Concept
Statements of Opinion
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Statements of Opinion
Opinion is where many misrepresentation claims stall. The claimant must first point to an assertion that is not in accord with the facts, and a statement of opinion or a prediction about the future does not ordinarily qualify.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 169 adds a second hurdle: to the extent an assertion is one of opinion only, the recipient is not justified in relying on it unless the recipient falls within one of three listed circumstances.2 Every statement of opinion therefore raises two questions. Can the statement be wrong about the facts at all? And was the listener entitled to act on it?
The law gives opinion this room because a listener can ordinarily hear it for what it is. A seller who calls a truck a bargain speaks from a position of interest, and the buyer discounts the remark and checks whatever matters. The three exceptions mark the places where that expectation breaks down: the listener has reason to trust the speaker, cannot check the speaker's view, or is unusually exposed to the kind of statement made. Each exception lifts the bar on reliance and does no more. The recipient must still prove the rest of § 164(1), which requires a fraudulent or material misrepresentation that induced assent and on which reliance was justified.3
The subsections below answer the two questions in order. The first defines opinion under § 168(1), since an assertion of fact never reaches § 169. The second shows that some statements phrased as opinion also assert facts. The last three take the circumstances of § 169 one at a time: a relation of trust and confidence with the speaker, a reasonable belief that the speaker has special skill, judgment, or objectivity, and a special susceptibility to the type of misrepresentation involved.4
What Counts as Opinion
Restatement § 168(1) defines opinion in two clauses. An assertion is one of opinion if it expresses only a belief, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact, or expresses only a judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or similar matters.6 A seller who says, “I believe this canvas is by the named painter,” speaks within the first clause: the seller reports a belief about a fact and signals that it falls short of certainty. A seller who calls a Range Rover “awesome” speaks within the second, because nothing about the vehicle could confirm or refute the word.7 The same is true of a seller who calls a sofa's green and orange plaid a “fun color.”8
A fact, by contrast, is an objectively ascertainable reality. A seller who says a sofa is made of leather or was made in the U.S.A. states something the world can verify, and the statement is false if the sofa is vinyl or was built abroad. Judgments of beauty, predictions that the sofa will be the envy of the neighbors, and promises that the buyer may return it if it looks wrong all fall on the other side of the line, and the general rule is that only a misrepresentation of fact constitutes fraud.9 A promise of future action is a separate category with its own rule, developed in the next section. It can qualify as fraudulent where the promisor had no intention of keeping it when making it.10
Authenticity shows how much the label can matter in practice. Because applying the U.C.C.'s warranty and disclaimer provisions to art fraud proved difficult, some states enacted laws aimed at art warranties. A 1966 New York statute makes an art merchant who sells a work to a nonmerchant buyer an express warrantor whenever the merchant, in describing the work, identifies it with an author or authorship.11
Specificity does most of the sorting. The more specific an assertion, the more likely it is fact, and the more general, the more likely it is opinion. To say that a crane is “capable of safely lifting 20,000 pounds” is a statement of fact, but to say that it is “a mighty strong crane” is a statement of opinion.12 The number gives the buyer something to plan a job around and something a test can disprove. The commendation gives the buyer neither.
Statements of value follow the same logic. A statement of the monetary value of property with no definite market value, such as a mine, an invention, old and used goods, or land, is generally made and understood as an expression of opinion only, and it is not ordinarily an actionable misrepresentation.13 The limiting phrase carries the point. Where a definite market price exists, a statement of value can be checked against it, and the reason for treating the statement as opinion weakens. The court in Byers v. Federal Land Co. applied the rule to a statement about the value of land.
Predictions of the future are notoriously unreliable and will not support an action for misrepresentation even if disingenuously made.14 A prediction nonetheless carries an implied representation about what the speaker knows today, a point the next subsection develops.
No test settles every case, and courts often leave the label to the jury. Ordinarily the question whether the representations made are opinion or fact is for the jury and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.15 Courts can also draw the line firmly for the speaker, as the Alabama court did in Ray v. Montgomery when it treated a seller's remarks about the condition of a house as opinion.
Classifying a statement as opinion starts a second inquiry. The next subsection asks whether the statement conveys facts beyond the belief it expresses, and the three after it ask whether the recipient falls within a circumstance § 169 lists.
Opinions Implying Facts
A statement phrased as opinion can still assert facts. Restatement § 168(2) provides that, if it is reasonable to do so, the recipient of an assertion of a person's opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient may interpret it as an assertion that the facts known to that person are not incompatible with the opinion, or that the person knows facts sufficient to justify forming it.17
An opinion is a shorthand summary of underlying facts, so a listener who cannot reach those facts has only the speaker's conclusion, and the speaker's access to the facts, to go on.18 The two implied assertions answer the two ways that conclusion can mislead. The first fails when the speaker holds contrary information. The second fails when the speaker knows too little to hold an informed view at all.
The doctrine works much as the law of half-truths does. A half-truth is literally true as to the fact stated but implies something false about other facts. A seller whose technician has just reported dangerous brakes, and who answers a buyer's question about them with “I just had them checked last week,” misleads more effectively than an outright lie would.19 Partial disclosure can amount to misrepresentation for the same reason.20 An opinion given without disclosure of known contrary facts follows the same pattern: the words say nothing false about the facts they mention, and they imply that nothing the speaker knows points the other way.
The form of the statement affects whether this reading is reasonable. “Fun color” suggests no information behind it, while “this sofa is fashionable” suggests some familiarity with facts about current market trends. A fact-based opinion is a misrepresentation if the speaker knows the facts do not support it or speaks with reckless disregard of whether they do.21 The recipient's position matters as well, because the rule reaches only facts that were not disclosed and that the recipient did not otherwise know. That is why the second seller in the cottage example made no misrepresentation.
The cases show the implied assertions at work. In Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, the district court dismissed Rodi's claim, but the court of appeals reversed and let a fraudulent misrepresentation theory go to trial. The school knew it had substantial problems in obtaining accreditation, and Rodi made a credible preliminary showing that the opinions of school officials were not honest, given what they knew of the ABA's criteria and the school's prospects of meeting them.22 Officials' views about accreditation look like predictions, yet they carried the implied message that the officials knew nothing pointing away from success.
In Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Prudential argued that Powell's representations during lease negotiations were opinion, or at least not known to be false. The court disagreed, holding the statements actionable material misrepresentations as a matter of law and finding legally sufficient evidence that they were known to be false when made. The trial court had identified three representations: the Secchis were lucky to get a practically new, problem-free building; the prior tenant had experienced no problems; and the building was a perfect restaurant site.23 Phrases such as “perfect restaurant site” sound like praise, but they sat beside checkable assertions about the building's history.
Hoffman v. L&M Arts marks the other pole. The court held that L&M's assurance that a painting would disappear into a private collection and would not be sold was a nonactionable prediction, because it rested on no present fact and anticipated the future conduct of a buyer, a third party whom L&M did not control. A contrary conclusion is imaginable if L&M had had no factual basis for the prediction.24 That limit fits the general rule: a prediction implies that the speaker knows no present facts inconsistent with it, and it can be actionable if the speaker purports to have special knowledge of those facts.25
The fraud provisions pick up both implied assertions. They reach a maker who does not have the confidence in the truth of the assertion that he states or implies, and a maker who knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for it.26 The later section on fraudulent misrepresentation develops that test. Employees in Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co. offered evidence that their employer made false statements about downsizing plans to induce them to accept severance, and the court found that enough for a prima facie showing of misrepresentation. Section 169 withholds justified reliance only to the extent that an assertion is opinion only.27 To the extent a recipient may reasonably read an opinion as implying undisclosed facts, the statement is an assertion about those facts, and the recipient does not need one of the three circumstances.
Statements about the law raise the same problem. A statement of law made by someone other than a lawyer was once commonly called mere opinion on which no one could rely, except that statements about the law of a foreign state were treated as fact. The rule was sometimes explained by the fiction that everyone is presumed to know the law, but its real rationale was that each person must determine for himself what the law is and may not rely on what the other party says it is. Such statements are now treated like other assertions and may be opinion or fact depending on their form and the circumstances. A statement that a statute has been repealed may be fact, and a statement of law may expressly or impliedly contain facts. A statement that a corporation has the legal right to do business in a state may be taken as a representation that every step needed to qualify the corporation there has been taken, and reliance on it may be justified.28 For a litigated example in the lease setting, see National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Building Corp., in which a former tenant of industrial premises sued its landlords for damages in fraud and for breach of warranty.29
Opinion From a Trusted Source
The first circumstance in which a recipient may justifiably rely on an assertion of opinion only appears in § 169(a): the recipient stands in such a relation of trust and confidence to the person whose opinion is asserted that the recipient is reasonable in relying on it.31 The qualifying relations include any fiduciary or other relation of trust and confidence, among them attorney and client, principal and agent, insurer and insured, partners, members of the same family, and many others. They are the same relationships that create liability for nondisclosure.32
The general rule rests on an assumption that opposing parties discount one another. A buyer who hears a seller praise the price knows the seller gains if the buyer believes it, so the buyer treats the remark as sales talk and checks independently. A relation of trust removes that assumption. A client who has come to depend on an adviser has stopped checking because the adviser invited the dependence, and an adviser who could give a careless or self-serving opinion and then say the client should have discounted it would turn the client's confidence into a weapon against the client.
The clause does not make every relationship sufficient. It requires a relation of such a kind that the recipient is reasonable in relying on the opinion, so a court asks how the relationship actually worked between these two people. Familiarity between parties who still bargain on opposite sides does not by itself answer that question. In MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, a billionaire collector sued a gallery and its owner, accusing them of concealing material information and of undervaluing works when buying them and overvaluing them when selling them. The court held that, despite the parties' long working relationship and friendship, no fiduciary duty was owed and that the collector should have done his own due diligence.33 The holding concerned fiduciary duty, which is narrower than a relation of trust and confidence, but it shows why a recipient who deals at arm's length should expect to show more than familiarity.
Satisfying § 169(a) removes only the bar that opinion places on reliance. The recipient must still show a misrepresentation that was fraudulent or material and that induced assent.34 An adviser's honest opinion that turns out wrong remains outside the defense.
Opinion From a Skilled Source
Section 169(b) supplies the second circumstance: the recipient reasonably believes that, as compared with himself, the person whose opinion is asserted has special skill, judgment, or objectivity with respect to the subject matter.36 The previous subsection tied reliance to a relationship, and this one ties it to a gap between the parties. Three features of the wording control. The test is the recipient's reasonable belief, so apparent expertise can matter as well as actual expertise. The test is comparative, asking whether the speaker knows more, judges better, or stands more detached than the recipient, so the same statement may warrant reliance from a novice and none from an expert. And the skill, judgment, or objectivity must concern the subject of the statement.
The exception follows from what an opinion is. An opinion condenses underlying facts that the speaker has collected and weighed, and a listener who lacks access to those facts can only take the conclusion on the speaker's word. When the speaker has access to the facts and the listener does not, reliance may be justified, as when a jeweler represents the value of a diamond or a patent attorney represents that an invention is patentable, even though the parties are antagonists in a bargaining transaction.37 The general rule assumes that the listener can discount the statement or check it. An expert's statement defeats both assumptions, because the listener's inability to check is the reason the expert's view is worth having.
Professionals show the exception at its strongest, because their opinions are the service they offer. An attorney who believes a prospective client has a weak case on the facts, and who tells the client otherwise in order to induce the client to litigate, makes a fraudulent misrepresentation. The client is justified in relying on the recommendation because the attorney has expertise the client lacks.38
Superior knowledge need not belong to a licensed professional. The student in Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc. appealed an order dismissing with prejudice her fourth amended complaint against Arthur Murray, Inc. and a local franchised operator of its dancing schools.39 The court reasoned that the defendants could reasonably be supposed to have superior knowledge about whether she had dance potential and whether she was noticeably improving. A statement of a party with superior knowledge may be regarded as a statement of fact although it would be considered opinion if the parties were dealing on equal terms.40
Objectivity requires no expertise at all. A recipient may be justified in relying on the opinion of one whom the recipient reasonably believes to be disinterested in the transaction, provided that the fact that such a person holds the opinion is material.41 The mechanism is the one behind the whole exception. A listener discounts a seller's praise because the seller gains if it is believed, and a speaker who seems to gain nothing removes the reason for discounting.
Section 169(b) removes only the bar that opinion places on reliance, as § 169(a) does. The recipient must still show that the statement was a misrepresentation, which for an opinion usually means the speaker did not hold the view, knew facts that contradicted it, or lacked the basis the statement implied. The recipient must also show that the misrepresentation was fraudulent or material and that it induced assent.42
Particularly Susceptible Recipients
The third circumstance appears in § 169(c): the recipient is for some other special reason particularly susceptible to a misrepresentation of the type involved.44 The first two circumstances looked at the speaker, who was either someone the recipient trusted or someone who knew more. This one looks at the recipient. As a residual category it reaches whatever leaves a particular listener unusually exposed to a particular statement. The closing phrase ties the susceptibility to the kind of statement involved, since a listener who is shrewd about prices may still be an easy target for flattery about personal talent.
The exception follows from why opinion gets discounted at all. A claim that a product is the best on the market passes as sales talk because the listener can hear it as the interested view of the seller, mark it down, and check what matters. A recipient who cannot do that stands in a different position, and a speaker who sees the weakness and talks anyway is using it as the means of persuasion. Reliance on an opinion may be justified even when the speaker is no expert, if the speaker knows the recipient cannot gain access to the underlying facts, as when the subject matter is far away, the recipient is ignorant or illiterate, or the speaker uses concealment or trickery to block access.45
The general approach to justification supports the point. The standard is primarily subjective, much like assumption of risk. A person who is unusually gullible, ignorant, or stupid may honestly and justifiably believe a misrepresentation that a normal person would not, while a person with special expertise must use it and may be unjustified in relying on a statement an ordinary person would accept at face value.46 A court applying this approach looked to the plaintiff's own inexperience and gullibility in Rozen v. Greenberg.
Syester v. Banta shows flattery doing the work. The plaintiff was a lonely and elderly widow who, in the court's words, fell for the blandishments and flattery of people who saw some easy money available. The court upheld the jury's conclusion that the defendants had made a concerted effort, lacking in propriety, to obtain releases from her, amounting to fraudulent overreaching, a predatory play on the vanity and credulity of an old lady.47 The jury decided whether the flattery crossed the line, which fits the general rule that whether a representation is opinion or fact ordinarily goes to the jury.48 The opinion here was a compliment, and the court's reasoning was about fraudulent overreaching, so the case illustrates the situation the clause addresses and is not a holding construing its words.
The clause has a boundary. Lack of expertise describes nearly every buyer who hears a seller's praise, so treating it as particular susceptibility would erase the general rule of § 169. The clause is reserved for a recipient who is unusually exposed to the type of statement at issue.
Clearing § 169(c) removes only the bar that opinion places on reliance. The recipient must still show a misrepresentation that is fraudulent or material and that induced assent.49 The test varies with culpability: where the misrepresentation is intentional, avoidance is available even if the fact represented is immaterial, while an unintentional misrepresentation must be material.50 A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest assent, or if the maker knows it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so. A speaker who knows of a listener's susceptibility therefore cannot call the statement immaterial on the ground that an ordinary listener would have shrugged it off.51 Two later obstacles remain open. A court may reject reliance where red flags would have put a reasonable person on notice of the statement's falsity,52 and a recipient who has read and understood a disclaimer of representations may be bound by it.53