Concept
Improper Purpose, Lawful Contract
Illegality and public policy
Improper Purpose, Lawful Contract
Some contracts are lawful on their face and still serve a wrong. A chemical sold at a fair price is a lawful sale, and so is a lease of an aircraft. If the buyer plans to turn the chemical into illegal drugs, or the lessee plans to use the aircraft for smuggling, nothing in the agreement condemns itself, and the policy problem lies wholly in the intended use. Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the framework: a term is unenforceable on public-policy grounds if legislation says so, or if the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement.1 The question here is how that balance works when one party's purpose, and not the bargain itself, is the offense.
Closeness to wrongdoing does not answer that question. Professor Walter Gellhorn observed in 1936 that judges “are not bound to regard as void every contract which seems in some way to fall within the general aura of the criminal law,” but only those whose enforcement, after respectful study of the public policy involved, will “disserve the general interest as it has been indicated by the legislature.”2
In Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the Restatement's rule for this setting. If a promisee has substantially performed, enforcement is not precluded on public-policy grounds because of an improper use the promisor intends to make of what it obtains; but a promisee who acts for the purpose of furthering that use cannot recover.3 That rule, found in § 182, operates inside the balancing that § 178 requires.4
The rule divides the parties by role. Ordinarily only one of them is tied directly to the improper purpose, such as the buyer who means to make illegal drugs from a lawful chemical, and that party can expect to lose if it sues on the contract.5 The litigated question is therefore whether the other party, the supplier or lessor who delivered value and now wants payment, may enforce. A court considers the gravity of the threatened misconduct, how deeply that party was involved, and how close the connection is between its performance and the anti-social activity.6 If it has substantially performed, a court is inclined to let it enforce unless it became actively involved in furthering the improper purpose, or knew of the intended use and that the use involves grave social harm.7
The two exceptions mark the point at which a supplier stops being an innocent source of value and becomes a participant. Acting to further the improper use is participation itself. Knowledge of a use involving grave social harm bars even a supplier that shared no stake in the goal, because a court will not lend its process to complete a grave harm the supplier understood. The default in favor of a substantially performing supplier rests on a different point. The doctrine serves the public welfare and not fairness between the parties, so a refusal to enforce can hand one side an unjustified windfall, and the default keeps that result off a supplier who did nothing wrong.8
The smuggling purpose is the same in both leases, so it cannot decide whether a lessor collects. The lessor's knowledge and conduct decide that, and an exam answer that stops at the customer's improper purpose has found only half of the issue. The same two-stage inquiry governed Blossom Farm, where the facts show how a lawful sale acquires an improper end.
Blossom, whose salesman Julian Podell handled the account, sold PTX Food Corporation's product Isokappacase to Kasson from August 1981 until February 1984.9 The label called the product a starter medium, but it contained more than 75 percent casein, a composition characteristic of a yield enhancer. Kasson added it directly to the cheese milk to increase yield and did not label the finished cheese as imitation, as federal standards required.10 The sale itself was legal, because a yield enhancer may be used when the end product is labeled as imitation or analog cheese. The use turned improper only when Kasson meant to sell its output as real cheese that purportedly met federal standards of identity.11 The analysis therefore had two stages: whether the promisor's use was improper, and whether the promisee had knowingly involved itself. The court found sufficient evidence on both. Blossom had delivered the shipment for which it sought $138,306, so it began where the rule favors enforcement, and the only question was whether its involvement took it outside that protection.12
The Restatement comment on which the court relied treats the promisee's purpose as a question of fact. It may be shown by “specific acts to facilitate the promisor's improper use” or by “a course of dealing with persons engaged in improper conduct.”13 Blossom's record contained both kinds of proof. Podell realized that Kasson was ordering about one hundred times more product than a starter use could explain, and that volume could only mean use as a yield enhancer.14 The president of PTX, called in to solve a clotting problem at Kasson, learned that the product went directly into the cheese milk, suggested a pump to help, and told Kasson's president that the end product could not conform to federal standards for real cheese. He relayed his conclusions to Podell, who kept a “secret list, confidential” of how much Kasson was buying.15 The pump suggestion is the specific act that facilitates the use, and the steady volume shipments after the warnings are the course of dealing.
The harder link was knowledge of the mislabeling itself. Kasson's president testified that he never told Podell or the PTX president how he labeled the cheese, and that he considered the practice a gray area of the law. The court inferred the knowledge from the economics, and the inference runs in four steps. Imitation cheese sells for less than real cheese. Kasson could not have survived economically had it sold its output as imitation at that lower price. A buyer using the product at that volume and staying in business must therefore have been selling the output as real cheese. Both Podell and the PTX president knew or should have known as much.16 Blossom chose to overlook the problem and kept making volume shipments, a course of dealing that benefited both companies. Because mislabeling cheese offends the state policy of distinguishing imitation from real cheese, the court held the transaction anticipating that conduct unenforceable.17 The court added that a promise may be unenforceable when it involves conduct offensive to public policy even though the promise does not itself induce the conduct, which describes Kasson's promise to pay for a lawful product.18
The same inquiry into underlying purpose reaches a contract whose offense lies in why it was made, not in what later happens to the goods. When the underlying purpose of a contract is to conceal a crime in return for financial advantage, the contract is grounded on blackmail. The in pari delicto rule then requires a court to balance the parties' relative guilt, and it goes beyond that balance to consider how enforcement or nonenforcement affects the public good. The balance can be hard to strike.19
The Blossom Farm court limited its holding to unenforceability, following §§ 178 and 182, which frame the question in terms of unenforceability and not illegality. It observed that earlier Wisconsin cases had not separated illegal contracts from legal contracts that contravene public policy.20 The framing suits the facts, because Blossom's contract to sell was legal, and unenforceability lets a court ask, party by party, who may request its help. A party that did not know of the improper purpose keeps the ability to enforce; only the party with the improper purpose, or the party that furthered it, is shut out.21 In Blossom Farm the practical result was that the seller could not collect the price and the buyer escaped its promise, which leaves the parties where the court found them, the outcome the in pari delicto rule produces when the parties are equally blameworthy.22 A related maxim, clean hands, can likewise defeat a claim for an equitable remedy such as specific performance when the claimant's own conduct was improper, and both ideas return in the section on the consequences of unenforceability.23
Step four is where the two parties' positions diverge, and it is where Blossom Farm was decided: on the volume of the orders, the technical help, and the continued shipments.