Concept
Materially Different Meanings
Misunderstanding
Materially Different Meanings
Section 20(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts opens with a condition that governs everything after it: there is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations.1 The rule then turns to what each party knew or had reason to know, but those questions arise only after the opening condition is met. A student who jumps straight to knowledge and fault will apply § 20 to disputes that the objective test would have settled on its own.
The paradigm is Raffles v. Wichelhaus. A seller agreed to deliver 125 bales of Surat cotton arriving from Bombay on a ship called the Peerless.2 Two ships of that name sailed from Bombay, one in October and one in December.3 The buyers pleaded that they had meant the October ship, and the seller offered cotton that arrived on the other.4 The seller demurred, so the court assumed the facts most favorable to the buyers and asked only whether their defense was legally sufficient. The court's decision is a single line declaring per curiam that it was. The rest of the report consists of exchanges between lawyers and judges during oral argument, so the case serves better as a vehicle for the doctrine than as a source of reasoning.5
What the case stands for is a three-part test. A misunderstanding defeats a contract only when all three conditions coincide:
- The contract is ambiguous, meaning reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.
- The parties actually had different interpretations of the language in mind.
- The misunderstanding is material, meaning important.6
When all three are satisfied, the contract is unenforceable. The law declines to enforce it because, if neither party can be assigned the greater blame for the misunderstanding, there is no nonarbitrary basis for deciding whose understanding to enforce, and the parties may abandon the contract without liability.7
Each condition shuts a different route to saving the deal. Words with one reasonable reading carry that reading, whatever a party privately thought. If both parties actually meant the same thing, that shared meaning governs.8 And a difference that does not matter fails the third condition. Only when all three coincide does the doctrine release the parties.
Ambiguous Language
In the Raffles formulation, the contract must be ambiguous, meaning reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.9 The word reasonably carries the weight. If the language has a single reasonable reading, the objective test supplies it, a party's different private understanding changes nothing, and no § 20 problem exists however sharply the parties later disagree. A party also cannot manufacture ambiguity with a strained second reading, because the question is whether a reasonable reader of the contract could have gone either way.
Contract law separates two interpretive problems, and only one of them opens the door to § 20. Interpretation is the activity of finding the meaning of words. A term is ambiguous when it has more than one meaning and the task is to find which one the parties intended: in “This feather is light,” the word could describe weight or shade. A term is vague when the question is whether it applies beyond its clear core. A white feather is plainly light and a black one plainly is not, but no one can say how dark a gray feather must be before it stops counting.10
A contract for eviscerated “chicken” shows the ambiguity that matters. The term could mean fryers, stewing hens, or perhaps some other category, and it is ambiguous because it is subject to two distinct meanings and there is no satisfactory way to resolve to which meaning it refers. If the buyer subjectively intends fryers, the seller subjectively intends stewing hens, and neither knew nor had reason to know of the other's meaning, the contract may be unenforceable.11
Ordinary goods show the same contrast. A gross of red ball-point pens is ambiguous, because “red” may describe the ink or the barrel, and each is a complete and different meaning. A gross of red T-shirts is only vague, because “red” names a family of shades and the dispute is over how far the family extends. A buyer who expects scarlet and receives crimson is quarreling about the edge of a meaning both sides share, which is an ordinary interpretation problem and not a misunderstanding.
Genuine ambiguity leaves the objective test with nothing to work on. When two distinct meanings compete and nothing in the contract chooses between them, there is no objective criterion for deciding which one was intended.12
In Raffles the ambiguity was latent. Nothing on the face of the words named two ships. The problem arose because two ships called Peerless existed, and a reasonable person reading the contract would not have known which one was its subject.13 The buyers' lawyer made exactly that argument, urging that the two ships created a latent ambiguity and that the court should admit evidence showing the seller and the buyers were thinking of different ships.14
The two ships exist in Raffles too. What differs is whether the words leave them competing. Ambiguity is therefore judged by reading the contract as a whole, and a word that looks ambiguous standing alone may be settled by the terms around it. On an exam, a party who asserts a different private meaning has not yet shown ambiguity. The question is whether a reasonable reader could have gone either way.
Actually Different Meanings
Ambiguity shows only that a term is open to two readings; the second condition asks whether the parties in fact adopted different ones.16 The verb in § 20(1) describes a fact about the parties themselves, and the rule operates only when each party attached a meaning that differs from the other's.
In Raffles the contract was ambiguous because two ships sailed under the name Peerless, and on the facts most favorable to the buyers the parties actually were thinking of different ships.17 Because the seller's demurrer admitted the buyers' facts, the court assumed the divergence and never had to find it. At a trial, the divergence would be a fact for the evidence to establish. That is why this condition stands apart from ambiguity: the two ships existed whether or not anyone had either one in mind.
This requirement is where a party's private meaning re-enters a system that otherwise ignores it. Objective interpretation ordinarily gives words their reasonable meaning even when a party meant something else.18 Section 20, by contrast, asks what each party knew or had reason to know about the other's meaning, and no one can answer that without first finding what meaning each party held. Private meaning therefore enters the doctrine as evidence of a fact: what each party understood when the deal was made.
The same inquiry cuts the other way when the evidence shows that the parties meant the same thing. If both parties intend a particular meaning, contract law enforces it even if it contradicts the objective interpretation of the language.19 Recall the piano sale: if the evidence that both parties meant $300 survives the parol evidence rule, the contract means $300, even though $500 means $500 to a reasonable reader.20 Section 201(1) of the Restatement (Second) gives a shared meaning the same effect, and courts applying it, as in TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co., treat the parties' mutual understanding as controlling even when it differs from a reasonable person's reading.21
A contract for the Peerless shows how little the ambiguity matters once the meanings match. If both parties subjectively intended the same ship, there is a contract for that ship.22 If the parties meant the same ship, the contract rests on that meaning; if they understood the name differently, the court can weigh relative fault.23 A single fact separates that case from Raffles, and it changes the analysis entirely: matching meanings produce a contract, and divergent meanings send the court to the questions of knowledge and fault.
Proving what a party actually meant is a matter of evidence. Where it is unclear which barn a party meant to have torn down, the most direct way to find out is to ask that party. Other evidence then bears on the court's assessment of the party's truthfulness, such as a conversation in which the party described plans to a third person.24 Trade usage can serve a similar purpose. In one dispute over whether a lot was “developed,” the defendant showed that in the local real estate market a lot counts as developed when water and sewer lines are installed and the lot is otherwise ready for construction, and he established that he was an experienced commercial real estate developer.25
Courts seldom see a dispute in which the parties truly held different private meanings, or in which both held the same unusual one. In the usual litigated case, each party tries to prove that her own reading is the reasonable one.26 That dispute calls for ordinary interpretation. The misunderstanding doctrine applies only when the evidence shows that the parties' actual meanings diverged.
On an exam, a fact pattern that gives a term two possible readings and a party who now claims the other reading has established only the first condition. Ask next what the evidence shows each party meant when the deal was made. Matching meanings end the inquiry in favor of a contract on that meaning; divergent meanings send the analysis to the knowledge questions.
Materiality of the Difference
The adverb in § 20(1) supplies the third condition: the parties must attach materially different meanings.28 The Raffles test says the same thing in different words, requiring that the misunderstanding be material, meaning important.29 The first two conditions establish that a difference exists, because the language can be read two ways and each party in fact read it differently. Materiality asks whether that difference is important enough to keep the parties from having agreed at all.
The consequence explains the filter. When all three conditions are met, the contract is unenforceable and the parties may walk away without liability.30 A court that skipped the materiality question would let any verbal mismatch, however trivial, produce that result.
Raffles supplies the example. One Peerless sailed in October and the other in December, so the misunderstanding was material.31 The conclusion that no contract formed rests on that point. As one analysis puts it, each party was reasonable in believing the agreement referred to a particular ship, and neither had reason to know of the other's contrary understanding. There was no objective criterion for deciding which ship was intended, and, assuming the date of delivery was a material term, no contract came into being.32 That passage shows the conditions working together: reasonable but divergent beliefs, no reason to know of the other's meaning, and a material term. The next sections take up the knowledge questions.
Because the test asks whether the difference is important, the answer depends on what the disputed term does in the particular deal.
The ambiguity and the divergent pictures are the same here as in Raffles. The October and December sailings are what made that case material, and their absence is what leaves this deal standing.
On an exam, once the facts supply an ambiguous term and divergent meanings, ask what the disputed term does in the deal. A difference that bears on something important to the exchange, such as the delivery date in Raffles, is material. A difference that leaves each side's performance, timing, and price unchanged is not, and the contract stands. Tie the conclusion to the commercial facts the problem gives you.