Concept
Objective Assent and Its Limits
Misunderstanding
Misunderstanding and Mutual Assent
Objective Assent and Its Limits
Contract law decides whether a party assented, and to what, by asking what a reasonable person in the other party's position would take that party's words and conduct to mean. That is the objective theory of assent, and under it a party's private, unexpressed intent ordinarily changes nothing.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 marks the narrow place where this baseline gives way: the parties use the same words, each attaches a different meaning to them, and the question becomes whose meaning, if anyone's, the words carry.2
The facts of Lucy v. Zehmer are the classic illustration of how far the objective theory reaches, and a simplified hypothetical in that mold makes the point. A landowner scribbles an offer to sell farmland on a napkin during a friendly drink, and a neighbor accepts. Nothing in the setting signals a joke, but the landowner later says the napkin was one. A reasonable person in the neighbor's position would have understood the offer as sincere, so a contract formed despite the landowner's private intent.3 Judge Learned Hand put the point with an image: even if twenty bishops testified that a party meant something other than the usual meaning of the words, the party would still be held to the usual meaning.4
The rule rests on enforceability, fairness, and reliance. Holmes, who attacked the subjective theory in his 1881 lectures on the common law, defended the external approach on two grounds: the subjective approach made contracts too hard to enforce, and the external approach is fair because a speaker should expect words to be understood according to their normal usage.5 Reliance supplied a third. Earlier courts had required a real "meeting of the minds," meaning that the parties' subjective intent had to coincide. Around the classical period, however, the law emphasized protecting the reliance interest, moved away from subjective agreement, and applied the objective test strictly. If agreement was apparent from the manifestations of assent, reasonably interpreted, a contract formed on the terms those manifestations reflected.6
The objective theory yields in two situations, and the first is the simpler: the parties actually shared a meaning. When a court finds that both parties held the same understanding at the time they made the agreement, that understanding determines their rights, even if it contradicts what a reasonable outsider would read in the words.7 The objective test protects a party who reasonably relies on how words appear, and when both parties attached the same meaning, no one relied on a different one.
The second situation runs the other way. The usual rule that private meaning is irrelevant has an exception when one party knew or should have known the other's true intent. That party holds inside information and is not the reasonable observer the objective test protects.8 Helga and Jade have long joked that "I totally agree" actually expresses disagreement. At a company picnic, Helga offers $400 for Jade's diamond ring, and Jade, with witnesses present, says "I totally agree." Because Helga knew what Jade really meant, Helga cannot rely on the objective reading, and no contract forms.9 The difference from the napkin case is the acceptor's knowledge. The napkin acceptor had only the appearance of sincerity to go on, while Helga had the key to the joke.
A harder case arises when the words reasonably bear two meanings, each party holds a different one, and neither knows what the other has in mind. 10Raffles v. Wichelhaus is the standard example. Two merchants contracted for cotton to arrive "ex Peerless from Bombay," and two ships named Peerless were sailing from Bombay, one leaving in October and the other in December. The case is often taught as the prime example of the subjectivist approach, but its principle survives inside the objective framework as Restatement § 20 embodies it. There is no contract, even under the objective test, if the double meaning cannot be settled by recourse to its most reasonable meaning and the parties are equally blameless for the misunderstanding.11 The rationale is that if neither party can be assigned the greater blame, nothing nonarbitrary favors one party's understanding over the other's, so the parties may abandon the contract without liability.12
Section 20 organizes this residue by relative fault. Under subsection (1), where the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations, there is no mutual assent in two situations in which neither party stands better than the other: neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning the other attached, or each party knows or has reason to know it.13 Under subsection (2), one party's meaning controls when that party does not know, or has no reason to know, of the different meaning the other attached, while the other knows, or has reason to know, the first party's meaning.14 Both subsections ask the same question, what each party knew or had reason to know. When neither party carries the greater blame, the parties may walk away, and when one party does, the less culpable party's meaning prevails.15