Concept
When No Contract Forms
Misunderstanding
When No Contract Forms
A material misunderstanding can end in one of two ways, and the first is that no contract forms. Section 20(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts withholds mutual assent when the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and either of two conditions holds.1 Either neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning the other attached, or each party knows or has reason to know it.2 The earlier sections described what opens the rule: language that bears more than one reasonable meaning, a different meaning actually held by each party, and a difference that goes to something important in the bargain. Fault decides what happens next.
Fault matters because of the way the objective test ordinarily settles a dispute over meaning. The test asks what the parties reasonably appeared to intend, and when their understandings differ, the party with the more reasonable understanding prevails.3 That method works only when one reading can be ranked above the other. Section 20(1) covers the cases in which no ranking is possible, because the parties stand in the same position toward the misunderstanding. They are equally innocent in not reasonably realizing it, or equally guilty in realizing it and saying nothing.4 Neither meaning has the better claim, and a court that picked one would hold a party to a term that party never accepted. When the uncertainty touches a material aspect of the agreement, the only conclusion left is that no contract came into being.5
Both forms put the same question to each party: did this party know, or have reason to know, the meaning the other attached? Actual knowledge is one route to notice. Reason to know is the other, and it matters because a party who failed to realize the difference counts as innocent only if that failure was reasonable.6 Where one party is more accountable than the other for knowing of the misunderstanding, the result reverses and a contract forms on the terms the more innocent party understood.7 That reversal belongs to the next section. This one takes the two symmetrical cases in turn.
Neither Party Knows
The first symmetrical case is mutual innocence. Under § 20(1)(a), the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations, and neither knows or has reason to know the meaning the other attached.8 Raffles v. Wichelhaus is the classic example. A sale of cotton was to arrive on a ship named Peerless, and two ships of that name sailed from Bombay, one in October and one in December. Each party had one of them in mind and had no reason to suspect the other existed. Each was reasonable in believing that the agreement referred to a particular ship, and neither had any reason to know of the other's contrary understanding.9 The report of the case is thin and its doctrinal basis obscure, so it has been read as an outmoded subjectivist decision about minds that failed to meet. It is now widely accepted as the situation in which even the objective approach cannot resolve the misunderstanding.10
The objective test prefers the more reasonable meaning, so it needs a reasonable meaning to find, and here none stands out. No objective criterion shows which ship was intended, and a contract on reasonable terms cannot be established.11 Because the ship determined the date of delivery, a material term, no contract came into being.12 Nothing principled favors either understanding when neither party can be assigned the greater blame. The parties are therefore allowed to abandon the deal without liability.13
A modern price dispute has the same structure. In Konic International Corp. v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc., a Spokane employee sent to look into buying a surge suppressor had heard prices between $50 and $200 from several sellers. A Konic representative then quoted the price as "fifty-six twenty." Konic meant $5,620, but the employee, accustomed to the lower range, heard $56.20. Spokane ordered and installed the unit before the misunderstanding came to light. Each party read the quoted figure reasonably, neither knew or had reason to know the other's reading, and a price lies at the center of any bargain, so the Peerless reasoning applies unchanged.14 No contract was concluded. Konic could not hold Spokane to $5,620, Spokane could not insist on $56.20, and neither could recover from the other for breach.
The pattern is not confined to commerce. A poster offers a reward for the return of a lost black poodle named Raffles. Two lost black poodles of that name turn up in the neighborhood, and Pierre brings in the one the owner did not mean. The objective test holds the owner to the reasonable meaning of the poster's words, but it presupposes that a reasonable meaning can be found. If the court cannot say whose reading is more reasonable, the poster carries a fatal and irresolvable ambiguity.15 The owner may be faulted for his wording, but not for failing to foresee so bizarre a coincidence, so the parties are equally blameless and Pierre is unlikely to collect.16
The phrase reason to know sets the edge of this branch. A party who never actually grasped the other's meaning still falls outside it if the circumstances pointed to that meaning, because innocence requires that the failure to realize the difference be reasonable.17
On the hypothetical's facts, the seller is the more innocent party, so a contract would form on the seller's understanding.18 On an exam, treat this branch as a two-sided test. Confirm that the meanings differ materially, then ask of each party separately whether the circumstances gave that party any reason to know the other's meaning. Only when both answers are no does the rule leave the parties without a contract.
Both Parties Know
The second symmetrical case is mutual notice. Under § 20(1)(b), when the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations, there is no mutual assent if each party knows, or each party has reason to know, the meaning the other attached.20 The parties' subjective awareness therefore matters here as it does in the neither-knows case, and no contract should be found when each knew or had reason to know of the different meanings the other intended.21
This branch mirrors the neither-knows case. There, nothing signaled to either party that the other read the words differently. Here each party had the knowledge, or the information that would lead a reasonable person to it, and the difference went uncorrected anyway. The parties are equally guilty in realizing the misunderstanding but saying nothing.22 Holding either one to the other's meaning would reward whichever party happened to gain from a silence both kept, and would penalize the other for doing exactly the same thing. With no neutral ground for preferring a reading, the law declines to choose.
Rearranging the Peerless facts shows the branch at work. Suppose both parties know that two ships of that name sail from Bombay, each realizes the other may have a different one in mind, and neither raises the question. Both knew or had reason to know of the ambiguity and left it unresolved, so there is no contract.23 The rule requires actual divergence, however. If both parties in fact intended the same ship, there is a contract for that ship.24 The event is an unlikely one, since parties who both notice a gap in a term usually close it before signing, and that is why this branch seldom decides a litigated case.
Symmetry produces the result, and a change in the facts breaks it. If only one side is on notice, § 20(2) turns the analysis the other way. One party's meaning governs when that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party.25 The party without notice holds the more innocent understanding, and the contract forms on those terms.26 On an exam, the both-know branch appears when each party is aware that a term can be read two ways and is on notice of the other's likely reading. That shared awareness does not justify enforcing either side's meaning, because neither party is the more at fault.