Concept
Interest in Enforcement
Illegality and public policy
Interest in Enforcement
A court that refuses to enforce a contract on public-policy grounds sets a bargain aside for the public's sake, and the choice has a cost. Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes a term unenforceable if legislation says so or if the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against enforcement.1 That standard cannot be applied until both sides of the scale have contents, and § 178(2) supplies the contents of the enforcement side. In weighing the interest in enforcing a term, a court takes account of the parties' justified expectations, of any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and of any special public interest in enforcing the particular term.2
Each item names a cost of refusal, and the list exists because refusal is never free. The defense protects the public welfare and the courts' reluctance to lend the judicial process to certain transactions; fairness to the parties is not its goal.3 A refusal can therefore disappoint a party who arranged its affairs around the promise, can leave the other side holding value it never paid for, and can sometimes injure the public it was meant to protect. Judges are not bound to void every contract that falls within “the general aura of the criminal law.” They void only those whose enforcement, after respectful study of the public policy involved, would disserve the general interest as the legislature has indicated it.4 The three considerations measure that disservice from the enforcement side.
The three are independent sources of weight, and a case may present one, two, or all of them. A term that is hard to defend on expectations may still carry weight because denial would cause a heavy forfeiture, or because the public benefits from enforcement. We take them in the order of the statute.
Justified Expectations
Section 178(2)(a) directs a court weighing the interest in enforcement to take account of the parties' justified expectations.5 Every party who signs a contract expects performance or payment, so the weight lies in the adjective: only an expectation the party was reasonable to hold counts, and reasonableness depends largely on what the party knew when it acted. A party that dealt honestly, performed, and had no reason to know of an improper purpose holds the strongest expectation. A party that knew of the problem and went ahead holds one a court has little reason to protect, because it cannot fairly expect judicial help in finishing what it knew was wrong. This is the first point in the weighing where knowledge and fault enter, and it leads directly to the policy side's inquiry into how serious and how deliberate the misconduct was.
The rule follows from what a refusal is supposed to accomplish. A refusal costs the disappointed party its bargain, and that cost is worth imposing only if it buys something for the public, either by deterring misconduct or by keeping the courts from serving an improper end. In Watts v. Watts, an unmarried cohabitant sued for a share of the property the couple had accumulated, and the Wisconsin court said that courts should be reluctant to frustrate a party's reasonable expectations without a corresponding benefit in deterring misconduct or avoiding inappropriate use of the judicial system. Apply that reasoning to a party who could not have known of any problem. That party could not have acted differently, so denying payment deters nothing and punishes someone who did nothing to threaten the public. Apply it to a party who did know, and relief would reward the party that saw the problem and kept going, teaching suppliers that the safe course is to ask no questions and collect.
Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co. supplies the knowing counterpart. Blossom sued on an open-account contract for $138,306 that Kasson owed for its last purchase of Isokappacase, and the trial court concluded that the contract was illegal and unenforceable.6 Selling the product was lawful in itself, and Blossom had delivered it. But Blossom's salesman could see that Kasson was ordering roughly a hundred times more than a starter use could explain, which meant Kasson was using the product as a yield enhancer. The manufacturer's president had also told Kasson that the end product would not conform to federal standards for real cheese, and Blossom knew or should have known that Kasson was mislabeling its output. Blossom kept shipping large orders anyway, and in doing so it facilitated the improper conduct.7 Full performance did not rescue Blossom's expectation of payment, because the expectation rested on dealing Blossom knew was helping an improper end.
The distributor and Blossom both delivered goods that were lawful to sell, and what separates them is what each knew when it shipped. Knowledge operates as weight in the balance and not as an automatic bar. A party that has substantially performed will ordinarily be allowed to enforce unless it became actively involved in furthering the improper purpose or knew that the intended use involved grave social harm, and minor violations, or violations that came from ignorance or other innocent conduct, ordinarily do not preclude enforcement. The dispute usually runs one way, because the party with the improper intent seldom wins, and the live question is whether the other side may collect. An answer that stops at “the seller performed” misses what the seller knew, and an answer that stops at “the seller knew something was wrong” misses how grave the wrong was, which the policy side weighs next.
Forfeiture If Enforcement Denied
Section 178(2)(b) adds a second item to the enforcement side: any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied.9 A forfeiture is the loss of value a party has delivered or earned, suffered without a compensating return. Justified expectations ask what a party knew and could reasonably anticipate when it acted; forfeiture looks at the outcome and asks what a refusal would do to the people in the case. A refusal can leave one party holding a benefit it has not paid for and strip the other of value it has handed over, and the court asks whether that combined loss is out of proportion to the offense that triggered the refusal.
The factor belongs on the scale because the defense tolerates windfalls. The motive is sometimes to punish a party for making an anti-social bargain, even though the other party then escapes its obligation and keeps whatever it has already received.10 Courts accept that result because justice between the parties is not what the defense is for.11 The tolerance has a limit built into the weighing, however. When the loss from denying enforcement dwarfs the wrong, the refusal punishes without advancing any policy, and it can reward the more culpable side by letting it keep what it took. The danger is sharpest because illegality can also affect a claim in restitution, so a party that loses the contract claim may lose the value it delivered as well.12
Homani shows that forfeiture counts without deciding the case. A lender and borrower agreed orally to the payment of interest, but to evade tax on that interest they signed a note showing the loan as interest-free. The court refused to enforce the agreement to pay interest and was unpersuaded by the lender's argument that the borrower would receive a windfall, because it considered the public interest best served by removing the lender's incentive to enter such a transaction.13 Where refusal removes the incentive for the misconduct, a windfall can be the price of the policy.
In general, the treatment of an illegal contract turns on the nature and gravity of the violation, the goals of the law or policy, and the extent to which the impropriety permeates the contract. Sometimes refusing enforcement altogether best protects the public, and sometimes enforcing the contract, with or without adjusted terms, serves it better.14 A restraint-of-trade case shows the second path. The court held a three-year covenant partially unreasonable but a one-year limit reasonable, and it remanded for modification of the judgment to enjoin the defendant from unfair competition for one year.15 Trimming the term keeps most of what the enforcing party bargained for and avoids a total forfeiture.
When the contract cannot be enforced even in part, restitution is the usual pressure valve. It measures recovery by the value the claimant conferred, and a court may allow it to a party who would otherwise suffer a forfeiture disproportionate to the contravention of public policy. The baseline remains that illegality bars restitution along with enforcement, so the relief is exceptional, but it lets a court honor the policy by refusing to enforce the bargain while keeping the loss in proportion to the wrong. A later section develops when restitution is available.
Licensing violations show the factor at its clearest, because the size of the forfeiture depends on how the defect relates to the policy. In Town Planning & Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Amesbury Specialty Co. the plaintiff performed engineering work without the certification as an engineer that the law required, and the court considered limiting its recovery to quantum meruit, the reasonable value of the work, in an amount below the contract price. It concluded that a “vector of considerations” pointed toward recovery of the contract price, and one of them was whether the characteristics that gave the work its value to the defendant were the same as those that made it a violation of law. A license defect with no bearing on what made the work worth paying for is a weak ground for taking the price, because denial would hand the defendant the work free of charge without advancing any licensing policy.
Trade-Winds Environmental Restoration, Inc. v. Stewart came out the other way. A contractor holding no mold-remediation license worked on a hurricane-damaged building under a rate-sheet contract estimated at $750,000, then invoiced $9,000,000. The owner paid $7,500,000, refused the rest when no documentation supported the invoice, and was sued for the balance. The court held for the owner on summary judgment because the contract was null and void for want of a license.17 The contractor argued that voiding the contract would chill disaster cleanup, but the court pointed to the competing interest in protecting the public from unlawful acts of contractors and to the statute's stated purpose of guarding against unqualified individuals who may injure or mislead the public. It also declined to second-guess a policy choice the legislature had made expressly.
The difference lies in the link between the defect and the policy. The missing certification in Town Planning did not connect to what made the work valuable, so paying the price rewarded nothing the law condemned. The licensing requirement in Trade-Winds spoke directly to the service the contractor sold, and an unsupported invoice at twelve times the estimate shows the risk such a statute addresses. The contractor's forfeiture of the unpaid balance was real, but the statute's protective purpose outweighed it. Forfeiture therefore adds weight to the enforcement side without deciding the case, and a later section on licensing statutes takes up how heavily the statute's purpose bears on the result. Applying the factor means identifying what value each party delivered or would keep, comparing that loss with the seriousness of the violation, and asking whether restitution or a narrower remedy can close the gap.
Special Public Interest
Section 178(2)(c) adds the third item to the enforcement side: any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.19 The first two items looked at the parties, at what each was entitled to expect and at what each would lose. This one looks outward, at whether people who are not parties benefit when the term is kept. It belongs on the scale because refusal is not free to the public: some terms let a valuable activity be offered at an affordable cost, and a court that voids such a term in the name of public protection may leave the public worse off. Two words control its use. Special signals an interest beyond the general value of having bargains kept, which sits on the scale in every case, and particular term ties the interest to the clause under challenge, so a benefit that flows from some other part of the deal adds nothing.
McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, Inc. shows the interest at work. A paintball player injured at the facility had signed a release in which he assumed the risk of injury and absolved the operator of liability for negligence, and the court affirmed summary judgment for the operator. It reasoned that it would not serve the public good if a business could not exclude liability by a reasonable and explicit disclaimer, because the risk of liability would preclude many activities and events. Enforcing a term of that kind can serve the public good better than refusing it.20 The mechanism is plain. Every injury claim is a cost to the operator, and an operator who cannot limit that cost by contract must raise prices, shrink the activity, or close, so the people who want to play lose the chance. The public interest in enforcing the term is the public's interest in having the activity exist at all, and a clear, voluntary release is what makes that possible.
The same kind of term can lose when the counterweight is heavy. In Hubner, the court held that using an exculpatory agreement to escape liability for personal injury that a New Jersey statute authorized was so likely to upset the Legislature's balance of risks and costs that, absent further direction from the Legislature, enforcement as a defense had to be denied as contrary to the policy the Legislature had expressed.21 The interest in enforcing a release is real, but it counts without deciding the case, and a later section takes up the policy side of exculpatory clauses.
An asserted public benefit carries weight only if the term actually produces it. In Shadis, the Commonwealth defended agreements that kept a legal-services organization from collecting attorneys' fees by arguing that the minimum funding it supplied, which qualified the organization for federal money, benefited the poor more than potential fee awards could. The court called the argument disingenuous. Advance funding gives the state no inducement to comply with civil rights laws, while the prospect of paying attorneys' fees does, and the state may also have an incentive to settle a case early.22 The contrast with McCune lies in how closely the benefit tracks the clause. Remove the release in McCune and the activity itself is threatened, so the benefit and the term rise and fall together. Enforce the no-fees clause in Shadis and the clause weakens the very incentive on which the civil rights laws rely.
Public interests of other kinds also weigh on the enforcement side. In P.M. v. T.B., the Iowa court rejected the argument that gestational surrogacy contracts are void against public policy. It considered the public-policy implications of the opposite ruling: banning such contracts would deprive infertile couples of perhaps the only way to raise their own biological children, and it would limit the contractual rights of willing surrogates.23 Town of Newton v. Rumery supplies a different interest. The Supreme Court upheld an agreement in which a criminal defendant released civil claims in exchange for dismissal of the charges, and it stated the governing principle: a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement. The release was voluntary, since the defendant was a sophisticated businessman represented by an experienced lawyer, and the possibility of coercion in similar agreements did not by itself justify a per se rule against such bargains. Such agreements also serve the public by protecting officials from the burden of defending unjust claims, and this prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason tied to his prosecutorial responsibilities, namely sparing a sexual assault victim the scrutiny and embarrassment of testifying at either trial.24 Justice O'Connor, who supplied the fifth vote, added that those relying on such covenants must establish that the agreement was neither involuntary nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.
Legislation can settle the matter before any weighing starts. A statute may declare a term void or unenforceable, which tells the court not to enforce it even if the equities point the other way.25 Some states have done this with surrogacy, prohibiting all such contracts, declaring their terms unenforceable, and in some instances imposing criminal penalties; the District of Columbia and Michigan are examples.26 A statute that is silent on enforceability can still point a direction when its provisions or purpose show a goal of protecting persons in the position of one party, which signals the court to favor that party.27 Bidding statutes are of that kind: they protect subcontractors on government contracts from bid shopping by general contractors, commonly by restricting the general contractor's freedom to substitute other subcontractors for those listed in its bid without the granting authority's approval.28
Where no statute decides the question, the special public interest joins justified expectations and forfeiture on the enforcement side, to be set against the policy against enforcement, and the term fails only if its interest is clearly outweighed.29 The enforcement side is therefore rarely empty, and an exam answer that lists only the harm of enforcement has weighed half the test.