Concept
Material Misrepresentation
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Material Misrepresentation
A contract is voidable when a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation induced the recipient's assent and the recipient was justified in relying on it (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1)).1 The previous section covered the fraudulent kind, which turns on what the maker knew or believed. The material kind turns on how much the misstated fact mattered, and the maker's honesty drops out of the analysis. Section 162(2) defines the term in two parts: a misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.2 Because the definition says nothing about the maker's state of mind, an entirely innocent misrepresentation of a material fact creates a defense.3 The two parts measure importance differently, one against a reasonable person and one against the particular recipient, and a subsection below takes each in turn.
The recipient who relies on materiality usually faces a nonfraudulent maker, one who spoke without a deliberate intent to mislead.4 That maker may have been negligent, having failed to use reasonable care in ascertaining and communicating the truth, or innocent, having been wrong through no fault at all. The boundary with fraud can shift, because carelessness that rises to recklessness or gross negligence may qualify as fraudulent.5 At the other end, courts accept that an innocent speaker's error can support relief. One court framed the pivotal issue as “whether an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact warrants the granting of a claim for rescission” and answered, “We believe that it does.”6
The law asks more of the recipient as the maker's culpability shrinks: the less culpable the maker, the stronger the showing of importance and of reasonable reliance should be.7 The tests reflect that trade. For an unintentional misrepresentation, avoidance usually requires materiality, and the standard is objective. For an intentional one, avoidance is available even if the fact is immaterial, because the standard is subjective and materiality is irrelevant.8 Courts have stated materiality in various ways, and none of the formulations is applied uniformly, but they share a function: they justify some control by judges over the more volatile behavior of juries. The requirement appears most prominently in insurance litigation, where a policy buyer's misrepresentation about health is a commonplace ground for rejecting a claim.9
A nonfraudulent misrepresentation that is not material leaves the contract intact under these rules, though the recipient may have a claim under others, such as those governing breach of warranty.10 The overlap exists because a nonfraudulent misrepresentation is akin to a contractual promise.11 Some legislatures have made the link explicit for particular goods. New York's legislature approved a bill in 1966 providing that an art merchant who sells a work to a nonmerchant creates an express warranty if, in describing the work, the merchant identifies it with an author or authorship.12
Remedies appear at the end of the chapter. Here the question is what makes a misrepresentation material, and the two subsections below answer it.
Objective Materiality
The first test asks how a reasonable person would react: a misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest assent.14 The inquiry looks at the fact and ignores both the maker's honesty and the recipient's private reasons. A tort formulation of the test shows how closely it tracks the deal: a matter is material if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action “in the transaction in question.”15 The same fact can therefore matter in one sale and not in another. The working question is whether a reasonable person in the recipient's position, knowing the truth, would likely have declined to conclude the contract.
Termite damage is a fact of the same kind. In one case, buyers who had moved in found a pamphlet in a drawer titled “Termites, the Silent Saboteurs” and learned from a neighbor that the house had been infested before. An exterminator confirmed termite damage to the floor, the steps, and wood columns and estimated the cost of repairing the floor alone at about $5,000.17 Facts like these go to the condition of the house the buyers thought they were getting.
Facts collateral to the bargain sit at the other end of the range. The materiality requirement does its most work when one party makes false statements about a matter collateral to the immediate subject of the bargain.18 In the usual case, a salesman's false statement that a car was previously owned by a federal judge, when a law professor owned it, is not material enough for the buyer to be justified in relying on it as a substantial factor in the decision to buy.19 Puffery falls on the same side of the line. The requirement excludes a seller's broad and predictably exaggerated statements about the quality of an item, as distinct from particular claims of fact, and claims based on such statements may be dismissed in the alternative for want of justifiable reliance.20 Whether a statement is a representation of fact or only opinion or puffing is ordinarily a question for the jury, and the answer depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.21
Materiality can also fail on the particular facts even when the subject sounds important. In one case the plaintiff had to prove not only a misrepresentation about the ownership of the land but a material one. He never tried to prove that the seller could not comply with its contract to “convey or cause to be conveyed” the land, and the evidence tended to show that the seller was able and willing to have title conveyed once he complied with his own contract. The court held that the ownership representation was not material “under these circumstances.”22 A false statement about ownership mattered little where the buyer's path to title stayed open.
Materiality plays a smaller role when the maker acted fraudulent. If the § 162(1) test for fraud is satisfied, a defense arises irrespective of the importance of the misrepresented fact, although some courts unthinkingly state that even then the fact must be material.23 Some treatments likewise list a material fact among the elements of fraud.24 A trivial fact still makes the recipient's case harder. The recipient must show that the statement induced assent and that reliance on it was justified, and a fact that no reasonable person would weigh seldom serves as a substantial factor in a decision.25
Materiality alone does not decide a case. The foundation was material in the hypothetical, and Bridget still would lose on a showing that she did not reasonably rely. The two requirements look from opposite sides: the materiality of a misrepresentation is determined from the viewpoint of the maker, while the justification of reliance is determined from the viewpoint of the recipient.26 A court may reject justifiable reliance, even on a material fact, when red flags would have put a reasonable person on notice of the statement's falsity and the recipient proceeded without investigating.27 In one fraud action, a divided court held as a matter of law that the party who relied was not justified in relying on a salesman's oral representation, observing that the action was brought in fraud and not for breach of warranty.28 Inducement is likewise a fact-specific inquiry. In the duress setting, for example, the victim must show that, under all the circumstances, it had no reasonable alternative but to acquiesce.29 The sections that follow develop both elements.
Known Importance to Recipient
The second test in § 162(2) turns from the reasonable person to the particular recipient: a misrepresentation is also material if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to manifest assent.31 A fact that no reasonable person would weigh can therefore be material when the maker knows that this recipient weighs it heavily. The comment to § 162 explains why. There may be personal considerations that the recipient regards as important even though they would not be expected to affect others in his situation, and if the maker is aware of them, the misrepresentation may be material even though it would not be expected to induce a reasonable person to make the contract. One who preys on another's known idiosyncrasies cannot complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds.32
The tort restatement frames the whole inquiry as notice. A misrepresentation is material if a reasonable person would give it weight or if the defendant knew that the plaintiff would give it weight, “whether reasonably or not,” and the question, in effect, is whether the defendant knew or should have known that the misrepresentation would matter to the plaintiff.33 The formulations differ on how much the maker must know. Section 162(2) says that the maker “knows.” A tort formulation reaches a maker who “knows or has reason to know” that the recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important, although a reasonable man would not.34 Some contract treatments likewise say that a misrepresentation is material if the maker knew or should have known that it was likely to induce the particular person to assent, and that such a misrepresentation can support avoidance even if it was only negligent or innocent.35 A careful answer quotes § 162(2) and mentions the looser versions only when the facts turn on the difference.
Astrology supplies one illustration. The standard is generally that of the reasonable person, but a recipient who is specially, even peculiarly, disposed to regard a statement as important may find it material as to him if the maker knows of that disposition. If the maker knows that the recipient believes in astrology and falsely represents that the astrological signs strongly favor the transaction, the representation may be deemed material.36 A reasonable person would shrug at the statement, but this recipient is exactly the person at whom it was aimed.
Three limits keep this half of the test in proportion. First, the knowledge that counts is knowledge of the recipient's interest and not knowledge that the statement is false. A seller who knew that the ballplayer story was false would face the fraud route, where no showing of importance is needed.37 The knowledge test therefore matters most for the honest or careless maker, whose awareness of what the recipient cares about supplies the notice that an ordinary innocent maker lacks. Second, where the maker did not know of the recipient's interest, only the objective test remains, and an undisclosed private concern adds nothing to it. Third, materiality does not establish inducement. The recipient must still show that the misrepresentation induced assent and that reliance on it was justified, and those questions are judged from the recipient's viewpoint.38