Concept
Working a Misunderstanding Problem
Misunderstanding
Working a Misunderstanding Problem
A misunderstanding problem comes out right when you work it in a fixed order: three screening questions, then one question that decides the case. Section 20 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets that order. Under §20, there is no mutual assent when the parties attach materially different meanings and stand on equal footing toward the confusion, but the manifestations operate according to one party's meaning when the parties stand unequally.1 What each party knew or had reason to know of the other's meaning determines which footing they are on.
The three screening questions come first, and each one closes a different exit from §20:
- Is the language reasonably open to more than one meaning? If a reasonable reader would see only one, the objective test supplies it. Interpretation looks to what the parties reasonably appeared to intend, and the party with the more reasonable understanding prevails.2
- Did each party in fact attach a different meaning? If both attached the same one, that shared meaning governs, even if a reasonable person would read the words differently.3
- Does the difference matter? Section 20 reaches only materially different meanings, so a trivial divergence leaves the contract standing.4
Only a problem that clears all three reaches the question that decides it.
Joyner v. Adams clears all three on one lease amendment. The parties disputed what completed development of the leased lots meant under a rent escalation provision. The plaintiff read it to require construction of buildings, and the defendant read it to require only that water and sewer lines be in. The defendant argued that his reading was the only reasonable one, but the court rejected that argument, because the law of the case was that the amendment was ambiguous and open to more than one reasonable meaning even when read with the base lease.5 Each side had attached its own meaning, and the choice between them decided whether the rent would be recomputed backward, so the difference went to the money at stake.
Passing the screens still did not decide Joyner, and the reason is the center of the method. The trial court had awarded judgment to the plaintiff without finding what either side knew about the other's meaning. The court of appeals sent the case back and explained that a determination whether either or both parties knew or had reason to know of the other's meaning is essential in almost every case in which a court finds a lack of mutual assent.6 The answer to that question maps onto the result:
- If neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning the other attached, no contract forms.7
- If each party knows or has reason to know the meaning the other attached, no contract forms either.8
- If one party has no notice of the other's meaning and the other knows it, the meaning of the party without notice governs.9
- The result is the same if the other party merely has reason to know the first party's meaning.10
Each outcome carries a different legal consequence, and each depends on what was said, written, and understood during the negotiations. Knowledge is therefore a fact question that a trial court must resolve before the law can be applied.
The instruction on remand states both poles. If the trial court found that the defendant knew or had reason to know what the plaintiff meant while the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know the defendant's meaning, there was a contract on the plaintiff's meaning, and otherwise her claim failed.11 On remand the trial court found that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to know the plaintiff's meaning, and the court of appeals affirmed.12 The support for that finding came from the negotiations. The plaintiff dealt through her husband-attorney and several accountants, nothing in the record showed that they conveyed her reading to the defendant, and the defendant had flatly rejected a proposal to write completed-building language into the agreement.13 A party cannot be on notice of a meaning that was never communicated and that the dealings pointed away from. The decisive facts in any problem sit in this record of who told whom what.
The first trial court had reached for a shortcut in place of those findings. It awarded judgment to the plaintiff under the rule that ambiguity is construed against the drafter, and the court of appeals held that this was error.14 The rule operates as a rule of legal effect and is not a method of ascertaining the meanings the parties attached. It rests on a presumption that the drafter was better placed to protect his own interests, to foresee uncertainties, and sometimes to leave a meaning obscure.15 That presumption fits adhesion contracts and deals between parties of unequal bargaining power. It has no footing where, as in Joyner, both sides were experienced, bargained from equal positions through a protracted negotiation in which this very provision drew scrutiny, and the record did not show that the defendant rather than the plaintiff chose the words.16 Section 20 asks about knowledge and the drafter rule asks about authorship, so substituting one for the other skips the inquiry that decides the case.
Courts also approach the last step with a reluctance to end the analysis by finding that no contract formed. The choice is wider than picking one party's meaning. The manifested intention each party should reasonably have understood may differ from the detailed private account either one offers.17 After performance a court may even enforce terms that neither party intended, because finding that no contract formed would come much too late.18 No contract is therefore the answer for the true residue of cases, in which each party's reading is entirely reasonable, nothing favors one over the other, and the parties are equally blameless for the confusion. In Raffles v. Wichelhaus the shipping name could not be settled by recourse to its most reasonable meaning. The treatise's poodle variation makes the same point: Raffles' owner may be faulted for his wording, but not for failing to anticipate that two lost black poodles in the neighborhood answered to the same name.19 A problem that supplies a clearly more reasonable reading, or a clearly innocent party, should be resolved toward a contract.
The baseball card dispute makes a good open problem because its reported facts stop where the knowledge inquiry begins. Bryan Wrzesinski, a twelve-year-old who owned some 40,000 baseball cards, bought a 1968 Nolan Ryan and Jerry Koosman rookie card from a newly opened store, where the price was marked 1200/. An inexperienced clerk read the figure as $12.00 and took that amount. The proprietor, Joe Irmen, said the card was offered at $1,200, a price in line with its market value, and asked for it back.20 The case settled just before the judge's decision, with the card to be sold at auction for charity, so no court resolved it.21 The three screens seem to be answered on those facts: the mark can be read as $12.00 or $1,200, two people held those different readings, and a hundredfold gap in price is as material as a difference can be. What the facts leave open is knowledge. The needed proof concerns what a young but experienced collector knew or had reason to know about the card's market value and about what the marking meant, including whether he saw the tag, whether he noticed the clerk's misreading, and what was said at the counter. Experience with a large collection may have told him that $12.00 was far below market, although his youth may cut the other way. If the buyer was on notice that the tag meant $1,200 and nothing put the store on notice of a different reading by him, the store's meaning would govern. If neither side was on notice, or both were, no contract would form. The same facts can also be analyzed as a mistake, a doctrine the later sections of this chapter distinguish from misunderstanding.