Concept
Inducement by the Misrepresentation
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Inducement by the Misrepresentation
A false statement undoes a contract only if it did some work on the recipient's decision. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 167 states the test: a misrepresentation induces a party's manifestation of assent if it substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent.1 The earlier sections of this chapter examined the statement and its maker, asking whether the assertion was false, fraudulent, or material, and whether silence could stand in for speech. Inducement turns to the recipient and asks what happened when that person decided to agree. Some courts describe the element in two parts: the recipient believed the statement to be true, and relied on it in entering the contract.2
The requirement follows from what the defense protects. A party is bound because it chose the contract using its own judgment, and a misrepresentation justifies undoing that choice only when it bent that judgment. A statement the recipient disbelieved, or believed but gave no weight, left the judgment intact. Inducement also differs from the justified reliance covered in the next section: inducement asks whether the statement in fact moved this recipient, and justified reliance asks whether the recipient was entitled to act on it.
Substantial Contribution
Section 167 sets the bar at substantial contribution, not sole cause. Buyers weigh price, convenience, and a seller's assurances together, so a false statement is seldom the only weight on the scale, and a sole-cause rule would let a speaker defeat nearly every claim by pointing to a second motive. Bowen L.J. stated the more realistic measure in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice: once the plaintiff proves the statement false, he must show that it was either the sole cause of his act or materially contributed to it.3
Tort law reaches the same place. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 546 and 547, the statement must have been a material and substantial factor in influencing the recipient's conduct, but the recipient's reliance need not be the sole cause of the loss. The test asks whether the recipient accorded the statement any substantial weight in arriving at a decision, and that question is ordinarily for the jury.4 Other influences do not weaken the claim. It is immaterial that the recipient was moved by other considerations, such as similar misrepresentations from third persons, if the statement in question also substantially influenced the decision.5
Inducement can also be inferred from the shape of the bargain. One commentary on the dispute between Michael Jordan and Karla Knafel reasons that accepting Knafel's claim that Jordan's agreement was not induced by the paternity issue would suggest that the two had haggled over and settled nothing, which would make the case equivalent to blackmail, silence for money.6 On that reasoning, the paternity issue was the subject of the bargain, and a bargain struck over a subject is hard to explain as unaffected by it.
At the strong end of the spectrum, the statement is the decisive factor in the recipient's choice. When one party's opinion is decisive in inducing the other to enter the transaction, misrepresenting that opinion goes to the heart of the contract, particularly where the speaker has expertise and the other party is justified in relying on the recommendation.7 An attorney who believes a prospective client's case is weak, and who expresses the opposite opinion to induce the client to litigate, makes a fraudulent misrepresentation of exactly this kind.8 Section 167 demands less than decisiveness. It asks only for substantial contribution.
Presumption of Reliance
Proving what moved another person's mind is the hard part of inducement, and the definition of materiality eases it. A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.10 Both prongs are built on likely inducement, so proof that a statement was material supports the inference that it in fact moved this recipient. The inference operates as a rebuttable presumption of reliance: the recipient proves materiality, and the maker must show why this recipient was the exception. The second prong reaches even a seemingly trivial fact when the maker knows the recipient cares about it.
Intentional misrepresentation adds a wrinkle. For an unintentional misrepresentation, avoidance usually requires materiality, an objective standard. Where the misrepresentation is intentional, the standard is subjective and materiality is irrelevant.11 When the lie concerns a fact that a reasonable person would shrug off, materiality offers no inference, and the recipient must show from testimony and surrounding circumstances that the lie in fact weighed in the decision.
A dispute between NIVE, the seller, and Rembrandt, the buyer, shows what circumstantial evidence of inducement looks like. On 21 May 2015, NIVE told Rembrandt that unanticipated extra regulatory costs would force a price increase, and on 12 June it proposed an increase of €2.50 per kilogram “after thorough calculation.”12 Rembrandt asked for a breakdown of the extra costs, and on 22 June NIVE sent a cost calculation of €2.59 per kilogram; two days later Rembrandt agreed to the increase.13 On 25 June the parties made a new contract on materially the same terms as the original, except that every price rose by €2.50 per kilogram.14
Two features of that sequence bear on inducement, whatever the truth of the figures. Rembrandt demanded the breakdown before agreeing and agreed within two days of receiving it, and the one term that changed was the term the breakdown addressed. A buyer who asks a seller to justify a price and then accepts it has, on the face of the record, given the justification weight. If the figures were false, that sequence would support a finding that they substantially contributed to the decision.
The presumption speaks only to whether the recipient in fact relied. The maker rebuts it with evidence that the recipient did not believe the statement or relied only on an independent investigation, and the next two subsections take up those rebuttals. Whether the recipient had a right to rely is a separate question for the next section.
Disbelief and Known Falsity
A statement the recipient did not believe cannot have induced the recipient's assent. Courts that break the element into parts ask whether the recipient believed the statement to be true and relied on it,16 and the tort formulation likewise requires that the recipient have acted or refrained from acting in reliance on the misrepresentation, believing it to be true.17 A recipient who spots the falsity before assent, or who learns the truth and goes ahead anyway, did not act believing the statement true, so the lie did nothing to the decision. Disbelief means actual discounting. A recipient who suspected that the statement might be wrong but still gave it weight in deciding was moved by it, because the test remains whether the recipient accorded the statement substantial weight.18
Timing decides the question, because § 167 asks about the decision to manifest assent.19 A recipient who learns the truth only after the contract was made was deceived when it counted. What the recipient does after learning the truth belongs to the remedies discussion later in this chapter.
Independent Investigation
A recipient who checks a statement before relying on it raises a harder question, because the check can mean two things: the recipient trusted the findings over the seller's words, or the recipient sought confirmation of something already believed. Section 547 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the basic proposition that a recipient who relied solely on its own investigation, and not on the defendant's representation, has not relied in fact, and without subjective reliance the recipient loses.21 The mere fact of an investigation does not carry that proposition. People often rely on several pieces of information at once, and reliance on one does not preclude reliance on another, so an investigation is evidence of non-reliance and is not conclusive of it.22 The same point appears in tort: that the recipient made an independent investigation or had other facts in hand does not of itself defeat recovery, since the investigation or facts may not have been conclusive, and the test remains whether the recipient gave the statement any substantial weight.23
The contractor relied solely on her own findings, so the seller's claim carried no weight with her and did not induce her. Whether the bookkeeper's glance displaced the seller's statement is ordinarily a question for the jury, and on these facts the statement supplied the assurance on which he acted, which is substantial weight.
A recipient who never checked at all was still induced if the statement moved him. Whether he should have checked goes to the next requirement, justified reliance.