Concept
Fault and Good Faith
Mutual mistake
Fault and Good Faith
Carelessness rarely costs a mistaken party the remedy; unfair dealing does. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 157 states the rule: a mistaken party's fault in failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract does not bar avoidance or reformation under the rules of this chapter, unless the fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.1
The earlier parts of this chapter asked whether the mistake was shared, basic, and material, and which party bears its risk. Section 157 adds a third question for a claimant who clears those hurdles: did anything about how the claimant came to be mistaken forfeit the remedy? Usually nothing did. The inquiry works as a second gate behind risk allocation, and one court's summary of the rationale shows how the two connect: even though a mistaken party does not bear the risk of a mistake, he may be barred from avoidance if the mistake was the result of his failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.2
Conduct counts at all because mistake relief is equitable. The law of mistake arose in courts of equity, when common law courts were disposed to enforce every bargain without regard to the equities, and it is still applied and interpreted as a matter of equity. Fault, good faith, unconscionability, and general fairness can therefore bear on how a mistake issue is decided, and every general rule in the area gives way to overriding considerations of what is fair under the circumstances.3 The opposite pull is just as real: contracts are made to be performed, and relief from a contract on grounds such as mistake remains the exception.4 Section 157 sits between the two. A claimant who merely overlooked something keeps the remedy; a claimant who dealt unfairly loses it.
Two settings apply the same threshold. The first subsection takes up § 157 and the mistaken party's own fault. The second takes up § 172, which asks whether a recipient's carelessness makes reliance on someone else's statement unjustified.
The Mistaken Party's Fault
Nearly every mistake could have been prevented with more care, and § 157 is built around that fact. A buyer could have ordered the survey, a seller could have had the item appraised, a contractor could have rechecked the figures. If any such lapse forfeited relief, a court could say in almost every case that the claimant should have caught the error, and the doctrine would protect almost no one. The rule therefore leaves the remedy open despite ordinary carelessness and closes it only when the claimant's fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.5
Opinions that use older vocabulary ask instead whether the plaintiff's lack of care amounted to gross negligence or neglect of a legal duty; White v. Berrenda Mesa Water Dist. is an example. The Restatement's test looks to the party's good faith and fair dealing, so a slip that is merely careless, however plain in hindsight, does not by itself defeat relief.
Personal injury releases show how a claimant's knowledge, not carelessness, can decide these cases. An injured party who was unaware of her injuries at all when she signed a release, and who later learns the truth, has had some success avoiding the release on a theory of mutual, material mistake.6 The cases separate her from the claimant who signed knowing that the extent of the harm was uncertain. In Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734 (Wyo. 2001), rescission for mutual mistake was unavailable to an injured party who settled with knowledge that the extent of a closed head injury was uncertain and with the assistance of counsel. In Gibli v. Kadosh, 717 N.Y.S.2d 553 (App. Div. 2000), the court said that, to avoid grave injustice, relief would be available if the plaintiff could show that the injury was of a different nature than both parties believed it to be when they signed the release.7 Kendrick turns on what the claimant knew and accepted at signing, which is closer to the risk-allocation question than to the fault inquiry in this part.
Fault and Justified Reliance
A recipient who relied on a false statement meets the same threshold. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 172 provides that the recipient's fault in not knowing or discovering the facts before making the contract does not make the reliance unjustified unless the fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.9 Section 157 asks whether a mistaken party's carelessness costs that party the remedy; § 172 asks whether a recipient's carelessness defeats the reliance on which the claim rests. A student who holds one rule holds the other.
Reliance would mean little if a recipient had to verify every statement before acting on it, because a speaker could then excuse a false statement by pointing to the recipient's failure to check. The exception answers a different concern: a recipient whose own conduct falls short of good faith and fair dealing has no claim on the protection that ordinary trust receives. The speaker's fault enters the balance as well. The test of justifiable reliance reflects a balance between the fault of the party making the misrepresentation and the reasonable expectations of the victim, so the less culpable the speaker, the stronger the showing required of the statement's importance and of the victim's reasonable reliance.10
Land sales show the default at work. A seller's defense that the buyer failed to exercise due care is disallowed where the seller made a reckless or knowing misrepresentation. The defense is typically allowed if the buyer's fault was so negligent that it amounted to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. In general, then, a purchaser of land may rely on the seller's material representations and need not ascertain whether they are true; see, e.g., Boyle v. McGlynn, 814 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2006). The same principle applies to agricultural land bought with plans for a development that could be considered a nuisance.11
Insurance applications show the threshold at work when the incorrect information comes from the party seeking coverage. The more common approach entitles an insurer to relief when it proves that the information was incorrect, that it was important either to the insurer's decision to insure or to the terms of the contract, and that the insurer in fact relied on it.12 Some authority also requires the insurer to prove an intent to deceive, but the common test contains no such element, so an honest but incorrect answer can satisfy it.13 When the applicant did not know the answer was wrong, both parties share a mistaken premise about a fact the policy rests on, and the insurer's own conduct in the transaction remains part of the equities a court weighs.14
A nonfraudulent misrepresentation also faces an obstacle that fraud does not. An exception to the parol evidence rule allows parol evidence to show fraud, but parol evidence relating to a nonfraudulent misrepresentation is excluded if the writing is integrated or the term is inconsistent with a partially integrated writing.15
Legislatures sometimes step in where general doctrine fits a recurring problem badly. Recognizing the difficulty of applying the U.C.C.'s warranty and disclaimer provisions to art fraud, some states have enacted laws dealing specifically with art warranties, and in 1966 the New York legislature approved a bill providing that an art merchant who sells a work to a nonmerchant buyer creates an express warranty if, in describing the work, the merchant identifies it with an author or authorship.16 Where a statute governs, a court reads the statute's own terms and scope rather than applying the general doctrine unaided.17