Concept
Nondisclosure and Duties to Speak
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Nondisclosure and Duties to Speak
The two previous sections dealt with parties who acted: they made a statement, hid a defect, or told half a story. Silence gives a court no act to examine, so Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 starts from a default and lists the exceptions. A person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to that person is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in the listed cases only.1 Two limits follow from that wording. The rule reaches only facts the silent party actually knows. And outside the listed cases silence is just silence, so no misrepresentation exists for the voidability rule of § 164(1) to act on.
The default comes from Laidlaw v. Organ, decided by the Supreme Court in 1817. A buyer in New Orleans learned before the seller did that the Treaty of Ghent had ended the war with Britain, news that would raise the price of tobacco, and bought without mentioning it. The Court held that the buyer was not bound to share what only the buyer knew, because a contrary rule would be hard to confine where the means of intelligence were equally open to both sides, and it sent the case back for a new trial. The usual justification is economic: information costs time and money to gather, and a rule forcing every holder of useful knowledge to share it before bargaining would remove the reward for gathering it.
Modern law keeps the default but lets four situations override it. Section 161(a) through (d) treats silence as an assertion when it leaves an earlier statement misleading, when it leaves the other side mistaken about a basic assumption, when it leaves the other side mistaken about a writing, and when the other person is entitled to know because of a relation of trust and confidence.2 Tort treatments of nondisclosure list overlapping duty situations.3 Duties that statutes create lie outside § 161 and outside this section.
Correcting Prior Assertions
Section 161(a) is the most intuitive of the four situations. It treats silence as an assertion when the silent party knows that disclosure is necessary to keep an earlier assertion from being a misrepresentation, or from being fraudulent or material.5 Something the silent party said, or was asked, must come first. Without that earlier speech the no-duty default governs, so subsection (a) never makes anyone volunteer information; it requires a speaker to keep the speaker’s own words from misleading.
Words spoken in negotiation keep working on the listener until the contract is made. A buyer told that the roof is sound prices the roof as sound on the day of agreement. A speaker who learns that the statement has stopped being true, and who lets the buyer go on relying, repeats the statement at the moment of assent while knowing it to be false. The duty therefore turns on what the speaker knows: the facts that undercut the earlier statement and the listener’s continued reliance on it.6 Three applications show how far the rule reaches.
The first application is a statement that was true when made and false by the time of the contract. Events may have changed the facts, or the speaker may later have learned that the statement was wrong from the start. Either way, a speaker who knows the other side is relying must disclose the truth.7 The same duty arises when a speaker made a false statement expecting no one to rely on it and then discovers that the listener is about to; once the speaker knows of the reliance, the speaker must disclose the falsity.8 The duty lasts until assent, because a stale statement cannot induce a contract already made.
The duty has limits, because a statement reaches only as far as what it conveys. In Hord v. Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, an accurate 1991 operating summary of a firm’s prospects did not create an implicit duty to update the information when conditions changed, and the court rejected the claim that the plaintiff could treat the summary as an accurate picture of the next fiscal year without some additional inquiry or affirmative representation.9 A summary tied to one year says nothing about the next. A loan application is different, because it describes the applicant’s circumstances at the time of the loan and invites reliance on them.
The second application is the half-truth, which the previous section treated as a misrepresentation in its own right. Subsection (a) adds a point about timing: a party who had no duty to speak on a subject, but speaks anyway, takes on a duty to tell the rest. As one decision puts it, “one who voluntarily elects to make a partial disclosure is deemed to have assumed a duty to tell the whole truth . . . even though the speaker was under no duty to make the partial disclosure in the first place.”10 A seller who says a car was driven only by a sweet little old grandmother must add, if it is true, that she drove it in stock car races.11 The same sentence about a car that really was driven gently needs no supplement, so the duty is measured by the gap between the picture the words paint and the facts the speaker knows. In another decision a resident of the Philippines was offered a job in Oregon without being told that the job slot was under review; the court treated the silence as fraudulent and awarded damages when the slot was canceled as of the promised start date.12
The third application is a direct question answered in a way calculated to mislead. A party with no obligation to raise a topic may still be liable once asked about it, because the answer is itself an assertion. In Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, the sellers were leaving a house because a convicted sex offender lived next door, and a state statute relieved sellers of any duty to disclose that fact. When the buyers asked why the sellers were moving, the sellers said they wanted to be closer to friends. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the buyers’ fraud claim, reasoning that a person asked a question that fairly calls for disclosure commits fraud by answering in a way deliberately calculated to mislead. Liability came entirely from the answer. Had the buyers never asked, silence would have been permitted, since the statute removed any duty to volunteer and no earlier assertion needed correcting.
The cases on evasive answers share one pattern: courts measure a reassurance against what the speaker knew when giving it. In Gresh v. Waste Services of America, Inc., an option holder asked about plans to sell the company and was told that a sale was not imminent. The court held that the common-law duty of good faith required the company either to be straight with the option holder or to say nothing at all, because the statement cost him the chance to exercise his option while it was worth something.13 A student’s suit over a law school’s prospects for accreditation reached the same place from the other direction. The court of appeals reversed a dismissal and allowed the fraud claim to go to trial, because the school knew it had substantial accreditation problems and the student had made a credible preliminary showing that the officials’ optimistic opinions were not honest.14 Disputes over whether statements like these are actionable are often fought on the pleadings, as in Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., where a dance student’s fourth amended complaint against a franchised studio had been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.15
Proving the earlier assertion does not finish the claim. The recipient must still show that the misrepresentation concerned a material fact, that the recipient relied on it justifiably, and that injury followed,16 and inducement is judged on all the circumstances.17
Correcting Basic Mistakes
Section 161(b) is the broadest of the four situations and the only one without a fixed trigger. It treats silence as an assertion when the silent party knows that disclosure would correct the other party’s mistake about a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract, and when nondisclosure amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.19 Both parts must be met. The first asks what the silent party knew: the fact, and the other side’s mistaken belief about it. The second asks whether silence in those circumstances falls below honest dealing. Subsections (a), (c), and (d) each supply a trigger, whether an earlier statement, a writing, or a relationship; subsection (b) supplies a standard. Courts therefore apply it by weighing circumstances, since a rule applied automatically, without a sense of why the parties acted as they did, can frustrate their real interests.20
The first part borrows from the law of unilateral mistake, in which one party’s error about a basic assumption can sometimes justify relief. Subsection (b) carries that idea into nondisclosure: a party who becomes aware that the other is mistaken about a basic assumption must correct the mistake where honesty and fairness require, even though the party did not cause it.21 An illustration shows the overlap. Healy sells a new home to Johnson, knowing that improper fill under the foundation has made it defective. Johnson reasonably does not know, and Healy says nothing. Johnson could not claim mutual mistake, because Healy was not mistaken, but Healy had a duty to disclose and Johnson can avoid the contract on that basis.22
The first part cannot decide a case alone. The buyer in Laidlaw knew the seller was ignorant of a fact bearing directly on price, and the Court still held that the buyer had no duty to speak. If knowing the other side’s ignorance were enough, every bargain between a better-informed and a less-informed party would be open to attack. The good-faith part does the sorting. Sellers who know of a termite infestation are often obligated to disclose it, while buyers who know of valuable gold deposits on the property are generally found to owe the seller no duty.23 The usual explanation turns on how the knowledge arose. The seller’s defect is a fact about the thing sold that only the seller can know, while the buyer’s deposit is something the buyer found by its own effort, and requiring a buyer to hand over its research before buying would leave no reason to do the research.
The termite cases show the rule at work on a latent defect, meaning a harmful condition the seller knows about and the buyer cannot readily see. In Hill v. Jones, buyers who had moved into a house found a pamphlet in a drawer titled “Termites, the Silent Saboteurs,” learned from a neighbor that the house had once been infested, and had an exterminator confirm termite damage to the floor, the steps, and wood columns; repairing the floor alone was estimated at about $5,000.24 The court held that a seller owes a duty to disclose a known condition of the dwelling that materially affects its value and that the buyer does not know about.25 It adopted the Florida formulation of the rule as a fair balance of the parties’ interests in the sale of a private residence.26 The claimed misrepresentation there came after the contract was signed. Even assuming the integration clause reached statements made after signing, the court said, the clause could not shield the sellers from liability if the buyers proved fraud.27
The Florida decision that the Hill court adopted, Johnson v. Davis, explains why a knowing seller’s silence is treated like an assertion. Where a failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the line between concealment and affirmative representation is thin, because both spring from the same motives, produce the same result, and offend the same principles of fair dealing.28 Under that formulation a home seller who knows of facts materially affecting value, facts that are not readily observable and not known to the buyer, must disclose them.
The duty is not uniform across jurisdictions. The no-duty rule of Swinton, a termite case, has eroded: Obde v. Schlemeyer, another termite case, rejected it,29 a New Jersey court said that Swinton “does not represent our sense of justice or fair dealing,” and a North Dakota court called caveat emptor, which may have suited an agrarian society, “no longer an expression of American mores.”30 Massachusetts, by contrast, still lets a house seller stay silent about termites, though the seller must disclose conditions dangerous to health and safety, and caveat emptor remains viable in commercial real estate and in dealings between merchants.31
Two illustrations in a restatement commentary explain why discoverability matters. In one, denying recovery would give buyers an incentive to buy more expensive inspections that would rarely be worth the cost, and it is more efficient to require the seller to reveal what the seller knows. In the other, requiring each side to inform itself, or just requiring the buyer to put direct questions to the seller, is not unduly burdensome and fits the customs of real-estate dealing.32
Because subsection (b) leaves good faith open, the decisions sort by recurring considerations:
- Who holds the knowledge: a seller with a latent defect in what is sold, or a buyer holding valuable information about it.33
- Whether the other side could have found the fact by diligent inquiry.34
- The setting: a private home sale, a commercial deal between merchants, or a contract of a kind, such as suretyship or insurance, that carries heightened disclosure duties.35
- Whether the silent party also spoke or acted on the subject, since concealment and affirmative statement shade into each other.36
- Whether the silent party gained the knowledge by its own effort and expense.
The first two steps are usually met in both the foundation case and the researched-deposit case, so the contest tends to occur at steps three and four. The foundation defect lies beyond the buyer’s reach, and the gold deposit is the geologist’s own work product.
Mistakes About a Writing
Section 161(c) treats silence as an assertion when the silent party knows that disclosure would correct the other party’s mistake about the contents or effect of a writing that evidences or embodies the agreement, in whole or in part.39 The rule has two requirements: knowledge of the other side’s mistake, and a mistake about the document itself, whether what its words say (its contents) or what they do in law (its effect). Unlike subsection (b), subsection (c) has no separate good-faith clause, because the setting supplies the unfairness. The writing is the one thing both sides are about to rely on, and the one thing a signer is expected to have read.40
That expectation is the ordinary rule: parties must know the terms of the agreement they sign, and a failure to read does not release them. An Indiana decision stating the rule also recognized its limit, because one who employs misrepresentation to induce a party’s obligation cannot bind the party to the terms of the agreement.41 That court found the defendant’s express misrepresentations alone enough to support actual fraud and did not reach a further argument. The limit follows from what the duty to read assumes. The duty puts the risk of misunderstanding on the signer on the premise that the document is what it appears to be. A party who knows the signer misunderstands the document, and says nothing, has turned that premise into a trap, because the signer’s failure to check is exactly what the silent party is counting on. A duty to disclose restores the premise at the cost of one sentence from the only person who knows a correction is needed.
The contrast case is the signer who read and understood the writing. A person who has read and understood a clause disclaiming representations is bound by it, and the clause is inconsistent with a claim of reliance on oral statements that contradict it.42 Section 161(c) protects the signer who did not understand, and whom the other side knew did not.
In Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed silence of this kind. The sellers trusted the buyer to revise the written drafts so that they matched the parties’ oral agreement, and the buyer inserted a term that departed from it. The sellers skimmed the documents and signed. The court held that the buyer’s silence about the change was equitable fraud, and it did not let the sellers’ failure to read carefully defeat the claim. A related wrong is to read a proposed contract aloud while leaving out portions, which the decisions treat as a half-truth that misrepresents the document.43
The knowledge requirement sorts cases the same way when nothing was concealed. A party who delivers an accurate document, unaware that the signer holds some mistaken belief about it, has no known mistake to correct, and the signer’s failure to read remains the signer’s risk.
Two later parts of this chapter build on this subsection. Section 161(c) concerns a signer who knows the document is an agreement but is wrong about its contents or effect. A signer deceived about the character or essential terms of the document itself, with no reasonable opportunity to learn them, falls under § 163, where the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent at all.44 And the section on reformation for fraud addresses how a court may correct a writing that misstates the agreement instead of merely releasing the victim from it.
Trust and Confidence
Section 161(d) treats silence as an assertion where the silent party knows a fact that the other person is entitled to know because of a relation of trust and confidence between them.46 The first three situations depend on events in the bargaining: a statement that has gone stale, a mistake the silent party recognized, a document misunderstood. Subsection (d) depends instead on what the parties are to each other, and it asks only whether the relationship entitled one of them to the information.
The reason for the category lies in the reason for the default it modifies. The no-duty default tolerates silence because arm’s-length parties are expected to inspect, ask questions, and bargain for themselves. A person who has placed trust in another has set that self-protection aside because the other invited the reliance. If the trusted party could stay quiet, the confidence it invited would become the means of taking advantage of the person who gave it. Securities law shows the same logic. The case of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, as Chiarella v. United States describes it, recognized that a bank acting merely as transfer agent would have owed no duty of disclosure. But the bank had also assumed a duty to act for the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had relied on its personnel. Because the bank’s officers carried a responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market makers inducing the sellers to sell without disclosing the more favorable non-Indian market.47
There are two routes into the category, and they differ in how the relationship is proved. Some relationships are fiduciary as a matter of law: principal and agent, guardian and ward, executor and estate beneficiary, trustee and beneficiary, attorney and client, physician and patient, majority and minority stockholder, and the like. Certain kinds of contracts carry the same duty, including suretyship or guaranty, insurance, partnership, and joint venture.48 Other relationships become confidential on the facts. A confidential relationship arises where one person does not look out for her own interests because she justifiably places trust and confidence in the judgment of the other.49 Close family relations are the most common example, and the duty can reach even the parties to a pre-nuptial agreement; more broadly, a duty of disclosure arises whenever one party justifiably believes the other is looking out for that party’s interests.50 Family ties tend to qualify because reliance commonly accompanies them, and the reliance carries the weight.
A fiduciary who deals with the person who trusts it takes on more than a duty to speak, because the terms must also be fair and fully explained. In Miller v. Sears, a client was allowed to rescind a sale of property to the client’s own attorney because the attorney could not show that all material terms had been fully disclosed.
When a fiduciary or confidential party fails to disclose, the claim is often called constructive fraud. The law uses the word constructive when a situation does not meet a particular legal test but is treated the same way anyway.51 Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship that induces the other’s justifiable reliance to that party’s prejudice.52 If the obligated party withholds relevant facts and a contract follows, the protected party has a defense to enforcement of any disadvantageous contract.53 Under § 161(d) the silence is still treated as an assertion, so inducement and justified reliance remain part of the analysis.
The category has limits, because many close or long-standing dealings involve no relation of trust. In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, an employee alleged constructive fraud based on a confidential relationship with the employer. The court held that no presumption of such a relationship arises from the bare fact of employment and that additional ties must be shown. The absence is especially clear when the parties are negotiating to end their relationship, because each side is then expected to look after its own interests.54 Friendship stands in the same position: in Arko v. Cirou, a lender’s close personal relationship with its borrowers did not create a confidential relationship. Ordinary commercial dealings are arm’s length too. In Grisham v. Philip Morris, Inc., the court found no fiduciary relationship between a smoker and a tobacco company, because “commercial, arms-length relationships are not fiduciary relationships.”55 In each of these the premise behind the no-duty default survives, since each side kept the job of protecting itself. The same silence may still be actionable under subsections (a) through (c) or as concealment, but it cannot breach subsection (d).