches the agreement through § 208, a lease statute, or other state law.
Consumer and Commercial Parties
Section 2-302(1) and § 208 speak of a contract or a term and draw no line between households and firms, so a business may invoke either provision as readily as a consumer may.2 Courts nonetheless apply the doctrine more often in consumer cases than in dealings between business firms, and one federal district court has said that courts are more inclined to find unconscionability in a consumer case than in a commercial one.3 The reason lies in the factors courts weigh: the parties’ relative bargaining power, their relative sophistication, including education and experience, whether terms were hidden or unduly complex, and whether the contract was one of adhesion.4 Those factors tend to favor an individual buyer and to disfavor an experienced firm that has counsel. The doctrine has still been applied between commercially sophisticated parties, so the commercial setting raises the challenger’s burden without closing the door.5
Courts have been less willing to find unconscionability where the bargaining positions are more likely to be equal and where experienced traders are less likely to face “unfair surprise” in the terms.6 Many courts add that it is improper to borrow concepts developed to protect consumers and use them to favor one commercial party over another.7 The same caution appears in risk allocation. Comment 3 to § 2-719 explains that the parties may allocate “unknown or undeterminable risks,” and although a clause limiting or excluding consequential damages is subject to scrutiny under the unconscionability standard, courts usually uphold these clauses between business persons.8
A sophisticated party that negotiated its contract almost always loses. In Continental Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. the Ninth Circuit rejected the airline’s claim because the doctrine “cannot be invoked by so sophisticated a party as Continental in reference to a contract so laboriously negotiated.”9 In U.S. Welding v. Battelle Energy Alliance the court rejected the claim of a “sophisticated corporate entity, complete with in-house counsel,” and observed that the case was not one in which a powerless consumer is forced into a contract to obtain a necessary benefit.10 In Boston Helicopter Charter, Inc. v. Agusta Aviation Corp. an attorney represented the buyer, who also negotiated for transfer of the warranty from the helicopter’s prior owner, so the court saw no “uninformed buyer that section 2–302 seeks to protect against unfair surprise.”11 Another decision, cited alongside it, found no procedural unconscionability where the parties were “two sophisticated businesses” and there was no evidence of uneven bargaining power, adhesion, or hidden or unduly complex terms.12 What these cases share is counsel, negotiation, and leverage, the facts that make oppression and unfair surprise implausible.
The pattern is strong but not categorical, because bargaining power varies among firms and the doctrine looks at the party actually before the court. Business parties were never wholly excluded. In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, Campbell agreed to buy all the carrots a farmer grew on a certain acreage at thirty dollars a ton, but Campbell was not obligated to buy them, and the farmer could not sell them elsewhere without Campbell’s permission. The court refused to enforce the contract, because the one-sided arrangement reflected Campbell’s vastly superior bargaining power.13 A gross disparity in bargaining power is possible between merchants, as when a giant corporation deals with a much smaller enterprise.14 Consumers are the primary beneficiaries of the doctrine, but small businesses can be victimized by unconscionable contracts and will receive judicial protection, and litigation over omitted or misplaced Yellow Pages listings is common.15
Education and explanation offer a second route to relief. The dealer in Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. was a high school dropout who could not read, a fact the oil company did not know. The court struck down a clause in his dealer contract limiting the company’s liability for consequential damages, a clause it called “not prima facie unconscionable in a commercial setting,” and held that the company had “an affirmative duty to obtain the voluntary knowing assent of the other party.” The company could easily have met that duty by explaining the clause to him “in laymen’s terms.”16 The plaintiff in Weaver v. American Oil Co. was likewise a high school dropout, and the Johnson court compared the two.17 The reasoning fits the process element. The usual reason to hold a signer to the paper is that the signer could have read it and asked, and that reason weakens when the signer cannot read and the drafter says nothing. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. reached a similar result for a farming business that bought machinery from an international manufacturer under a form that disclaimed warranties and excluded consequential damages. The disparity in size and the placement of the terms on the back of the form supported procedural unconscionability, and the shift of crop-loss risk to the buyer supported substantive unconscionability.
Two opposite errors recur in answers. The first says the doctrine disappears once both parties are businesses, a conclusion the cases contradict, since small businesses can be victimized and receive judicial protection.18 The second treats any gap in size as enough. A large counterparty explains why a small business might have lacked a choice, but the line between a gross inequality of bargaining power, which is a procedural flaw, and mere inequality, which is not, is hard to draw. So is the line between a term that unfairly favors one party and a term that does not.19 The better analysis asks what this particular business could understand, negotiate, or avoid, and then asks whether the challenged term is one-sided in its commercial setting.
Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration is one of the oldest and best-established alternatives to litigating in court, and parties who choose it by contract choose a forum with its own procedures.21 The Federal Arbitration Act protects that choice. It reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,” so courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms. The Act’s saving clause, however, permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”22
That clause is the doorway through which unconscionability reaches arbitration agreements. Mandatory arbitration clauses are common in employment contracts, where employers often impose them as a condition of employment, and in consumer contracts, and the cases on their enforceability have generated some of the most contested rulings in contemporary contract law.23 Rulings that adhesive arbitration agreements are unconscionable have been especially common in employment and consumer cases in the California state and federal courts.24
The saving clause preserves “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” and does not preserve defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.25 The Court has also said that a court may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”26 Because arbitration law has been federalized, a state rule that disables arbitration agreements is open to a preemption challenge unless it applies to contracts in general and is not directed at arbitration agreements alone.27 A working screen follows from these statements. If the reasoning that condemns a feature of an arbitration clause would condemn the same feature in a lease, a franchise form, or a sales contract, the challenge sits within the saving clause. If the reasoning depends on the fact that the agreement is one to arbitrate, it does not.
A challenge that clears the screen runs on the ordinary test. Unconscionability generally includes an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party together with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other.28 The elements are weighed on a sliding scale: the more substantively unconscionable a term is, the less procedural unconscionability is needed to refuse enforcement.29
Mandatory arbitration is usually adhesive, and courts disagree about how much that shows. Some treat the standard circumstances of adhesive formation, with no bargaining and one party setting all the terms, as generally satisfying the procedural element, and they make substantive unconscionability the decisive question: are the unilateral terms so one-sided that no reasonable person, if given a choice, would willingly subscribe to them?30 One court found “a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability” in a wireless carrier’s adhesive service agreement despite the availability of market alternatives.31 Others insist that adhesion alone is not enough. A nondrafter who assents to an adhesive contract cannot challenge its terms merely because they were nonnegotiable, but must show that the drafter took unfair advantage of its dominant bargaining power to impose unfairly one-sided terms.32 In Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. the court held a nonnegotiable arbitration provision in an employment contract not procedurally unconscionable merely because it was adhesive, and not substantively unconscionable as a whole because the procedure was fair and applied to claims by both parties. It did hold unconscionable a provision requiring each party to bear its own attorney’s fees, because the provision waived the employee’s statutory right to recover fees if he prevailed, and it severed that provision.33 The challengers in D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp. lost although the contract was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, which shows how little that presentation accomplishes by itself.
Because adhesion usually supplies at most a modest process showing, successful challenges target terms that tilt the forum toward the drafter. The recurring ones are these:
- a duty to arbitrate that binds only the weaker party, with a carve-out preserving the drafter’s access to court for the claims it is likely to bring;34
- a limitations period for the weaker party’s claims that the drafter does not accept for its own;35
- a filing fee payable to the drafter, or other costs the weaker party would not bear in court;36
- a one-way duty to pay the drafter’s attorneys’ fees, or a waiver of the weaker party’s statutory right to recover fees;37 and
- an arbitrator selected by the stronger party alone, as in Beltran v. AuPairCare, Inc., a remedies problem taken up later.
Each of these terms attacks a condition on which arbitration substitutes for litigation. In Armendariz the court accepted arbitration of employment claims based on statutes only if the process permits the employee to vindicate statutory rights, and it required a neutral arbitrator, adequate discovery, a written decision that permits limited judicial review, and limits on the costs of arbitration.38 A fee paid to the drafter and a one-way fee obligation burden the weaker party with costs a court would not impose, and a drafter-chosen arbitrator compromises neutrality. The cost rule is stated directly: when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not bear if free to bring the action in court.39
A single agreement in Prasad v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC combined two of these terms. Its shortened limitations period applied only to employees, and that one-sidedness survived the employer’s defenses. In Pokorny, a similar provision was found unconscionable because it shortened a potentially longer limitations period for claims the defendant’s distributors might bring but left the defendant free to sue without any such restriction.40 The agreement also charged a $50 filing fee. Defense counsel acknowledged that the payee was Pinnacle itself, although he said the money went toward arbitration costs and was not kept by the company.41 That concession matters under Ingle, where the court found a similar $75 fee unconscionable because employees had to pay it to the very entity against which they sought redress. A true filing fee might be appropriate, but that fee was not an expense employees would bear in court.42
The subcontractors in Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC faced a stack of one-sided terms. The agreement shortened the limitations period for their claims to six months, required them to pay any attorneys’ fees Empire might incur, and referred to American Arbitration Association commercial rules that were never attached or otherwise provided to them.43 It also exempted from arbitration the claims employers typically bring, namely declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief protecting Empire’s proprietary information and non-competition provisions, while sending every claim the subcontractors might bring to arbitration. The court accepted that “not all lack of mutuality in an adhesive arbitration agreement is invalid.” But the question was whether the multiple one-sided provisions, considered together, supported the finding of strong indicia of substantive unconscionability, and they did.44 The qualification matters because a single asymmetric term rarely decides the case. See also Davis v. USA Nutra Labs, finding no substantive unconscionability even on the assumption that the arbitration provision was not mutual.
The limit on this body of law comes from AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The Concepcions bought AT&T service advertised as including free phones, were charged $30.22 in sales tax on the phones’ retail value, and sued as part of a putative class alleging false advertising and fraud.45 Under California’s Discover Bank rule, a class waiver in a consumer contract of adhesion, in a setting where disputes predictably involve small amounts of damages and the stronger party is alleged to have carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums, becomes in practice an exemption of the party from responsibility for its own fraud, and the waiver is unconscionable.46 The Ninth Circuit applied that rule and found the provision unconscionable, calling the rule “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”47 The rule had real force under the sliding scale. In another carrier case, a court held that even though the evidence of procedural unconscionability was limited, the high degree of substantive unconscionability in the class waiver tipped the scale and made the arbitration provision unconscionable, because the waiver fell directly within the earlier holding.48
The Supreme Court held the rule preempted, which means federal law displaces it. The Act’s overarching purpose, evident in §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings, and requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.49 No matter how justifiable the state policy, the California decisional law conflicted with the fundamental objectives of § 2.50 The Court did not condemn unconscionability as a defense. It reasoned that a doctrine normally thought generally applicable can be applied in a way that disfavors arbitration, and that a court may not rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate to hold it unconscionable.51
Concepcion did not end unconscionability review of arbitration clauses, and Samaniego shows why. The employer there argued that Concepcion preempted every unconscionability-based reason for refusing to compel arbitration, and the court answered that the employer read the decision too broadly. The Supreme Court had repudiated the categorical Discover Bank rule but reaffirmed that the Act permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses such as unconscionability, so arbitration agreements remain subject to the ordinary analysis.52 What separates the two decisions is the target of the rule. Discover Bank condemned a feature that defines the arbitral forum, the absence of class procedures, across a whole category of consumer contracts. The Samaniego analysis asked about a shortened limitations period, one-way fee shifting, and a carve-out that sent only the installers’ claims to arbitration, terms a court would call one-sided in a lease or a franchise form as readily as in an arbitration agreement. Decisions that rested on the Discover Bank rule alone, such as the class-waiver holding in the T-Mobile case, lost that foundation.53
Prospects for invalidating arbitration clauses have narrowed. As a general rule, courts uphold arbitration agreements no matter their would-be deficiencies.54 The court in Murtithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc. rejected substantive unconscionability arguments based on a class ban, a one-year limitations period, and a fee-splitting provision, absent firm evidence that arbitral costs would likely be prohibitive for the plaintiff. The California Supreme Court in Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. held an adhesive employment arbitration agreement enforceable. A shortened period supported unconscionability in Prasad and failed in Murtithi, so outcomes vary with the jurisdiction, with the proof of how a term actually burdens the challenger, and with whether the drafter can justify it. Exam answers go wrong in two directions. One treats the federal statute as immunizing arbitration clauses from unconscionability review, which the saving clause contradicts. The other treats a categorical rule against class waivers as a permissible unconscionability ruling, which Concepcion forecloses.
Leases and Non-Sales Contracts
Section 2-302 states the rule for contracts for the sale of goods, so by its own terms it does not reach a land sale, a services agreement, or the lease of an apartment.56 Restatement § 208 closes that gap by giving a court the same three responses for any contract or term that was unconscionable when made.57 A rule written for goods can travel because the harm it addresses does not depend on the subject matter. Oppression and unfair surprise arise wherever a party with little choice signs a standardized form whose terms that party cannot realistically evaluate. The Restatement comment describes the policy in these terms: it applies to a wide variety of conduct, the determination is made in light of the contract’s setting, purpose, and effect, and relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process like those behind the rules on capacity and fraud, with some overlap with rules of public policy.58
The doctrine’s reach grew through the Code. Unconscionability began as an equitable doctrine, and that changed when § 2-302 adopted it as a general rule for contracts for the sale of goods. The Code’s influence on the common law then led courts to apply the doctrine in cases at law involving other contracts, and § 208 closely follows § 2-302’s wording. Unconscionability is now a general doctrine of contract law, available whether the suit is legal or equitable.59 Courts have applied it to home improvement contracts, equipment leases, real estate brokerage contracts, an installment land sale, a contract opening a checking account, a filling-station lease, and the settlement of a will contest, among others.60
A land sale shows the analogy at work. A clause in the contract gave the seller the chicken litter produced by the buyers’ farming operation for thirty years without payment. Taking the seller’s own figures, the court concluded that the seller would benefit by $216,000 in addition to the purchase price, and it struck the term out as unconscionable.61 The result fits the doctrine’s two sides: it denies enforcement to a term found oppressive, and it looks to the inequality of the exchange as well as to the bargaining process.62 An answer that rejects such a claim because land is not goods has mistaken a limit on one statute for a limit on the doctrine. An answer that applies § 2-302 to the land contract as binding text has mistaken the source. The analysis runs through § 208 and the governing state law, with § 2-302 as persuasive support.
Leases of goods have a statute of their own. Section 2A-108 is the UCC’s unconscionability provision for leases, and like § 2-302 it gives a court three avenues to redress a lease or lease provision that is unconscionable.63 It also protects consumer lessees in a way § 2-302 does not. If the court finds that a consumer lease was “induced by unconscionable conduct,” or that “unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim” arising from the lease, it may grant “appropriate relief.”64 Subsection (2) therefore reaches conduct at formation and conduct after the lease is signed, and its focus is procedural: it asks what the lessor did, not what the lease says. The Official Comment gives an example. Making a statement to induce the consumer to lease the goods, in the expectation of invoking an integration clause to exclude the statement’s admissibility in a later dispute, may be unconscionable.65 Section 2-302 has no comparable provision.
Other consumer statutes work the same way. A federal appeals court read the West Virginia consumer credit statute (the WVCCPA) to allow claims of “unconscionable inducement” even when the substantive terms of a contract are not themselves unfair. It remanded a mortgage case so that the district court could decide whether the loan was induced by unconscionable conduct, where the borrower alleged a vastly inflated appraisal of his home.66
Leases of real property fall outside Article 2A, which governs leases of goods. For dwellings, the case for scrutinizing lease terms grew out of increasing disenchantment, since the mid-1970s, with traditional landlord-tenant concepts in residential leases, particularly for indigent tenants and sub-standard dwellings.68 A residential lease claim should therefore start with § 208 and the state’s landlord-tenant legislation, which is where the standard appears.