Concept
When One Meaning Prevails
Misunderstanding
When One Meaning Prevails
The two cases in the last section share a feature: the parties stood on equal footing. Neither knew how the other read the words, or both did, and in either case nothing favored one meaning over the other, so no contract formed.1 Section 20(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts covers the unequal case. The parties' manifestations operate according to the meaning one party attached to them if that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other and the other knows the first party's meaning, or if the first party has no reason to know of any different meaning and the other has reason to know the first party's meaning.2 The two branches are built alike. They differ only in how firmly the second party is put on notice: by actual knowledge in clause (a), by reason to know in clause (b).
Fault explains why an imbalance in knowledge can pick a winner where equal knowledge could not. Under Corbin's approach, when the parties' meanings differ, a court can weigh relative fault and apply the meaning of the party less to blame for the difference.3 Knowledge measures blame. A party who knows how the other reads a term can clear up the difference with a question, while a party with no hint of another reading has nothing to ask about.
The objective test sets the baseline. Holmes defended the external approach on the ground that a speaker should expect his words to be understood in accordance with their normal usage.4 A party who knew more than the words showed cannot take shelter in that baseline. When Party A knows that Party B misspoke or did not intend what she appeared to say, A cannot retreat behind the objective rule to identify B's intent, because A knew more than would appear to a reasonable person.5
Actual Knowledge
Clause (a) of § 20(2) gives the clearest case. One party's meaning controls when that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other party knows the first party's meaning.6 The rule operates only after the threshold conditions are met: the language is open to more than one reasonable meaning, each party in fact attached a different meaning, and the difference is material.
Each half of the condition concerns one party. The favored party must be innocent: it took the words in one sense and received no signal of any other. The other party must actually know the favored party's meaning, from something it was told, read, or saw. Failing to look is not knowing; that case belongs to the next section.
The innocent party wins because the knowing party was the only one positioned to expose the problem, and one sentence before the deal would have done it. If a party could stay silent about a divergence it knew of and later cite the ambiguity to escape the deal, silence would be a free option. Binding the knowing party to the innocent party's meaning removes that option. The reasoning is the same as in the objective-rule exception above: a party with inside knowledge knows more than a reasonable observer would.
A piano sale shows the rule on small facts. The seller writes $500 in the agreement with Alice, who reads the figure as $300. The seller knows how Alice reads it. Alice has no idea the seller means $500. Alice's meaning prevails, and the price is $300.7
The same single fact would have changed Raffles v. Wichelhaus, where the parties were thinking of different ships. Had the buyers actually known that the seller was thinking of the December Peerless, the seller's meaning would have prevailed.8 Only one fact separates the piano seller's position from the both-know case of the last section: whether Alice, too, knew what the seller meant. Had she known the seller meant $500, each party would have known the other's meaning, § 20(1)(b) would apply, and no contract would form.9 The seller's silence counts against the seller only because Alice was innocent.
Knowledge is a fact to be proved, and the exporter's email is the kind of fact that proves it. Without the email, a court would have to ask whether the exporter should have realized how the yard prices, which is the reason-to-know question taken up next. On a fact pattern, test the halves separately. First ask whether the favored party had any awareness of a different meaning. Then ask whether the other party actually knew the favored party's meaning. A no to the first question and a yes to the second produces a contract on the innocent party's meaning, and a yes to both leaves no contract.10
Reason to Know
Clause (b) of § 20(2) extends the rule to a party who should have known but did not. One party's meaning controls if that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other has reason to know the first party's meaning.12 The structure, the threshold conditions, and the logic of fault carry over unchanged. Only the strength of the notice differs.
Reason to know is an objective standard. It asks what the information the party actually had would have told a reasonable person, so a party who held the relevant facts but never drew the obvious inference is on notice. The objective standard keeps a party from escaping by not looking closely, and it spares the innocent party the task of proving what went on in the other's head. It also gives parties a reason to speak: when the facts would alert a reasonable person to the other side's meaning, one question ends the confusion, and the cost of not asking falls on the party who should have asked.
Two consequences follow. Everything in the actual-knowledge cases survives, because a party who actually knows is on notice, and clause (b) adds the cases where proof of awareness falls short. And the inquiry runs both ways. The favored party must itself lack reason to know of the other's meaning. If it had reason to know, each party was on notice, § 20(1)(b) applies, and no contract forms.13 The piano sale shows the pairing. The seller's position is the same whether the seller knew or merely had reason to know how Alice read the price, provided Alice had no reason to know the seller meant $500; in that event Alice's meaning of $300 prevails.14
Notice comes from circumstances: an unusual price, a history of prior dealings, the presence of other bids. A garbled price is the cleanest test, because the question is how far the figure strayed from anything the circumstances made plausible.
Ambiguity opens the question but does not answer it. In one lease dispute, the defendant argued that, read with the Base Lease, his interpretation was the only reasonable reading of the rent escalation provision. The court had already rejected that argument, and the law of the case was that the amendment's language was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning even when read with the Base Lease.15 That ruling clears the threshold. Which meaning governs, if either does, still depends on what each side knew or had reason to know. A party who wants its own reading enforced must therefore point to something said, done, or apparent in the dealings that put the other side on notice.